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Brief elaboration of post war socio-economic policy-making in the Netherlands 
 
Corporatism as a government strategy to restore or create consensus under the 
conditions of relative autonomy and mutual instrumentalisation of the actors involved, 
can only be expected to function, if at all, under precisely these circumstances, that is, 
relative autonomy and mutual instrumentalisation. In order to argue that the period  
after1965 in the post-war history of Dutch incomes policy best satisfies these 
requirements, I will give a brief sketch of both the relevant organisations and the history 
of Dutch incomes policy since 1945.  
Post war Dutch incomes policy is usually described as a transition from a centrally 
guided, statutory incomes policy by the government to a formally free incomes policy, 
that is, free from government intervention (Fernhout 1980: 151-153, 155; Windmuller 
and De Galan 1977: 2, 26-27; Dercksen et al 1982: 122-126; de Liagre Böhl et al 
1981: 106-109; Fortuyn 1981: 325-329, 373-424; van Ruysseveldt and Visser 1996: 
211-214; see also van Waarden 2003). 
There are three main periods in Dutch incomes policy after 1945: 
- 1945-1963, guided and differentiated statutory incomes policy; 
- 1963-1968/70, transition to a formally free incomes policy; 
- 1968/70 - present, a formally free incomes policy. 
In the period between 1945 and 1963, the Minister of Social Affairs determines 
incomes policy, after recommendations from the Foundation of Labour (STAR – 
Stichting van de Arbeid). It is also the Minister who formulates the guidelines, which 
the College van Rijksbemiddelaars has to apply when they check collective contracts 
between employers and unions (Fernhout 1980: 143; Windmuller and De Galan 1977, 
Vol. 2: 16-21; Fase 1980: 47-51). The Social and Economic Council (SER – Sociaal 
Economische Raad)usually confines itself  “to recommendations concerning social 
security, terms of employment, labour legislation and the main issues of wage policy, if 
they were specifically asked” to give a recommendation (Windmuller and De Galan 
1977, Vol. 2: 29 - translation jjw). The participation of interest groups in government 
policy in this period, confined to social issues, is restricted to non-binding 
recommendation with regard to policy formation, and to implementing government 
policy. Government and parliament (the political parties heading the various pillars) 
remain the dominant actors and determine the agenda. Interest groups are not meant to 
take on government tasks (except in the execution of government policy), nor are they 
invited to determine policies themselves. In the institutionalised relation between 
government and interest groups in the area of socio-economic policy, it is the 
government (and parliament) that acts, the interest groups re-act (see also: Teulings 
1980: 18; Nobelen 1983: 102 ff). In the last instance it is the 'coercive' or 'statutory 
powers' of the government (Panitch 1979: 142), which keeps the employers' 
organisations and unions together in the implementation of the centrally guided 
statutory incomes policy. 
In other words, the coalition governments of christian democratic and social democratic 
parties in the post-war period both created the framework for macroeconomic planning 
and policy-making, and integrated the relevant socio-economic actors in that framework 
‘top-down’. It is clearly party government and parliament that determine the room to 
manoeuvre for the interest groups. 
Between 1963 and 1968/1970, with many conflicts and experiments, the transition from 
statutory incomes policy to a formally free incomes policy takes effect (van Doorn et al 
1976; Windmuller and De Galan 1977; Fase 1980: 300/1, 303-305). The Law on Wage 
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Formation (1968/70) is the political expression of this transition. However, the 
government retains the authority to intervene with a six-month wage freeze.  
Within the union federations major changes occur. The affiliated branch unions become 
more powerful vis-à-vis the central federation. Slowly, negotiations on the branch and 
industry level gain more importance. 
Generally, this period is regarded as a time of polarisation and conflict. Consensus 
within the institutions is on the decline and decentralisation within the union federations 
has resulted in a less co-operative inclination. From the perspective of corporatism as a 
government strategy, however, this period is more interesting than the previous one. 
Unions and employers' organisations take a much more independent stance towards 
each other and towards the government. The government loses its absolute domination 
in the area of wage policy, but still retains the power to intervene if they feel the general 
economic situation calls for intervention. Although party government (and parliament) 
ultimately can still determine the ‘rules’ of the game, the conditions for corporatism as a 
possible government strategy to forge or restore consensus in a situation of both 
autonomy of the actors and mutual instrumentalisation have been shaped (Keman et al 
1985). 
Since 1970 incomes policy is formally free, although the government retains the power 
to intervene. From 1970 tot 1986, the government could intervene with a wage freeze if 
it felt the general economic situation called for intervention. In 1986 the Law on Wage 
Formation is amended. Government intervention in wages in the market sector is then 
only allowed in case of a national emergency, caused by external factors (Korver 
1993: 394). Trade unions and employers’ organisations have now ample room to 
manoeuvre to pursue their interests in the market sector, but in case of an emergency, 
government (and parliament) can still take over. The government’s leading role with 
regard to incomes policy in the (semi-) public sector remains beyond question. The 
ultimate, deciding responsibility for incomes policy, therefore still rests with party 
government and parliament. 
If there was ever a period in which the interactions between government, unions and 
employers' organisations with respect to policy-making could be analysed in terms of a 
neo-corporatist strategy, it is precisely this period. Incomes policy in the market sector 
is free. Interest groups have ample room to manoeuvre, but in case of an emergency 
party government (and parliament) can still take over. Economic problems mount as a 
consequence of the oil shocks in 1973 and 1979/1980. This is precisely the environment 
in which corporatism, as a possible government strategy to restore consensus and foster 
economic growth, will have to prove its worth. Consequently, the research is focused on 
incomes policy after 1965. 
In this period the rules governing the annual incomes policy are such that within the 
market sector trade unions and employers’ organisations are ostensibly free to pursue 
their own agenda’s. However, government can still overrule the outcome (provided 
there is a crisis caused by external factors), and has a leading role with regard to 
incomes policy in the (semi-) public sector and social security legislation. 
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Availability and use of data 
 
In this research project the annual negotiations between trade unions and employers’ 
organisations on wages and other terms of employment, and the matching 
government policies and interventions after 1965 have been studied.  For the trade 
unions and employers’ organisations primary sources include their annual notes with 
which they enter these negotiations. The government’s policies and interventions are 
documented in the annual budget and related government notes and parliamentary 
discussions. All these documents, plus the accompanying actions, are more or less 
extensively reported in the SER Bulletin (SIB – see references), which has served as 
the main source for the research.  
The extent of the SIB’s information on incomes policy varies over the years. Until 
1980, annual negotiations and consultations are extensively reported in the weekly 
Bulletin, as are the government’s corresponding actions and policies. Early 1981, the 
SIB changes from a weekly to a bi-weekly, and in autumn 1982 to a monthly 
Bulletin. These editorial changes are accompanied by a marked decrease in useful 
information on annual negotiations and consultations on incomes policy in 1981, 
1982 and 1983. From 1984, the SIB briefly regains its previous high standard in 
presenting comprehensive information concerning incomes policy. However, in 
1988, 1989 and 1990, there is again a sharp decrease in useful reports on negotiations 
and consultations with regard to annual incomes policy. From 1991 to 1995, the 
reports on annual incomes policy are more extensive and comprehensive again, 
although they do not reach the high standards prevalent before 1981 and between 
1984 and 1988. From 1996, this information becomes more scarce and haphazard. 
And from 2001, SIB reports on the annual negotiations and consultations on incomes 
policy are usually restricted to photoshoots of the participants or interviews about 
their personal evaluation of the atmosphere in which past negotiations took place that 
all sadly lack the answers to common questions like who, what, where, when, how 
much and why? In September 2009 the SIB is renamed in SERmagazine, but this 
change of name has had no positive effect for the information provided. 
For the periods in which the SIB is not a reliable source, additional sources have been 
used, including the annual reports and notes on incomes policy of trade unions and 
employers’ organisations as well as the STAR, the annual government budgets, 
policy agreements (Regeeraccoorden) and government declarations of incoming 
governments, and other relevant information as reported in the records of parliament 
(Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal), and the official 
government gazette (Nederlandse Staatscourant). Regrettably, with the digitalisation 
of the Staatscourant in 2009 the only function that remains is that of official 
government gazette data base. All independent, and very helpful news reports on the 
annual budget are terminated.  
Digitalisation also has had an adverse effect on the content of the annual reports of 
the employers’ and trade union organisations. After 2005 these organisations either 
stop producing annual reports (trade unions) or issue only very short, financial annual 
reports (employers’ organisations). The evaluations of the past year in terms of 
demands and negotiations between social partners and between them and the 
government are terminated or have to be gleaned from their respective websites. 
Newspaper reports on the annual government budget and the reactions of social 
partners after 2005 are much easier accessed in digital format than on paper, but also 
quite often lack in factual content. It seems as if increased digitalisation also 
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increases the efforts needed to get the answers to basic questions like who, what, 
where, when, how much and why? 
The information from the above sources has been supplemented with other sources. 
These include Windmuller et al (1977, 1983), van Doorn et al (1976), Fase (1980), 
STAR (1985), and Akkermans (1999). These sources extensively report the annual 
negotiations between trade unions and employers’ organisations and the matching 
government interventions until 1985. Similar sources for the later period that focus 
specifically and with great detail on these annual negotiations and related government 
interventions do not exist. But Korver (1993), van Bottenburg (1995), STAR (1995), 
van den Toren (1996), van Heertum-Lemmen and Wilthagen (1996), Visser and 
Hemerijck (1997, 1998), Roebroek and Hertogh (1998), Akkermans (1999), Visser 
(1999), Hemerijck and Visser (2000), Hemerijck et al (2000), Hemerijck (2002, 
2003), Slomp (2002), van Waarden (2002, 2003) and Bruggeman and van der 
Houwen (2005) do provide additional information on a number of years. Other 
sources used are referenced in the text. 
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Government strategies and styles of decision-making 
 
Government strategies: 
- I = Passive 
- II = Co-operative 
- III = Congruent 
- IV = Guiding 
 
Styles of decision-making of trade unions and employers’ organisations: 
- A = Confrontation 
- B = Bargaining 
- C = Problem solving 
 
The focus is on both the effects of different government strategies on the styles of 
decision making between trade unions and employers’ organisations, and the effect 
of different styles of decision making between trade unions and employers’ 
organisations on government strategies. 
 
 
Combinations of styles of decision-making of trade unions and employers’ 
organisations 
 
Combinations of styles of 
decision-making 
Classification Resulting combined style 
of decision-making 
AA Both trade unions and 
employers’ organisations 
opt for confrontation 
A = Confrontation 
(Chicken game) 
AB, BA One of the parties opts for 
confrontation, the other for 
bargaining 
A = Confrontation 
(Chicken game) 
AC, CA One of the parties opts for 
confrontation, the other for 
problem solving 
A = Confrontation 
(Chicken game) 
BB Both trade unions and 
employers’ organisations 
opt for bargaining 
B = Bargaining 
(Prisoners’ Dilemma) 
BC, CB One of the parties opts for 
bargaining, the other for 
problem solving  
B = Bargaining 
(Prisoners’ Dilemma) 
CC Both trade unions and 
employers’ organisations 
opt for problem solving 
C =  Problem solving 
(Battle of the Sexes) 
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19651
 
 
For 1965 the government Marijnen (KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD) wants to limit the rise 
of wages to 4-5%, including 1.5% compensation for the rise in social security 
premiums for old age and disability pensions. 
If necessary, the government announces it will intervene in collective contracts 
through the Board of Government Mediators (College van Rijksbemiddelaars). The 
goal of government policy is to redress the slight economic dip by reducing real 
income; maintaining a balanced budget and issuing higher interest rates on credit 
(SIB 36, 1964: 12-15). 
The government gives the trade unions and employers’ organisation a choice between 
various packages: 
- a binding wage measure across the board of 1.5% compensation per 01-01-1965 
for rising social security premiums (old age and widow’s pensions), plus a 
maximum of 3.2% wage increase; 
- a binding wage measure across the board above 1.5% accompanied by a 
correspondingly lower maximum for wage increases; 
- a binding wage measure across the board which prescribes both compensation and 
total wage increase in detail (SIB 47, 1964: 15-18). 
The agendas of trade unions and employers’ organisations are determined by their 
different views on economic prospects. Unions feel that the forecast for 1965 made 
by the Central Planning Bureau (CPB) is too pessimistic, like it was in the previous 
years (SIB 41, 1964: 2, 3). They reject the calculations, based on this forecast, which 
indicate that a wage rise of 2% in real terms is the maximum which can be afforded, 
and prepare for tough negotiations (SIB 38, 1964: 19). The government’s alternative, 
tax reductions instead of wage rises, is rejected. Unions feel that better wages in 1965 
are both desirable and unavoidable. The government’s other proposals, in a letter to 
the Foundation of Labour (STAR), for a small wage rise (in combination with tax 
reductions), are rejected as well. And in response, the unions up their demands (SIB 
48, 1964: 7-9). 
Employers’ organisations refuse to negotiate over these demands (SIB, 39: 1964: 21, 
32; SIB 42, 1964: 6, 7). Their main objection is that wage rises can not be 
incorporated in prices, because government has capped prices. A, in their view, too 
high a rise in wages, as the unions demand, will lead to a deterioration in 
competitiveness of Dutch firms (SIB 48, 1964: 7). Eventually, employers’ 
organisations agree to a (small) general wage rise. Unions, however, want both a 
general wage rise, and to continue negotiations on the branch and company level 
(SIB 44, 1964: 2, 3). 
When the negotiations in the SER and the STAR grind to a halt, the government 
intervenes through the minister of Social Affairs with a new proposal. The proposal 
includes a slightly higher wage rise than in the previous packages (3.5% instead of 
3.2%), a rise of the minimum wage, the possibility of paying special bonuses, and 
extra child allowances for larger families. With this package, the government 
                                            
1 Since 1965, after the so-called ‘wage explosions’ of 1963, 1964 and 1965, the search for a new 
system of wage negotiations is on. The main problems of the existing system are the fact that 
government beforehand determines the maximum allowed wage rise, and also severely limits the 
freedom of negotiations on other issues. Between 1963 and 1968/1970, the system changes from an 
almost completely government led system to a formally free system (van Doorn et al, 1976; 
Windmuller et al1983: 152-161). 
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succeeds in getting the chairmen of the peak organisations to close a deal in informal 
talks. The ‘wage agreement 1965’ (loonakkoord 1965) includes: 
- a wage increase as of January 1st, 1965; 
- an acceptable wage cost increase of 3%; 
- a continuation with wage differentiation in those companies that have applied that 
in 1964 as well; 
- a minimum wage of 110.= guilders per week; 
- the introduction or improvement of wage systems linked to performance; 
- a bonus payment, subject to renewed talks between STAR and government, if and 
when economic growth turns out to be better than expected (SIB 49, 1964: 2-4; 
SIB 50, 1964: 2; STAR 1985: 45, 46).  
To facilitate agreement, government takes over part of the employers’ premiums for 
child allowances (SIB 49, 1964: 2-4). Notwithstanding disagreement over the exact 
contents of this Central Agreement, it is later elaborated in the STAR and, 
reluctantly, accepted by both parties (SIB 50, 1964: 2). Neither party is content with 
the agreement, but, apparently, both parties view it as the best possible result. 
Despite larger wage rises at the branch level than allowed for in the agreed package, 
the STAR approves the collective contracts concluded, without any subsequent 
interference by the government (Windmuller et al 1983: 197). In June 1965 the 
government even authorises the payment of a 2% bonus, which was part of the 
agreed package. 
 
1965 
Government strategy III III 
Trade unions style A B 
Employers’ organisations style A B 
Combined styles social partners A B 
Outcome IIIB 
 
The government actively intervenes in the negotiations by offering various packages 
to trade unions and employers’ organisations. When negotiations bog down in a 
deadlock, it is the government that resolves the deadlock with a new proposal that is 
grudgingly accepted by both parties.
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1966 
 
The agenda of the government Cals (KVP, ARP, PvdA) concerning the wage 
negotiations for 1966 is heavily influenced by the massive evasion of the maximum 
wage rise allowed by the government Marijnen (KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD) in 1965 
(Windmuller et al 1983: 197, 199/200). The government decides to authorise the 
Board of Government Mediators again to check the wage agreements in the 
collective contracts, instead of the STAR. 
During the negotiations for 1966, both trade unions and employers’ organisations 
show a declining willingness to compromise. They have great difficulties with the 
way wages are determined. Consequently, pressure on the government to come up 
with a new system for wage and incomes policy increases (van Doorn et al 1976: 
226-247). 
Trade unions and employers’ organisations fail to reach an agreement on wages in 
the STAR. The main obstacles are the demands of the unions for a wage rise in real 
terms and the level of a minimum wage. Unions demand 125 guilders per week (SIB 
46, 1965: 23; 47, 1965: 17, 18). Employers feel that a minimum wage goes against 
the freedom of wage formation, as it diminishes the flexibility in wage structure in 
companies. Nevertheless, they are willing to agree to a raise amounting to 110 
guilders per week (SIB 46, 1965: 23; SIB 47, 1965: 17-19; SIB 48, 1965: 20). In 
response, unions accuse the employers of taking out their previous defeat on this 
issue on the lowest paid and demand that the government changes the provisional 
legislation on the minimum wage into a proper law (SIB 48, 1965: 24). 
Employers’ organisations and trade unions do reach agreement on other aspects of 
terms of employment: 
- equal pay for men and women (for equal jobs) – the STAR will judge collective 
contracts on this issue; 
- a gradual reduction of working hours without a timetable (the government wanted 
to set July 1st, 1967 as the starting date) (STAR 1985: 46). 
Due to the lack of agreement between unions and employers’ organisations on wages, 
the STAR does not look unfavourable on government intervention with regard to this 
issue. The government then sets the level of the minimum wage on 120 guilders. The 
unions are more content than the employers who warn that this level will have a 
detrimental effect on general wage formation (SIB 50, 1965: 7-10; SIB 2, 1966: 28). 
The government also determines the norm for the maximum allowed wage rise in 
1966: 6 - 7% (SIB 46, 1965: 2). And on the issue of a reduction of working hours, it 
is also the government that takes the decision. 
Despite attempts by the Board of Government Mediators to implement government 
limits in separate collective contracts, these limits are regularly broken. Trade unions 
profit from the demand for labour (SIB 8, 1966: 6, 7; van Doorn et al 1976: 232). 
After several warnings and consultations with trade unions and employers’ 
organisations on a number of collective contracts that had wage rises above the 
prescribed norm, the government intervenes in these contracts through the Board of 
Government Mediators. Halfway 1966 the government toughens its control over 
prices and again declares its determination to strictly enforce the prescribed norm for 
wage rises (SIB 8, 1966: 6 – 7; SIB 9, 1966: 2, 3; SIB 11, 1966: 21; SIB 15, 1966: 
17; SIB 21, 1966: 5 – 8; SIB 23, 1966: 26, 27; STAR 1985: 46, 47). This policy is 
also vigorously enforced by the interim government Zijlstra (KVP, ARP) 
(Windmuller et al 1983: 201; SIB 24, 1966: 22). 
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1966 
Government strategy I III IV 
Trade unions style B B B 
Employers’ organisations style B B B 
Combined styles social partners B B B 
Outcome IVB 
 
As trade unions and employers’ organisations cannot agree on the level of the 
minimum wage, it is the government that breaks the deadlock and fixes that level. 
The amount chosen is between the offer of employers’ organisations and the demand 
of the trade unions. It is also the government that breaks the deadlock on the wage 
rise in real terms, sets the norm for the maximum allowed wage rise, and finally 
enforces that norm in decentral negotiations.
 11 
1967 
 
In 1967 the interim government Zijlstra (KVP, ARP) determines beforehand that 
wage rises should not exceed the expected rise in productivity of 3.5% (SIB 36, 
1966: 11-15; SIB 45, 1966: 7 – 8; SIB 46, 1966: 15 – 16). 
The agreed goals of central negotiations are to achieve a positive balance of 
payments and less inflation, and to maintain employment. Therefore, a limitation or 
reduction of wage costs and prices is necessary. Despite agreement between trade 
unions and employers’ organisations over these goals and means, central negotiations 
break down. The main breaking point is the demand of the trade unions that, apart 
from the general wage rise, remaining (financial) possibilities for better terms of 
employment on the branch and company level may be used for wages in the form of 
a temporarily blocked savings account. On the amount of the general wage rise, an 
agreement was almost reached (SIB 37, 1965: 24, 25; SIB 47, 1966: 17, 18). 
Eventually, government breaks the dead-lock and determines the whole package: 
- a wage rise of 4% in 1967 when collective labour contracts are renewed; 
- 1.5% per 01-07-1967; 
- a rise in the minimum wage; 
- an increase in social security benefits of 5% through indexation beforehand, and 
the remainder afterwards; 
- no reduction in working hours, unless already agreed to in longer term contracts 
(more than one year); 
- no price indexation of wages on 01-07-1967; 
- no capping of the rise in the health care premiums above 6.2% (SIB 48, 1966: 14 
– 15). 
However, all other demands of the trade unions, especially with regard to rising 
prices, taxes and social security premiums were ignored (Windmuller et al 1983: 
201). 
The differences with the original demands of the unions are striking. Although the 
general wage rise is close to their demands, the other conditions imposed by the 
government make it unacceptable for the unions. Firstly, the government does not 
allow any indexation of wages to rising prices afterwards. Secondly, the government 
sets strict limits for total rises in wage costs, which are to be controlled by the STAR. 
In response, the NVV pulls out of the whole incomes policy system and refuses any 
further co-operation. And although employers’ organisations in the first instance 
seem to comply with this part of the government package, the main employers’ 
organisation CSWV later also declines to co-operate (SIB 48, 1966: 15-16, 28; SIB 1, 
1967: 21). 
The government, however, is not moved to further concessions. Because the NVV 
and the CSWV refuses to co-operate and to check the proposed collective contracts 
through the STAR on their concurrence with government policy, all responsibilities 
for wages and related terms of employment are taken from the STAR and placed in 
the hands of the Board of Government Mediators. The Board is instructed to apply 
the government’s policy package across the board. This means that no differentiation 
on the branch level are accepted (SIB 48, 1965: 15, 16; SIB 1, 1967: 21; SIB 6, 1967: 
12; SIB 14, 1967: 15, 16;  van Doorn et al 1976: 243-246).  
 
 
 
 
 12 
 
1967 
Government strategy IV 
Trade unions style B 
Employers’ organisations style B 
Combined styles social partners B 
Outcome IVB 
 
 
The government breaks the deadlock in the negotiations between employers’ 
organisations and trade unions by imposing its own policy package with regard to 
wages and income. In response, trade unions and employers’ organisations refuse 
further co-operation with the government
 13 
1968 
 
In 1968 the government De Jong (KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD) ostensibly leaves the 
negotiations on wages to the trade unions and employers’ organisations. However, 
the government does determine beforehand that wage rises should not exceed the 
expected rise in productivity of 3% (SIB 36, 1967: 2). The government also 
announces its determination to intervene when wage rises in collective contracts 
exceed this norm (SIB 40, 1967: 20). In its consultations with the STAR, however, 
the government retracts on this announcement and agrees to wait for the results of the 
negotiations between trade unions and employers’ organisations (SIB 40, 1967: 21, 
22).  
Trade unions and employers’ organisations at least agree about one thing: both are 
against binding agreements on the central level. If and when parties agree on the 
central level, the government should honour these agreements. The Minister of Social 
Affairs should only intervene if and when collective contracts threaten to destabilise 
the national economy. However, parties again disagree on the issue of the minimum 
wage. Trade unions oppose further differentiation in wages between branches and 
companies and therefore demand a raise of the minimum wage comparable to the 
average wage and price rises. Employers’ organisations do not want to go further 
than a raise comparable to the average wage rise (SIB 38, 1967: 10-12). 
On October 24th, 1967, parties reach an agreement in the STAR about a free incomes 
policy without a Central Agreement, although the agreement does include the 
minimum wage. The agreement stipulates that there is to be no Central Agreement or 
norm, and that the government should only intervene in collective contracts when 
these threaten to seriously disrupt the economy. If and when the Minister of Social 
Affairs intervenes, he/she should first seek advice of an independent Committee of 
Economic Experts in which no civil servants are represented and that can rely on the 
trust of both unions and employers’ organisations. The organisations also reach an 
agreement on the division of payment of rising social security premiums over 
employers and employees (SIB 41, 1967: 4, 5; SIB 2, 1968: 17; SIB 4, 1968: 28, 29). 
The minister of Social Affairs accepts these agreements. However, the government 
increasingly worries about the extent of agreed wage rises and reductions in working 
hours, and, after extensive consultations with the STAR, frequently interferes in 
concluded collective contracts through the Board of Government Mediators (the 
recently appointed Committee of Economic Experts is by-passed), much to the 
resentment of the trade unions. The main focus for intervention is the reduction of 
working hours. Government wants to preserve some room for heavier taxation 
resulting from the introduction of the VAT (SIB 7, 1968: 5, 6; SIB 8, 1968: 15-18; 
SIB 9, 1968: 24; SIB 11, 1968: 24-26; SIB 14, 1968: 22-25; SIB 20, 1968: 24, 25; 
SIB 21, 1968: 9-13). In the end, however, the government does not ratify merely one 
clause about a reduction in working hours in the collective agreement in the building 
trade. And this only after consulting the independent Committee of Economic 
Experts (SIB 43, 1968: 9). 
The government also considers emergency legislation to extend the duration of all 
collective contracts of 1968 into 1969 with six months. A majority in parliament 
opposes these proposals and they are eventually dropped (van Doorn et al 1976: 262; 
SIB 20, 1968: 24 – 25; SIB 21, 1968: 9 – 13; SIB 22, 1968: 9 – 12, 20 – 21). 
Notwithstanding these disagreements, in 1968 also the Bill on the Minimum Wage 
and Minimum Holiday Allowance is passed (SIB: 17, 1968: 28, 29; SIB 18, 1968: 4; 
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SIB 34, 1968: 28 – 29; SIB 37, 1968: 40 – 42). On 23 February 1969 it becomes law 
(SIB 9, 1969: 6). 
 
1968 
Government strategy IV I IV I 
Trade unions style B B B B 
Employers’ organisations style B B B B 
Combined styles social partners B B B B 
Outcome IB 
 
The government starts by setting its own wage norm first, but then agrees to give 
trade unions and employers’ organisations a chance to work out an agreement 
amongst themselves. The government at first accepts the agreement that there will 
not be a binding Central Agreement, but then increasingly intervenes in decentral 
contracts. In the end, however, most interventions are dropped.
 15 
1969 
 
In 1969 the same transitional system of wage negotiations as in 1968 is in force. 
Although wage negotiations are ostensibly free from government intervention, the 
government De Jong (KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD) again states that wage rises should 
not exceed the expected rise in productivity (4%) as far as they did in 1968; and that 
part of those rises should be in the form of special savings accounts that are blocked 
for a number of years. The government also announces it will intervene (again) in 
collective contracts if trade unions and employer’ organisations do not heed the limits 
set by the government (SIB 36, 1968: 12 – 14; SIB 37, 1968: 25 – 33; SIB 43, 1968: 
9).  
In this year also, negotiations are conducted decentrally, on the level of branches and 
companies. Trade unions take a tougher stand than in the previous year (SIB 28, 
1968: 10; SIB 31, 1968: 21, 22; SIB 40, 1968: 9, 10; SIB 41, 1968: 11, 17-19). Partly 
the Bill on Wage Formation put before parliament in September 1968 is to blame. 
And partly because of the decisions by parliament regarding the minimum wage (SIB 
36, 1968: 20). Also, trade unions feel that government policy aims at changing the 
distribution of incomes in favour of company profits. On top of that, the internal 
pressure from individual branch unions on the national federations to take a tougher 
stand also mounts increasingly. 
Employers’ organisations keep fairly quiet. They feel that government policy does 
not go far enough and fear that the proposed growth of the (semi-) public sector will 
lead to shortages of capital and, consequently, to reduced investments. They remain 
set against all forms of wage earner funds and blocked savings accounts (SIB 43, 
1968: 6, 7; SIB 46, 1968: 6, 7). 
The results of the decentralised negotiations widely exceed the government’s wage 
limits (originally a 6.5% rise in wage costs was forecasted for the whole of 1969, but 
already in June it is expected to exceed 11%). Consequently, the government 
repeatedly intervenes in collective contracts. The main issues are the reduction in 
working hours and wage rises that exceed the government’s norms. The government 
prefers some form of a blocked savings account (SIB 2, 1969: 5, 6, 15; SIB 4, 1969: 
2-5; SIB 5, 1969: 16, 17; SIB 20, 1969: 32; SIB 21, 1969: 37; SIB 22, 1969: 12; SIB 
25, 1969: 8, 9; van Doorn et al 1976: 278, 289-292; Windmuller et al 1983: 223). To 
curb inflation (and price compensation in wages), and to accommodate the trade 
unions by compensating policies, the government institutes a temporary (five month) 
price stop (SIB 15, 1969: 16-18; SIB 21, 1969: 13; SIB 24, 1969: 11; SIB 34, 1969: 
22-24; van Doorn et al 1976: 296). 
 
1969 
Government strategy IV I IV 
Trade unions style A A A 
Employers’ organisations style B B B 
Combined style social partners A A A 
Outcome IVA 
 
Trade unions and employers’ organisations conclude decentral contracts that widely 
exceed the government’s proclaimed wage limits. Consequently, government 
repeatedly intervenes in those contracts.
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1970 
 
The government De Jong (KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD) refuses to accommodate the 
trade unions with regard to their demands for wage earner funds 
(vermogensaanwasdeling - VAD) and special savings accounts in which pay rises can 
paid but that are also blocked for a number of years. Notwithstanding the offer by the 
trade unions to lower their wage demands in return. The government also unilaterally 
imposes a threshold in the indexation of wages. On the other hand, the government 
follows the recommendation of the SER that new collective contracts can include a 
maximum wage rise of 5% plus a 1.5% reduction in working hours and postpones 
rises in VAT and rents (SIB 36, 1969: 7-11; MEV 1970: 9). 
Trade unions demand a real rise in wages of 2%, plus concrete government policies 
to combat unemployment and increase the number of houses (SIB 24, 1969: 2; SIB 
36, 1969: 16). Both trade unions and employers’ organisations oppose the rise in 
VAT, because of the consequences for prices. In response, the government not only 
postpones the proposed rise in VAT, but also issues a number of other measures to 
get both parties to exercise moderation with regard to wages. Both the employers’ 
organisations and the government agree that wages may rise some 2.5% in real terms. 
All in all, the differences between parties are minimal as far as wages are concerned 
(SIB 36, 1969: 17). 
Based on the 14th bi-annual report of the SER, a compromise is reached. In return for 
indexation of the expected 2.5-3% wage rise to compensate for price rises, the trade 
unions agree to co-operate in wage moderation (SIB 26, 1969: 2-5; SIB 27, 1969: 
20). Decentral negotiations on the branch and company levels proceed smoothly. The 
government does not interfere in the results in an effort not to worsen relations with 
the trade unions any further. 
Despite the ease with which wage negotiations are concluded, trade unions collide 
head-on with the government on the issue of the Law on Wage Formation, especially 
clause 8. According to this clause, government is entitled to intervene in individual 
collective contracts if and when it deems this necessary. When the Bill is eventually 
passed, NVV and NKV boycott wage negotiations on the central level in both the 
SER and the STAR (Windmuller et al 1983: 223 ff.; SIB 38, 1969: 12, 13; SIB 38, 
1969: 18-20, 23). Consequently, they refuse to participate in the formulation of 
recommendations by the SER on the institution of a Committee of Economic Experts 
(which has to advice the government on decentrally concluded contracts) and on the 
issue of price indexation of wages. In return, the Minister of Social Affairs, Roolvink 
(ARP), unilaterally decides to implement a ‘threshold’ of 3.5% in the price 
indexation (that means that only when prices have risen 3.5% or more, wages will be 
indexed accordingly). This leads to a further deterioration of the already very strained 
relations with the trade unions (van Doorn et al 1976: 345). And although employers’ 
organisations are ‘disappointed’ that unions seem to take out their grudge against 
government on the system of negotiations in industry (SIB 38, 1969: 13), in the 
STAR they support the unions in their refusal to have talks with the government as 
long as clause 8 is in force (SIB 2, 1970: 17). 
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1970 
Government strategy II IV 
Trade unions style C C 
Employers’ organisations style C C 
Combined style social partners C C 
Outcome IVC 
 
Negotiations on incomes policy proceed fairly smoothly and result in a bipartite 
compromise based on the 14th bi-annual report of the SER. The conflict between 
trade unions and the government is about a part of the new system of negotiations on 
incomes policy as laid down in the Law on Wage Formation (clause 8). Trade unions 
refuse to participate in any further negotiations on the central level. They are 
reluctantly supported by employers’ organisations. In response, the government 
unilaterally intervenes in the price indexation agreement.
 18 
1971 
 
Wage negotiations in 1971 are completely determined by the effects of the so-called 
‘400 guilders wave’ of the second half of 1970. This was the result of a number of 
originally ‘wild-cat strikes’ that started in the ports of Rotterdam and were eventually 
taken over by the trade unions  (van Doorn et al 1976: 362-373; Windmuller et al 
1983: 225/226). The government De Jong (KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD) announces in its 
1971 budget that it aims to neutralise the effects of these wage rises by a binding 
wage measure. However, the SER gives a negative recommendation and the 
government retracts its plans (SIB 43, 1970: 19). To better the relations with the trade 
unions, and to (re)start central negotiations, the government also announces it will 
‘freeze’ clause 8 (i.e. will not make use of it) of the Law on Wage Formation (SIB 
40, 1970: 16, 17; Windmuller et al 1983: 223). 
Following the ‘400 guilders wave’, in November 1970, trade unions and employers’ 
organisations reach agreement in the form of a recommendation by the SER. They 
agree that, in order to regain a stable economic development, wages should rise 
slower than productivity (SIB 43, 1970: 2-7). Trade unions, however, insist that price 
rises should be included, whilst employers’ organisations emphatically disagree. 
Employers are of the opinion that the demand of the trade unions will mean that the 
targets set in the recommendation of the SER will not be met. They therefore ask the 
government to exercise its own responsibility in order to achieve the desired wage 
moderation in 1971 (SIB 44, 1970: 12-16; SIB 45, 1969: 26, 27).  
Negotiations between trade unions and employers’ organisations break down. In 
response, in December 1970, the government imposes a binding wage measure for 
1971 based on clause 10 of the Law on Wage Formation. The measure is amended by 
parliament: 
- collective contracts as of 11-12-1970 are extended with a six-month period when 
they expire; 
- wage rises, including the ‘400 guilders wave’, in contracts already accepted by the 
Board of Government Mediators remain untouched; 
- a 3% wage rise per 01-01-1971 for contracts expiring on 31-12-1971, plus another 
1% on 01-04-1971; 
- the same wage rise apply for the  longer term contracts when they expire; 
- the ‘400 guilders’ are incorporated in wages immediately after expiration of 
contracts (SIB 45, 1970: 24-26; SIB 46, 1970: 21-23; SIB 47, 1970: 26; STAR 
1985: 48, 49).  
At the same time, the government imposes a price measure which states that only 
some specifically named external costs, plus the effects of the ‘400 guilders wave’ 
may be included in the recalculation of prices. Employers’ organisations object 
strongly to this part of the package, but acknowledge that government, in the face of 
insufficient guarantees for a necessary restraint in wage rises by organised labour and 
employers, has its own responsibility. They support the government’s wage measure 
and blame the trade unions and announce they will loyally co-operate with the 
government and shall not try to undermine its policy by giving in to ‘extreme’ 
demands of unions (SIB 40, 1970: 6, 16, 17; SIB 41, 1970: 6, 10-12; SIB 44, 1970: 
15, 16; SIB 45, 1970: 27; SIB 48, 1970: 21). The trade unions, however, organise a 
national strike of one hour on 15 December 1970, just preceding the parliamentary 
debate on the government’s measures (SIB 45, 1970: 27; SIB 46, 1970: 15-18, 23). 
Despite the governments appeal to trade unions and employers’ organisations to co-
operate loyally, the trade unions accuse the government of giving in to employers and 
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announce they will not be silenced and will try to redress the government’s policy 
after expiration where ever possible. After expiry of the wage measure they demand 
wage rises and organise strikes on the branch and company level to press their 
argument (SIB 45, 1970: 27; SIB 46, 1970: 23). In practice the effect of the wage 
measure was limited (Windmuller et al 1983: 226/227). 
 
1971 
Government strategy IV II IV I 
Trade unions style B B A A 
Employers’ organisations style B B A A 
Combined style social partners B B A A 
Outcome IA 
 
The government starts with taking a firm stand on wages. Then retracts its proposed 
package to give trade unions and employers’ organisations a chance to come to an 
agreement. To facilitate central negotiations, the government ‘freezes’ clause 8 of the 
Law on Wage Formation. Central negotiations break down. Then the government 
breaks the deadlock with its own (binding) policy package. Employers’ organisations 
support the wage measure in that package. Trade unions announce they will try to 
redress the government’s binding wage measure after expiration. And that is what 
they do. The new government refrains from intervention (see 1972).
 20 
1972 
 
The second provisional recommendation of the SER about wage and price policy in 
June 1971 suggests the introduction of a new system of formulating and 
implementing incomes policy. In the first recommendation of October 1970, the SER 
rejected detailed interventions in wages and prices by the government (clause 8). 
During 1971, following the binding wage measure after the so-called ‘400 guilders 
wave’, the notion took shape that a binding general wage measure is equally 
ineffective (clause 10). The SER proposes that an annual report on economic 
prospects, prepared by independent ‘crown members’ of the SER, will be discussed 
in the SER. The results of this discussion shall than form the basis on which the 
respective points of view of trade unions and employers’ organisations in the STAR 
will be formulated. The key is that prescriptions or instructions are to be replaced by 
a situation in which trade unions and employers’ organisation mutually try to 
influence each others demands (van Doorn et al 1976: 428-433). 
Based on this report by the SER, the new government Biesheuvel I (KVP, ARP, 
CHU, VVD, DS70) abolishes the wage measure of the preceding government De 
Jong (KVP, ARP, CHU, VVD) retroactively (SIB 28, 1971: 2-3, 31; Windmuller et 
al 1983: 227). The government also announces it will ‘freeze’ (meaning: not to use) 
clause 8 of the Law on Wage Formation, which makes it possible for government to 
intervene in negotiated contracts (SIB 34, 1971: 20-25; SIB 28, 1971: 2, 3). 
Furthermore, the government announces that wage negotiations should take place in 
complete freedom from government intervention. The government proposes to come 
to an effective control of inflation by means of ‘broad’ deliberations (that is, with as 
many of the relevant parties and institutions as possible) (SIB 24, 1971: 11-20; SIB 
28, 1971: 32-35; SIB 34, 1971: 2-6, 20; SIB 35, 1971: 5, 6). 
The trade unions’ agenda aims at ‘moderation under conditions’, meaning under the 
conditions that government policies include the necessary (financial) room for public 
and social services, direct private investments and see to a more just distribution of 
income by levelling the range between lower and higher incomes (SIB 38, 1971: 28-
32). The NVV originally calculates a total combined wage rise of 13.5%, but, as the 
others, quickly agrees to the maximum of 12%, which the SER Committee of 
Economic Experts has set (SIB 40, 1971: 2-7). In effect, this implies that the trade 
unions agree with combating inflation only, and do not demand a real rise of wages. 
As it turns out, government refuses to meet the conditions set by the unions (SIB 44, 
1971: 5; SIB 45, 1971: 15-17; van Doorn et al 1976: 459, 465, 466). 
Employers’ organisations reject any rise in incomes in real terms and strictly keep to 
their agenda that compensation for rising prices should be maximised to 6% to keep 
in line with the recommended 12% rise in the combined total wage sum as 
recommended by the SR. However, the rest of the SER does not share their point of 
view (SIB 38, 1971: 7, 8; SIB 39, 1971, 2, 3; SIB 43, 1971: 2-7; SIB 44, 1971: 5-7). 
Growing unemployment, which leads them to the point of view that their bargaining 
position has improved, may have influenced this position (SIB 39, 1971: 4-6; van 
Doorn et al 1976: 461). This position, combined with their refusal to discuss the 
conditions mentioned by the trade unions, means that the failure of wage negotiations 
in the STAR is settled before they have even properly started (SIB 45, 1971: 17, 18; 
van Doorn et al 1976: 462). 
Although negotiations between trade unions and employers’ organisations on the 
central level break down and ensuing repeated tripartite discussions on socio-
economic policies also do not lead to results, the government does not intervene (SIB 
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35, 1971: 5-7; SIB 39, 1971: 2-6; SIB 41, 1971: 19, 20; SIB 45, 1971: 15-18; SIB 46, 
1971: 19-23). Government squarely puts the blame on trade unions and employers’ 
organisations, but refrains from any concrete intervention to start up the process of 
negotiations again. The government restricts itself to verbal insistence on wage 
moderation. As a result, both parties claim that the government supports their point of 
view (SIB 41, 1971: 19, 20; SIB 45, 1971: 17; van Doorn et al 1976: 467). 
Negotiations continue on the branch and company level, accompanied by strikes. The 
government clearly does not wish to alienate trade unions and employers’ 
organisations, but to give the new wage setting system a fair chance. The slight 
economic dip in 1971 may have alleviated their fear for exorbitant wage rises. And in 
general, the outcome is a combined total wage rise of some 12%, as recommended by 
the SER’s expert committee (van Doorn et al 1976: 499-500). 
 
1972 
Government strategy II I 
Trade unions style B B 
Employers’ organisations style A A 
Combined style social partners A A 
Outcome IA  
 
The government goes to great lengths to remove any obstacles in order to get trade 
unions and employers’ organisations to conclude a central agreement. But 
negotiations break down. The government does not intervene in order not to 
aggravate relations with especially the trade unions any further. Decentral 
negotiations are marked by conflicts.
 22 
1973 
 
The need to combat inflation leads the government Biesheuvel II (KVP, ARP, CHU, 
VVD) to urge the trade unions and employers’ organisations to conclude a Central 
Agreement for 1973. In return, government is prepared to implement a 
comprehensive policy for incomes and prices (SIB 35, 1972: 28-35). 
In the 17th bi-annual report of the SER, both trade unions and employers’ 
organisations recommend a social contract between government and ‘social partners’ 
to combat inflation (SIB 20, 1972: 2-5). Expectations rise high, but are sorely tested. 
As a precondition for their participation in an anti-inflation policy, trade unions 
demand from government an expansion of the (semi-) public sector and a more 
levelled distribution of incomes, and from employers’ organisations a commitment to 
central agreements, a positive position regarding the unions’ demands from 
government, and facilities for unions on the plant level (SIB 27, 1972: 15-20; SIB 35, 
1972: 43-45). Employers’ organisations have quite a different view on how to 
counter inflation. Their preferred policies are a reduction in the growth of both public 
and private expenditure by reducing wage and price rises to regain competitiveness 
on the world market (SIB 20, 1972: 20; SIB 23, 1972: 10-14). In response, trade 
unions announce a package of minimum demands which government and employers’ 
organisation must meet to make a Central Agreement feasible (SIB 42, 1972: 2-7). 
Within the NVV, the industrial trade union has difficulties with this minimum 
package, because it is, in their view, restricted to material demands only. When the 
peak organisations reach a provisional agreement with the employers’ organisations, 
it takes some time to placate them (SIB 41, 1972: 4-7; SIB 42, 1972: 6). 
The outgoing government plays a crucial part in the negotiation process. By making 
concessions to both parties, an agreement is reached (SIB 42, 1972: 10, 11). 
Employers’ organisations initially refuse to sign the official agreement, because 
government in the mean time has capped prices in a response to a recent price hike. 
This puts the result of the laborious process of negotiations in jeopardy (SIB 35, 
1972: 36; SIB 41, 1972: 8, 9; SIB 44, 1972: 19-22; SIB 45, 29-31). Only after new 
concessions by the government regarding price calculations (SIB 45, 1972: 32, 33; 
SIB 46, 1972: 23), employers’ organisations agree to sign. The price paragraph of the 
agreement is put on hold for as long as the government price cap is in force. 
This in turn leads the trade unions to demand compensation as well. The government 
responds by not implementing its original plans for a franchise in the health care 
insurance and for a ‘freeze’ of the amount of child allowance for the second child 
(SIB 41, 1972: 8, 9). 
The resulting Central Agreement concluded on 6 December 1972 is a compromise 
based on major concessions by government to both parties: 
- the price index figure in 1973 may exceed the figure of 1972 with a maximum of 
3.75%; 
- other improvements of terms of employment in 1973, including wages, may not  
exceed 3.5%; 
- wages will be indexed completely, but with a ‘threshold’ of 0.75%; 
- special attention for the position of the lowest paid; 
- a step-by-step reduction in working hours that will not jeopardise the rise in 
productivity; the aim is to achieve the 40-hour working week and a standard of 20 
holidays per annum in 1975 (SIB 41, 1972: 8, 9; SIB 42, 1972: 2-7, 10-13; SIB 
46, 1972: 23, 24; STAR 1985: 49). 
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In the manufacturing industry, the implementation frequently leads to big rows (and 
strikes) between unions and employers’ organisations (and between the general trade 
unions and the unions for higher paid employees who are not (yet) represented in the 
neo-corporatist institutions on the central level), especially with regard to wage 
demands in guilders, instead of percentages. More and more, the unions use that 
device to give lower paid workers a higher raise than higher paid employees (SIB 47, 
1972: 10, 11; SIB 5, 1973: 9-12, 14, 21, 22; SIB 6, 1973: 17-20; SIB 9, 1973: 5, 6). 
As a result, first the NVV, and later also the NKV do not participate any more in the 
SER and the STAR. Only with great difficulty are relations patched up (SIB 15, 
1973: 23-27; SIB 16, 1973: 21-25; SIB 18, 1973: 13-17; STAR 1985: 49). On the 
whole, the general trade unions are only marginally successful in pressing their 
demands (Windmuller et al 1983: 229-231). 
 
1973 
Government strategy II II 
Trade unions style B A 
Employers’ organisations style B A 
Combined style social partners B A 
Outcome IIA 
 
Although government policy has significantly facilitated the bipartite Central 
Agreement, implementation leads to conflicts on the branch and company levels.
 24 
1974 
 
The original demands of trade unions and employers’ organisations are quite far 
apart: employers refuse any wage rises except compensation for rising prices; trade 
unions demand that compensation, plus another 2.5%, and a structural rise in the 
legal minimum wage on top of that. The employers are set dead against any levelling 
of incomes. The trade unions are in favour. The employers are against a further 
increase of the (semi-) public sector. The trade unions support the new Den Uyl 
(PvdA, KVP, ARP, D66, PPR) government’s policy platform: a more just 
distribution of incomes, power and knowledge, and they want a further expansion of 
the (semi-) public sector (SIB 27, 1973: 26-31; SIB 33, 1973: 3-5). 
From the start it is doubtful whether negotiations between unions and employers will 
result in an agreement. Nevertheless, due to the insistence of the government, parties 
remain at the negotiating table, and even reach some sort of a provisional agreement: 
- 2.5% wage rise (half in a percentage, the other half in guilders); 
- price compensation with a 0.3% ‘threshold’ (for rising taxes), and a minimum of 
160 guilders per per cent for incomes up to 35,000 guilders per year (higher 
incomes receive progressively less price compensation per percent) (SIB 41, 
1973: 25-30). 
However, the rank and file of the employers’ organisations rejects the agreement, 
especially on the basis of the levelling effect of the agreed price compensation (SIB 
41, 1973: 25-31; SIB 42, 1973: 18-20).  
Trade unions refuse to continue the negotiations and return to their position at the 
start of the negotiations. They do maintain the compromise reached on the 
compensation of price rises in wages (SIB 42, 1973: 18-20). 
The government reacts to the outbreak of the oil crisis in 1973 by preparing special 
emergency legislation (Machtigingswet) which gives government extraordinary 
powers for a three month period to enforce socio-economic policies to combat the 
economic effects of the oil crisis and the oil boycott against the Netherlands. The 
proposed government measures are based on the original Central Agreement that 
failed (SIB 42, 1973: 39; SIB 43, 1973: 28-34; SIB 1, 1974: 13-15; STAR 1985: 49, 
50): 
- workers receive a specified wage rise of 45 guilders per month under the duration 
of the Machtigingswet; 
- price indexation, if agreed in contracts, is permitted; 
- no special bonuses are allowed, unless specified in contracts, and should in that 
case not exceed the amount or level of 1973; 
- a reduction of working hours is permitted only when agreed to before 01-12-1973, 
or included in existing contracts; 
- as an interim measure, three months after expiry of contracts, a 3% price 
compensation will be paid, with a ‘floor’ of at least 150 guilders per per cent. 
The trade unions are not dead set against government intervention and do not object 
to the government’s preparations for emergency legislation, although they have a 
number of conditions: the measures should be temporary, employment must be 
safeguarded, all income groups must participate, prices must be kept in check, and 
there must be a 2.5% wage rise (SIB 43, 1973: 28-32; SIB 46, 1973: 36-38). The 
point of view of employers’ organisations is also clear. Although they appreciate the 
fact that government has devised its policies in close consultation with ‘social 
partners’, they strongly object to the government’s ‘favouritism’ towards the unions. 
And they feel it is wrong that the government uses the failed agreement as a starting 
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point of policies. They demand support for ailing industries, no reduction in working 
hours, less costly labour legislation and a general reduction in government 
expenditure (SIB 43, 1973: 32-34; SIB 44, 1973: 18, 19, 37, 38; SIB 45, 1973: 34-
36). 
The resulting emergency legislation (SIB 46, 1973: 15-21; SIB 47, 1973: 2-12) takes 
into account the demands of both parties, without necessarily honouring all. During 
the parliamentary debate, both parties appeal to parliament (SIB 47, 1973: 38, 39), 
but after parliamentary approval, they accept the legislation without much murmur 
(SIB 46, 1973: 36-38).  
Under the Machtigingswet’s package, during the first three months of 1974 trade 
unions and employers’ organisations are again granted the opportunity to come to an 
agreement amongst themselves. The government proposes a new package that 
includes the expenditure of some 2,000 to 2,500 million guilders to facilitate the 
realisation of a Central Agreement (SIB 11, 1974: 11-13; SIB 12, 1974: 33-34). 
Again, trade unions and employers’ organisations fail to come to an agreement. 
As a result, based on the Machtigingswet, government issues a binding wage 
measure: 
- after expiration of contracts wages and other terms of employment are ‘frozen’ for 
three months; 
- three months after expiration of contracts a wage rise of 15 guilders per month is 
allowed; 
- three moths after expiration of contracts a price compensation of  3%  is allowed 
as an advance payment; 
- the advance payment of the 3% price compensation will be at least 37.50 guilders 
per month and the minimum price compensation will be 160 guilders on an 
annual basis; 
- the price compensation will have a ‘threshold’ of 0.3%. 
In its intervention, government remains quite close to the positions taken by trade 
unions and employers’ organisations during the failed negotiations. Therefore, both 
parties can and do accept the measures, although employers’ organisations are more 
critical than trade unions (SIB 12, 1974: 32-34; SIB 13, 1974: 20-25; SIB 14, 1974: 
15-19; SIB 15, 1974: 10-13). 
 
1974 
Government strategy II II II IV II IV 
Trade unions style A B B B B B 
Employers’ organisations style A B A B B B 
Combined style social partners A B A B B B 
Outcome IVB 
 
Government tries to get trade unions and employers’ organisations to strike a deal. 
Parties conclude an agreement, but that is rejected by the rank and file of one of the 
parties. Negotiations are in a deadlock. The oil crisis induces the government to 
implement its own policy package with regard to wages, based on the failed Central 
Agreement. When parties can again not agree on wages, notwithstanding a 
government policy package of public expenditure to facilitate negotiations, the 
government implements a binding wage measure, taking into account the agendas of 
the other actors. Both parties grudgingly accept this binding wage measure. 
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1975 
 
To combat inflation, the government Den Uyl (PvdA, KVP, ARP, D66, PPR) aims at 
the conclusion of a Central Agreement for 1975. The trade unions demand, and are 
offered, a wage earner fund (VAD) as a pre-condition for agreeing to a Central 
Agreement (SIB 39, 1974: 26-27), to which employers’ organisations strongly object 
(SIB 38, 1974: 7-8), without, however, rejecting a Central Agreement as such (SIB 
39, 1974: 28). The rest of the 3,500 million guilder package of government 
expenditure proposed is carefully tuned to accommodate both trade unions and 
employers’ organisations. The package aims at boosting production and employment, 
at an increase in incomes in real terms, and at less inflation (SIB 44, 1974: 2-10): 
- a temporarily lower income tax (840 million); 
- extra funds for the housing and building sector (915 million); 
- an extra 170 million for expenditures by local councils and provinces; 
- extra funding to protect and create jobs (200 million); 
- extra funding to accommodate demand and supply on the labour market (200 
million); 
- assorted other measures (1,200 million). 
Trade unions and employers’ organisations have the same point of view for 
negotiations: a real increase in wages of 2.5-3% (SIB 26, 1974: 18-21; SIB 40, 1974: 
39, 40). They differ in their assessment of price rises (SIB 42, 1974: 24, 25). But the 
unions also demand some sort of wage earner fund as a precondition for a Central 
Agreement (SIB 38, 1974: 2-7). The government insists that parties should postpone 
negotiations, to give government the opportunity to come up with a policy package to 
make a Central Agreement possible.  
When the policy package of 3,500 million guilders is eventually revealed, including 
the promise of a Bill on wage earner funds (SIB 39, 1974: 26, 27), it does not bring 
unions and employers’ organisations to an agreement, despite all attempts by the 
government (SIB 44, 1974: 2-10). Differing expectations of economic growth, and 
the employers’ organisations resistance against any form of wage earner funds, are 
the main stumbling blocks (SIB 39, 1974: 28; SIB 43, 1974: 5-8, 24, 25; SIB 44, 
1974: 17). Further elucidation of the government’s package also fails to bring the 
parties to an agreement, despite the relatively minor differences between them. 
Employers’ organisations offer a wage rise of 1.5%, trade unions initially demand 
3%, but are later willing to settle for 2%. The breaking point is the levelling character 
of the price compensation demanded by the trade unions: half as a percentage and the 
other half in guilders2
Negotiations are continued on the branch and company level. Government does not 
intervene in these negotiations for which their policy package serves as the bottom 
line (SIB 47, 1974: 23-26), notwithstanding the worsening of the economic situation. 
 (SIB 38, 1974: 2; SIB 44, 1974: 24, 25; SIB 45, 1974: 2, 6-8, 
29; Windmuller et al 1983: 230). The industrial employers’ organisation proposes a 
compromise: a 2% wage rise, provided the unions drop their demands for union 
facilities on the plant level and the publication of all incomes (SIB 47, 1974: 23). As 
the retail employers refuse to go along with this proposal, it is eventually dropped 
and central negotiations break down. The decision on incomes policy is left to 
government and parliament. Both parties petition parliament, who eventually 
approves the government’s package (SIB 38, 1974: 2-8). 
                                            
2 Initially, the unions also demanded the wage rise be paid partly as a percentage and partly in guilders 
(SIB 31, 1974: 9-13). 
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It does not want to jeopardise its relations with both parties any further, given the 
strains left by the Machtigingswet applied in 1974. Instead, it keeps topping up its 
offers: apart from the 3,500 million mentioned above, another 1,000 million of 
government expenditure is announced (SIB 8, 1975: 15-21). 
 
1975 
Government strategy II 
Trade unions style B 
Employers’ organisations style B 
Combined style social partners B 
Outcome IIB 
 
The government’s policy package of public expenditure first serves as an attempt to 
get trade unions and employers’ organisations to conclude a central agreement. 
Negotiations, however, grind to a halt in a deadlock. The subsequently enlarged 
government’s package of public expenditure is nevertheless implemented and serves 
as the bottom line for decentral negotiations in which government does not intervene.
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1976 
 
In 1976, the Den Uyl government ((PvdA, KVP, ARP, D66, PPR) does its utmost to 
arrive at an agreement with trade unions and employers’ organisations for 1976. The 
government again proposes extra government expenditures up to 3,000 million 
guilders despite growing budget deficits, to get trade unions and employers’ 
organisations to agree to a Central Agreement: 
- VAT increase postponed for 6 months (800 million); 
- support for ailing industries (550 million); 
- labour market policies (350 million) 
- job-creation programmes (400 million) 
- social security premiums paid by employers taken over by government via taxes 
(600 million) 
- furthering company investments by fiscal measures (50 million) (SIB 34, 1975: 
13-26; 47, 48; SIB 42, 1975: 4). 
The agendas of trade unions and employers’ organisations differ quite substantially. 
Employers want real wage costs to lag 2.5% behind productivity. They are also 
adamantly against any price compensation. Trade unions especially want to preserve 
price compensation (SIB 38, 1975: 34-36; SIB 39, 1975: 23-25). Therefore, there is 
no basis for further negotiations on the central level (SIB 41, 1975: 30, 31; SIB 42, 
1975: 27-29). 
With its policy package to boost the economy, government tries to bring parties to a 
Central Agreement. However, negotiations between trade unions and employers’ 
organisations break down rapidly, despite several attempts of the government to 
renew consultations (SIB 41, 1975: 30, 31; SIB 42, 1975: 26-30; SIB 44, 1975: 17-
20). 
 Failing a Central Agreement, government considers a binding wage measure. When 
sounding out the respective opinions of the parties involved, employers’ 
organisations profess to have ‘major’, and trade unions even ‘insurmountable’ 
objections (Teulings et al 1981: 56-58). Notwithstanding their objections, 
government decides to use clause 10 of the Law on Wage Formation: a temporary 
‘freeze’ of wages and other terms of employment by extending the duration of 
collective contracts for a six-month period, excluding the compensation for rising 
prices. As part of the package the government also ‘freezes’ the incomes of the 
professions and high earners. The increase of VAT is postponed, the minimum wage 
is raised extra, and price rises are capped. Ailing industries receive extra subsidies 
(SIB 45, 1975: 10-17; STAR 1985: 50). Both employers’ organisations and trade 
unions object to the government’s intervention in what should be, in their view, ‘free 
negotiations’. 
During the period of the wage freeze, many discussions and negotiations between 
government, trade unions and employers’ organisations take place. The government 
tries to accommodate the trade unions by announcing it will come with a Bill on the 
VAD and on a new style Workers’ Council (Ondernemingsraad – OR). The 
government also announces it will delete the infamous clause 8 from the Law on 
Wage Formation, which gives the government the authority to intervene in individual 
collective contracts, when deemed necessary. To accommodate employers’ 
organisations, the government promises to come up with Bills enabling a downward 
adjustment of minimum wages and social security benefits (SIB 14, 1976: 2; SIB 18, 
1976: 15; SIB 19, 1976: 74; SIB 22, 1976: 2, 3; SIB 24, 1976: 3-7, 29-33). 
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Meanwhile, the government is preparing itself for the event that negotiations for the 
second half of 1976 break down as well. If that is the case, the ‘wage freeze’ will be 
extended with another six months, including a binding small wage rise as 
compensation for rising prices (SIB 19, 976: 2, 3; SIB 26, 1976: 28). During the 
negotiations, the government tries in vain to get trade unions and employers’ 
organisations to come to an agreement (SIB 25, 1976: 27-30). These cannot agree, 
not even when the government extends the six-month freeze with another month to 
give them extra time to conclude their negotiations. Especially the trade unions 
criticise this extension. As no agreement can be reached, government decides to 
extend the wage freeze to cover the second half of 1976 as well (SIB 28, 1976: 2-8; 
SIB 43, 1976: 25; SIB 47, 1976: 4-6). All in all, government policy in 1976 puts 
quite a strain on relations with both parties. But especially with the trade unions, and 
more specifically with the FNV, relations have seriously deteriorated (SIB 28, 1976: 
17-23; Windmuller et al 1983: 233-235).  
 
1976 
Government strategy II IV II IV 
Trade unions style A A B B 
Employers’ organisations style A A B B 
Combined style social partners A A B B 
Outcome IVB 
 
The government tries to facilitate negotiations by introducing a compensatory policy 
package of public expenditure. However, negotiations break down rapidly and are not 
resumed despite efforts by the government. Consequently, the government institutes 
a six-month wage ‘freeze’ and implements its own policy package of public 
expenditure. Negotiations continue for the period after the wage ‘freeze’. However, 
negotiations bog down in a deadlock despite all efforts by the government to induce 
both parties to come to an agreement. Therefore, the government extends the wage 
‘freeze’ to cover the rest of 1976 as well.
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1977 
 
As a result of both binding wage measures in 1976, relations between the Den Uyl 
government (PvdA, KVP, ARP, D66, PPR) and the trade unions have reached an all 
time low. Relations with employers’ organisations are strained as well, because of the 
government’s reform programme: wage earner Funds (VAD), Works Councils (OR), 
rents and land policy (SIB 25, 1976: 22, 23). This has a major impact on the 
negotiations for 1977. The government decides in advance not to intervene in 
negotiations between trade unions and employers’ organisations (SIB 36, 1976: 32; 
SIB 40, 1976: 43, 44). 
The agendas of trade unions and employers’ organisations (again) differ greatly at the 
end of 1976. Employers still want to end the system of automatic price compensation 
in wages to keep wage costs below productivity (SIB 18, 1976: 24-30; SIB 43, 1976: 
23, 24), and are dead set against the reform programme of the Den Uyl government 
(see also SIB 3, 1976: 9-12). The trade unions on the other hand, reach the 
conclusion that the automatic price compensation is their only effective defence 
against an ineffective government price policy. Nevertheless, they are willing to 
exclude some price effects from the index, like a rise in VAT (SIB 41, 1976: 3-7). 
And they support the government’s policy programme, which includes a Bill on wage 
earner Funds (SIB 25, 1976: 20, 21; SIB 45, 1976: 16). 
Despite incitements and mediation by the government, accompanied with incentives 
(lower taxes on wages and profits: SIB 40, 1976: 41, 42), parties are not able to reach 
a Central Agreement. The main stumbling block is the automatic price compensation. 
Consequently, negotiations are continued on the branch and company levels (SIB 47, 
1976: 13).  With the guided incomes policy of 1976 still fresh on everyone’s minds, 
and helped by reasonably good economic prospects, the government does not 
intervene in these negotiations. 
Early 1977 a wave of strikes is organised by the trade unions to defend the system of 
automatic price compensation. Negotiations on the lower levels grind to a halt 
completely. The deadlock is broken by active mediation of the government on the 
central level, at the request of the employers’ organisations (SIB 4, 1977: 20, 21; SIB 
7, 1977: 14-16; Windmuller et al 1983: 239). In February 1977 parties reach an 
agreement, the so-called ‘Protocol of The Hague’ (Haags Protocol). This Protocol is 
not a detailed Central Agreement, but a basis for further negotiations on the branch 
and company level. In the Protocol, the demands of the unions are honoured to a 
large extent. The system of automatic price compensation remains in force that year, 
and on top of that a wage rise in real terms is agreed. However, trade unions have to 
agree to a joint study of the whole system of price compensation, and to a joint study 
on the relation between profits and jobs (SIB 7, 1977: 14-17; SIB 20, 1977: 9; STAR 
1985: 50, 51). Based on the Protocol, negotiations on the branch and company levels 
resume. The government refrains from any direct intervention, but continues with its 
programme of reform and incentives to prop up collective contracts on the branch 
and company levels (SIB 5, 1977: 11-13, SIB 7, 1977: 7, 8; SIB 8, 1977: 4-6, 14; SIB 
21, 1977: 11; SIB 26, 1977: 21; Windmuller et al 1983: 236, 237). 
In the end, trade unions and employers’ organisations did not reach agreement on 
their joint studies (Akkermans 1999: 52-54) 
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1977 
Government strategy II II II 
Trade unions style B A B 
Employers’ organisations style B A B 
Combined style social partners B A B 
Outcome IIB   
 
The government facilitates central negotiations between trade unions and employers’ 
organisations. Central negotiations break down. Negotiations on the decentral level 
are marked by conflicts over the automatic price compensation. A bipartite Central 
Agreement, mediated by the government, eventually resolves these conflicts.
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1978 
 
Despite the Den Uyl government (PvdA, KVP, ARP, D66, PPR) is outgoing; they 
actively intervene in negotiations on incomes policy for 1978. Following its 
involvement in the so-called ‘Protocol of the Hague’ of 1977, both trade unions and 
employers’ organisations expect a substantial contribution from the government. 
Government in turn is prepared to come with a policy package of public expenditure 
of 2,500 million, provided trade unions and employers’ organisations come to a 
Central Agreement aimed at wage moderation (SIB 40, 1977: 19, 20; SIB 41, 1977: 
5, 6; SIB 42, 1977: 3, 4, 15). 
Before negotiations even start, the FNV states its support of the policy goals of the 
government. However, they and the other trade unions do not want to accept a policy 
of moderation (of wages and government expenditure) for more than one year. There 
is little confidence in the results of such a policy (SIB 29, 1977: 22). 
Employers’ organisations register a large series of complaints against the 
government’s policy package. Their main objection remains the price compensation, 
unless more sources of price rises are excluded from the index. On the whole, 
employers’ organisations feel that the policy package of the government does not 
sufficiently lower costs for them, despite extra offers by government (SIB 33, 1977: 
16-19; SIB 34, 1977:27, 28, 31; SIB, 42, 1977: 14 -18). 
The trade unions are strongly opposed to the demand of the employers’ organisations, 
but remain willing to negotiate. Although their demand for restoration of buying 
power by means of price compensation is not relinquished, they do not exclude the 
possibility that some sacrifices will have to be made for a reduction in working hours 
in order to combat unemployment (SIB 26, 1977: 5, 6; SIB 34, 1977: 27, 28, 30, 31, 
36, 37; SIB 36, 1977: 2; SIB 37, 1977: 22, 23; SIB 38, 1977: 9; SIB 41, 1977: 8, 9). 
Both parties do agree that the government’s policy package is not sufficient to reach 
a Central Agreement. Trade unions are indignant at the government’s proposal not to 
raise wages (SIB 40, 1977: 15; SIB 41, 1977: 5), but blame the employers’ 
organisations for the failure of the central negotiations (SIB 43, 1977: 24, 30, 31). 
Employers’ organisations feel that the package is not sufficient to keep both buying 
power in tact and enhance the competitiveness of the market sector. They conclude 
that negotiations will have to be devolved to the branch and company levels. As a 
consequence, central negotiations break down (SIB 41, 1977: 6; SIB 43, 1977: 20-
26). 
Due to growing unemployment, the main item in the negotiations on the branch and 
company level is the unions’ demand for agreements on jobs and job security 
(Arbeidsplaatsenovereenkomst – APO), in return for moderation of wage demands 
(including the price compensation) (SIB 43, 1977: 24-26; SIB 3, 1978: 17-19). 
Because it is outgoing, the Den Uyl government does not intervene in the ensuing 
negotiations on the branch and company levels, and neither does the incoming 
government Van Agt I (CDA, VVD). The new government announces it will honour 
the policy package devised by the Den Uyl government, and throws in another 50 
million to support agreements on jobs and job security concluded on the branch level 
(the trade unions had demanded 500 million) and an extra 1,000 million to cut costs 
for employers (SIB 7, 1978: 10, 11; SIB 8, 1978: 24, 25). 
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1978 
Government strategy II II 
Trade unions style A B 
Employers’ organisations style A B 
Combined style social partners A B 
Outcome IIB  
 
Both governments try in vain to bring trade unions and employers’ organisations to a 
central agreement by offering compensating policy packages for public expenditure. 
Both governments refrain from intervention in decentral negotiations.
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1979 
 
The policy programme ‘Bestek ‘81’ (Direction ’81) of the government Van Agt I 
(CDA, VVD) largely determines negotiations on wages and terms of employment for 
1979. Because of the worsening economic situation, government plans to cut social 
security expenditure, health care and wages of civil servants and other (semi-) public 
sector employees. The government’s aim is to reduce budget deficits and at the same 
time to increase profitability in the market sector. To win support by the trade unions, 
the government announces the speedy introduction of the bills regarding the VAD 
and the OR (SIB 25, 1978: 12-19; Roebroek and Hertogh 1998: 377, 378; Akkermans 
1999: 57, 62, 63). Bestek ’81, to a large extent, determines beforehand the room for 
wage rises. To accommodate the trade unions government pledges to protect the 
purchasing power of people on minimum wages and benefits, but only if and when 
the results of negotiations do not exceed the limits set by the government. 
Central negotiations break down in a very early stage. Trade unions blame the 
government: it had nothing to offer (SIB 32, 1978: 23; SIB 42, 1978: 3-9; SIB 43, 
1978: 14). Employers are disappointed but stress they were only prepared to strike a 
cost-effective deal. The government squarely blames the FNV and continues with the 
implementation of its policy programme (SIB 42, 1978: 6-9; SIB 43, 1978: 7, 8; SIB 
45, 1978: 37-39; SIB 3, 1979: 9-11; SIB 24, 1979: 19; SIB 29, 1979: 6). 
All trade unions have great difficulties with the government’s policy programme 
Bestek ’81. They feel that the low-income groups pay for those policies and do not 
reduce unemployment (SIB 33, 1978: 34-36; SIB 34, 1978: 11-14, 18, 19, 21, 22). 
The unions are especially indignant at the cuts in social security benefits and wages 
in the (semi-) public sector which the government announces prior to deliberations on 
those issues in the SER. Therefore, trade unions decide to counter the government’s 
policies by including compensatory demands in the negotiations on wages and other 
terms of employment. They demand compensation for inflation for lower and middle 
income groups, a reduction in working hours, and agreements on jobs and job 
security (APO’s). There is, however, a difference between FNV and CNV. The FNV 
is much more inclined than the CNV to push negotiations to the brink (SIB 34, 1978: 
11-14; SIB 37, 1978: 11-13; SIB 38: 1978: 12). 
Due to this clash between government and especially the FNV, employers’ 
organisations can afford to lean back, at the same time, however, insisting that Bestek 
’81 should be implemented as quickly and completely as possible (SIB 42, 1978: 3). 
When central negotiations eventually break down, because the trade unions feel the 
government package is insufficient, employers’ organisations profess their 
disappointment and renew their plea for a speedy implementation of Bestek ’81 (SIB 
44, 1978: 2). 
Both parties then intensely lobby parliament for their demands, but the government 
succeeds in getting their programme approved without major changes. The final 
version of Bestek ’81 does include some concessions to the trade unions, but again, 
these fall far short of what the unions want (SIB 43, 1978: 14, 15; SIB 44, 1978: 2, 
7).  
Renewed attempts by the government to get parties to conclude a Central Agreement 
by offering a policy package of public expenditure of 770 million fail as well, 
because the FNV feels that both the offer of the government and the response of the 
employers’ organisations beforehand reject all their demands. The CNV, habitually, 
takes a more positive stance towards negotiations and deliberations between parties 
and the government (SIB 45, 1978: 37-39; SIB 1, 1979: 11-14; SIB 3, 1979: 9-11). 
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During the ensuing negotiations on the branch and company levels, only the FNV 
demands a wage rise above inflation. Half of the workforce receives a modest wage 
rise on top of the price compensation. In all contracts the number of holidays 
increases with one or two days. Total wage costs increase with some 6.5%. 
Government does not intervene in the outcome of the negotiations (Windmuller et al 
1983: 241-243; SIB 2, 1979: 4-6). On the central level, talks about extra employment 
policies, based on Bestek ’81, continue (SIB 4, 1979: 22; SIB 5, 1979: 7, 13, 17; SIB 
8, 1979: 8; SIB 9, 1979: 17). A joint report of a tripartite working party is, however, 
in the final instance rejected by the FNV, who in turn come with their own report 
(SIB 32, 1979: 14, 15; SIB 33, 1979: 17, 18; SIB 34, 1979: 24; SIB 35, 1979: 16). 
 
1979 
Government strategy IV II IV II 
Trade unions style A A A A 
Employers’ organisations style B B B B 
Combined style social partners A A A A 
Outcome IIA 
 
The government determines beforehand the room for wage rises. At the same time, 
the government’s policy package to facilitate negotiations does include incentives for 
especially the trade unions to entice them to conclude a central agreement. These 
incentives, however, fall far short of the unions’ demands. The subsequently enlarged 
government’s policy package with extra public expenditure equally fails to bring 
trade unions and employers’ organisations to a central agreement. The enlarged 
policy package is the framework in which decentral negotiations take place. 
Government does not intervene in the outcome of these negotiations.
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1980 
 
Wage negotiations for 1980 are completely dominated by the effects of the second oil 
crisis of 1979. Trade unions, especially the FNV, make every effort to get central 
negotiations going. Finally, they issue a concrete demand of a wage rise of 2% above 
the price compensation (SIB 37, 1979: 21, 22; SIB 38, 1979: 10, 11). Only then, do 
employers’ organisations take up a clear position (SIB 38, 1979: 12). They regard 
this demand as ‘a slap in the face’ as it means a rise in total wage costs of 5%. If 
unions stick to their demands, employers’ organisations announce, they will not 
negotiate. As the government has announced tax cuts, they feel that any demand 
above a 0.5% wage rise is unfounded. Employers feel that the unions’ demands with 
respect to both wages and a reduction of working hours miss their mark: keeping 
buying power in tact and reducing unemployment (SIB 39, 1979: 5). 
The Van Agt I government (CDA, VVD) then intervenes with an incomes policy 
proposal based on wage moderation: price compensation plus 0.5% (SIB 37, 1979: 
25). 
The FNV counters with a demand for price compensation plus 1%. With this demand 
employers can agree. However, negotiations break down on a condition of the FNV: 
an extra payment between 0 and 1% for dirty, dangerous, and disagreeable jobs (SIB 
40, 1979: 5, 6; STAR 1985: 52). This became the so-called ‘nearly-agreement’ 
(bijna-accoord) of 1980, which was (all but) concluded, partly thanks to government 
intervention (see also Akkermans 1999: 67, 72-83, 88 on the internal ramifications on 
the FNV of this ‘nearly-agreement’). 
Early January 1980, the new economic forecasts of the effects of the second oil crisis 
become public (SIB 1, 1980: 49, 50). In response, government asks both parties to 
agree to a four-month wage pause, to gain time to devise a policy adjustment and to 
try and get both parties to a Central Agreement after all. Both parties refuse, and the 
government imposes a two-month ‘freeze’ of wages and other terms of employment, 
excluding the price compensation. In this ‘wage pause’ of two months the 
government will decide on appropriate measures to counter the economic downturn. 
Trade unions and employers’ organisations are asked to refrain from general wage 
rises and to reduce price compensations as well. In return, the government offers a 
tax cut to protect the purchasing power of people living on minimum wages and 
social security benefits (SIB 34, 1979: 39; SIB 37, 1979: 25; SIB 38, 1979: 7-9; SIB 
2, 1980: 9-20; SIB 7, 1980: 7-11).  
Trade unions and employers’ organisations eventually fail to reach an agreement, be 
it amongst themselves or with the government, even after an extension of the ‘wage 
pause’ with another month, and repeated threats by the government that it will ask for 
an extension of its regulatory powers under the Law on Wage Formation and impose 
a binding wage measure if no Central Agreement is reached (SIB 33, 1979: 29-31; 
SIB 38, 1979: 7-9; SIB 40, 1979: 5, 6; SIB 4, 1980: 9, 10; SIB 6, 1980: 14, 15, 24-26; 
SIB 7, 1980: 16, 17).  
Consequently, and despite strikes organised by the FNV against the proposed 
extension of the governments powers (SIB 2, 1980: 14; SIB 4, 1980: 8, 9; SIB 8, 
1980: 5-20; SIB 9, 1980: 18, 19), the government imposes a binding wage measure: 
no real wage increase is allowed and the price compensation is reduced by paying a 
set amount of 26 guilders per month to all (SIB 7, 1980: 7; Windmuller et al 1983: 
245/246). This intervention is followed by extra budget cuts to keep the deficit under 
6% (SIB 6, 1980: 16-20; SIB 7, 1980: 7-13; STAR 1985: 52). 
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Both employers’ organisations and trade unions thoroughly disagree with the 
government’s intervention policy, be it from a different perspective. They do agree 
on ‘free’ negotiations, without continuous government interference, but disagree on 
the contents of the government’s policy. Employers’ organisations feel the 
government does not go far enough, the FNV feel the government goes much too far. 
The CNV’s position is between the FNV and the employers’ organisations (SIB 6, 
1980: 26-30). The government in turn, feels that parties can not guarantee that free 
negotiations will not lead to excessive wage rises, which in turn, through all linking 
mechanisms between the market and the (semi-) public sector, will lead to even 
greater budget deficits (SIB 5, 1980: 9). 
 
1980 
Government strategy II III IV II IV 
Trade unions style B B B B B 
Employers’ organisations style B B B B B 
Combined style social partners B B B B B 
Outcome IVB 
 
First the government facilitates central negotiations by announcing tax cuts. When 
negotiations break down, government tries to get them going again by an incomes 
policy proposal that almost succeeds in getting trade unions and employers’ 
organisations to come to a central agreement. Then the effects of the second oil crisis 
begin to become clear, and government asks both parties to agree voluntarily to a 
wage pause. As parties refuse, the government institutes a binding wage pause. As 
trade unions and employers’ organisations still cannot come to an agreement, despite 
incentives offered by the government, the government finally imposes a binding 
wage measure. The binding wage measure is heavily opposed by both trade unions 
and employers’ organisations.
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1981 
 
In 1981, driven by the steadily worsening economic situation, the Van Agt I 
government (CDA, VVD) again sets limits to wage negotiations. No binding wage 
measure will be imposed, if the rise of combined total wages remains below 8%. 
Moreover, government is prepared to accept a higher budget deficit and offers 500 
million to combat unemployment for every per cent that combined total wages rise 
less than 8% (SIB 24, 1980: 3-6; SIB 25, 1980: 7-9). If, however, trade unions and 
employers’ organisations cannot reach an agreement, the price compensation or the 
holiday allowance will be capped (SIB 28, 1980: 3, 4). 
Again, government urges trade unions and employers’ organisations to reach a 
Central Agreement to exercise wage restraint. To make that possible, the government 
proposes a policy package of public expenditure (SIB 25, 1980: 7-9; SIB 29, 1980: 
17, 18; SIB 32, 1980: 24, 25). The package is, however, rejected by the FNV, 
because it falls far short of the goals set by the FNV: a clear and working 
employment policy, the targeted use of natural gas revenues for investment and jobs, 
and a more fair distribution of the proposed income reductions. In addition, the 
reductions in the price compensation by reducing its index and the cuts in holiday 
allowances are non-negotiable for the FNV (SIB 24, 1980: 6; SIB 27, 1980: 11; SIB 
29, 1980: 6, 7). For the CNV, the reduction of the price compensation is negotiable, 
if that money, plus the natural gas revenues, is put into a National Fund for 
Employment that is to promote investments that provide jobs (SIB 26, 1980: 17, 18; 
SIB 27, 1980: 11). 
Employers’ organisations, however, support the government’s policies. Their main 
criticism regards the high level of the budget deficit and insufficient cuts in public 
expenditure. They do agree with the reduction of the price compensation (SIB 27, 
1980: 10, 11; SIB 29, 1980: 7). 
During negotiations employers’ organisations hold back and do not respond to 
advances by the trade unions. Instead, they ask the government to implement its 
projected policy of wage restraint (SIB 30, 1980: 4, 5). The differences between both 
parties do not pertain as much to the amounts involved in the requested moderation, 
but rather to the distribution over the different income groups, and the effects on 
employment and profitability. 
When negotiations do break down, government responds with a partial wage 
measure, based on its previous policy proposals, which affects both new and existing 
contracts. The price compensation is reduced by 2%, and the holiday allowance with 
0.5%. Existing ‘floors’ in holiday allowances are not to be increased, and the 
allowances are capped at a maximum of 433.33 guilders per month. The aim is a rise 
of combined total wages of 4 to 5%. In exchange, taxes are cut as well. The 
government’s package does leave some room for extra payments for dirty, dangerous 
and disagreeable jobs, but the government immediately warns that ‘excessive’ wage 
rises will not be tolerated, that is, will lead to an encompassing wage measure (KHA 
1980: 675, 698, 707, 775; SIB 32, 1980: 24-26; SIB 34, 1980: 7, 8; SIB 2, 1981: 42, 
43; STAR 1985: 53). Trade unions express their disappointment; especially because 
existing contracts are broken open (SIB 32, 1980: 26). Employers’ organisations feel 
that the government’s intervention is inevitable, because of failing government 
policy. As long as the government does not solve the problems in the (semi-) public 
sector, the only way out is to restrain the (parties in the) market sector (SIB 34, 1980: 
9-11). 
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Early 1981, notwithstanding their disagreements on incomes policy, talks between 
employers’ organisations and trade unions on employment and labour market policies 
continue in the STAR. These talks result in an understanding between trade unions 
and employers’ organisations on three points: to further employment, to redistribute 
existing employment, and to improve the operation of the labour market. This 
understanding forms the basis for a series of recommendations for decentralised 
negotiations on the branch and company levels. On the central level, two working 
parties are installed to devise policies on employment and on bottlenecks in the 
labour market (SIB 2, 1981: 36, 37; SIB 3, 1981: 63-65; SIB 4, 1981: 84, 85; SIB 6, 
1981: 145-147; STAR 1985: 53). 
 
1981 
Government strategy III IV 
Trade unions style A A 
Employers’ organisations style A A 
Combined style social partners A A 
Outcome IVA 
 
The government proposes a policy package of public expenditure to get trade unions 
and employers’ organisations to conclude a central agreement on incomes policy. 
The package is rejected by trade unions. In response, employers’ organisations refuse 
to negotiate. Consequently, the government imposes its own incomes policy package 
on trade unions and employers’ organisations.  
On the issue of employment, trade unions and employers organisations manage to 
come to an understanding on their own. This understanding forms the basis for 
decentral negotiations.
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1982 
 
Before and in 1982, three governments are involved in wage negotiations: the 
government Van Agt I (CDA, VVD), Van Agt II (CDA, PvdA, D66) and Van Agt III 
(CDA, D66). The first Van Agt government continues with Bestek ’81: wage 
moderation and cuts in social security benefits, health care, and wages of civil 
servants and other (semi-) public sector employees, to prop up company profits and 
reduce rising budget deficits (SIB 19, 1981: 465). 
The Van Agt II government proposes a dual policy package: reduction of the growing 
budget deficit by continuation of cuts in government expenditure, accompanied by a 
job creation policy (SIB 24, 1981: 578-79; SIB 25, 1981: 603; SIB 5, 1982: 100, 
101). When parties cannot conclude a Central Agreement, government intervenes 
with a partial wage measure (SIB 25, 1981: 600, 601). Although the government in 
principle agrees to the contractual freedom of trade unions and employers’ 
organisations, it reserves the right to intervene when deemed necessary, but with a 
minimum of force, hence the ‘partial’ wage measure: 
- a maximum of 46.50 guilders in compensation for each per cent price rise; 
- holiday allowances are again cut with 0.5% and remain capped at 433.33 per 
month; 
- existing ‘floors’ in holiday allowances may, however, be increased with 5% (SIB 
3, 1982: 49, 50; STAR 1985: 54). 
The second Van Agt government has a very bad relation with both the trade unions 
(because of its proposals to reduce payments during sick leave (SIB 1, 1982: 7; SIB 
5, 1982: 98, 99; SIB 6, 1982: 119, 120)) and the employers’ organisations (due to the 
levelling effect of capping and reducing the price compensation and the holiday 
allowance). Due to internal disagreement over the policy of job creation between the 
PvdA on the one hand, and the CDA and D66 on the other, the government expires 
after six months (Windmuller et al 1983: 250-51; Roebroek and Hertogh 1998: 379). 
The minority government Van Agt III continues the original policy of the Van Agt I 
government: further wage moderation and budget cuts. For the first time, social 
security benefits are cut as well (SIB 11, 1982: 241, 242). The government’s main 
task, however, is to organise elections. The partial wage measure remains in force. 
Although both trade unions and employers’ organisations agree that economic 
growth is necessary, their opinions on the policy measures required to achieve that 
goal are wide apart. Both parties object to the package the new Van Agt II 
government proposes for the realisation of an agreement. Trade unions fear too much 
moderation and employers’ organisations too little budget cuts. Within a matter of 
weeks, negotiations have broken down and the government announces a partial wage 
measure. Both parties protest to this intervention, individually and as the STAR. 
Their main objections are that the intervention does away with contractual freedom, 
and that it is not in the interest of economic growth. The parties differ on the 
proposed corrections of the distribution of measures over higher and lower income 
groups. The trade unions feel that the proposed distribution remains unfair to the 
lower paid; the employers’ organisations are against any kind of ‘levelling’ measures 
(Windmuller et al 1983: 250, 251; KHA 1982: 104-108; SIB 25, 1981: 600-602). 
Parallel to the wage negotiations, the co-operation between both parties on 
employment, working hours and the operation of the labour market continues. The 
two working parties formed in 1981 issue reports which act as a series of 
recommendations to parties for decentralised negotiations on the branch and 
company level on issues like part time work, early retirement, job creation, 
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education, labour exchange, et cetera (SIB 23, 1981: 552; SIB 24, 1981: 572-575). 
Attempts by the Van Agt II government to prop up this co-operation by issuing an 
employment package founder on the internal disagreement within the government 
between the PvdA on the one hand, and the CDA and D66 on the other (SIB 4, 1982: 
84; SIB 5, 1982: 100-102; Windmuller et al 1983: 250-51). 
 
1982 
Government strategy I II IV 
Trade unions style B B B 
Employers’ organisations style B B B 
Combined style social partners B B B 
Outcome IVB 
 
On the issue of incomes policy, the various governments pursue their own course, as 
trade unions and employers’ organisations cannot come to an agreement. On the 
employment issue, parties intensify their co-operation, both on the central and the 
decentral level.
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1983 
 
The outgoing minority government Van Agt III (CDA, D66) proposes a tough budget 
for 1983. The aim is to prevent government finances getting out of control 
completely. The expected budget deficit over 1982 will be above 10%. Therefore, the 
government plans some 13,000 million guilders in budget cuts in 1983 by ‘freezing’ 
social security benefits and salaries in the (semi-) public sector on their July 1st, 1982 
levels. And even then the expected deficit for 1983 will reach 12%. Trade unions and 
employers’ organisations are asked to comply and to exercise a 2% wage moderation, 
that is, inflation minus 2%. If not, government will intervene to make sure its budget 
policy is not undermined by agreements between unions and employers. In return, 
government is prepared to hold the financial finalisation of the budget until after 
consultations with the STAR over wages and other terms of employment for 1983 
(SIB 15, 1982: 329; Roebroek and Hertogh 1998: 379-80). 
On 28 October 1982 CDA and VVD reach an agreement over a government policy 
platform for 1984-1986. This opens the way for the formation of the Lubbers I 
government. The 1983 budget is largely taken over from the outgoing government. 
For 1984-1986, the new government proposes wage moderation for the market sector 
of 2% per year (inflation minus 2%). The (semi-) public sector will face cuts of some 
12,000 million guilders in total. Half of this amount is achieved by cutting social 
security benefits and wages and other terms of employment in the (semi-) public 
sector. The other half will come out of other government expenditure. Special 
measures to spare the lowest paid workers are made conditional on the results of 
consultation with and between trade unions and employers’ organisations 
(Nederlandse Staatscourant 28-10-1982; Visser and Hemerijck 1997: 100). 
The agenda of the trade unions differs radically from the proposed government 
policies. For both the FNV and the CNV jobs are the main issue. They accept that in 
view of the severe economic problems income for workers cannot be maintained. 
FNV and CNV reject, however, that cutting wages only can solve the problems. In 
their view, that will only increase unemployment as a result of declining internal 
demand. Instead they argue for a comprehensive policy agreement between the 
government, the trade unions and the employers’ organisations. The core of that 
agreement should be an exchange between price compensation and jobs, by a 
reduction in working hours. The trade unions reject the proposed cuts in the (semi-) 
public sector. They want to preserve all existing linkages between the market and the 
(semi-) public sector (SIB 8, 1982: 166, 167; SIB 14, 1982: 307; SIB 15, 1982: 328, 
329). 
The employers’ organisations on the other hand see the proposed budget for 1983 as 
only the first step in a programme of even more cuts in the (semi-) public sector to 
get government finances in balance again. They argue for free negotiations on the 
decentral level of branches and industries, and reject a comprehensive central 
package like the unions propose. Only the retail organisations protest against the 
announced government cuts for fear of reduced internal demand (SIB 15, 1982: 328, 
329). 
Both trade unions and employers’ organisations agree, however, that further direct 
government intervention in wages and other terms of employment is undesirable (SIB 
15, 1982: 328). 
The incoming government Lubbers I puts pressure on trade unions and employers’ 
organisations by announcing that its government declaration in parliament will 
include yet again an intervention in wages and other terms of employment (see also 
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Jones 1999; Andeweg 2000: 706). This induces Van Veen, chairman of the STAR for 
the employers’ organisations, to persuade Kok, chairman of the STAR for the trade 
unions, to come to an agreement, the so-called ‘Akkoord van Wassenaar’ of 19 and 
24 November 1982, to keep government out of the market sector. Trade unions agree 
to suspension of the price indexation in 1983 and 1984, and employers agree to a 
reduction in working hours and the creation of part time jobs in order to redistribute 
employment. Both acknowledge that in the end it is the profitability and 
competitiveness of Dutch companies that are the reference points for negotiations. 
The ‘Wassenaar Agreement’ is not a Central Agreement with detailed clauses, but a 
‘recommendation’ to parties on the branch and industry level to ‘break open’ existing 
contracts in order to effect an exchange of price compensation for a reduction in 
working hours3
The Wassenaar Agreement regards the market sector. In response to the agreement, 
the government drops the proposed wage measure from its government declaration 
on 22 November 1982, but announces even greater cuts in the (semi-) public sector. 
Instead of 12,000 million over the whole period 1984-1986, it will be 7,000 million 
annually over those three years, or 21,000 million in toto. And for 1983, on top of the 
13,000 million already in the budget, another 1,200 million is added. Reduction of 
the budget deficit and deregulation of social security legislation to achieve a more 
flexible job market are the two main points of the government’s policy platform (SIB 
16, 1982: 359). Strongly opposed by the trade unions, the government introduces the 
necessary legislation to ‘freeze’ social security benefits, the minimum wage and 
wages in the (semi-) public sector. In effect, the (semi-) public sector is de-linked 
from the market sector (SIB 16, 1982: 359; SIB 17, 1982: 386, 387; Visser and 
Hemerijck 1997: 101; Akkermans 1999: 38). 
. In essence, the agreement is the first step of decentralisation of wage 
negotiations in the market sector (SIB 6, 1985: 114). On the central level, actors start 
working parties on the redistribution of employment and on youth unemployment 
(SIB 16, 1982: 353, 354; van Bottenburg 1995: 192-197; SIB 5, 1995: 10-13; SIB 12, 
1997: 3-9; Kuipers 1998: 15-21; Bruggeman and Camijn 1999: 265-271; STAR 
1985: 54, 55; Visser and Hemerijck 1997: 81, 82; Visser 1999: 288; Hemerijck and 
Visser 1999: 129-131; Hemerijck 2002: 231-232). 
In the market sector, the agreement is a great success, initially. On January 18, 1983 
more than 75% of workers under collective contracts have their price compensation 
suspended pending negotiations over where and how to use that money. But not all 
renegotiations succeed (SIB 1, 1983: 19). The government therefore announces that it 
will intervene with binding measures if unions and employers fail to agree on a 
reduction in working hours. Both parties oppose the possibility of intervention (SIB 
2, 1983: 49-51).  But under pressure of the government, trade unions and employers’ 
organisations on the branch and industry level succeed in reaching more agreements. 
In April 1983, some two-thirds of workers under collective contracts have their price 
compensation exchanged for a reduction in working hours, usually in the form of 
early retirement and more holidays. The collective contracts to this effect are usually 
for a period of up to two years. They end January 1st, 1985 or after (SIB 9, 1984: 
202). About one-third of the workforce eventually receives their price compensation 
in cash as no deals could be concluded. Trade unions and employers’ organisations 
are content with these results, and so is the government, who refrains from 
intervention (SIB 4, 1983: 97; SIB 5, 1983: 126, 127).  
                                            
3  The official title of the agreement is ‘Centrale aanbevelingen inzake aspecten van een 
werkgelegenheidsbeleid’ which translates roughly as ‘Central recommendations with regard to aspects 
of an employment policy’. 
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The government, in the mean time, continues and intensifies its programme of budget 
cuts by announcing a reduction of the minimum wage for the under-23, a reduction of 
social security benefits with 2%, and a capping of the holiday allowance for (semi-) 
public sector employees (SIB 3, 1983: 69, 70; SIB 4, 1983: 98; Roebroek and 
Hertogh 1998: 384-85).  
 
1983 
Government strategy III IV I IV I 
Trade unions style C B C B C 
Employers’ organisations style A C C B C 
Combined style social partners A B C B C 
Outcome IC 
 
Under strong pressure from the incoming government, trade unions and employers’ 
organisations succeed in striking a deal. The bipartite ‘Wassenaar Agreement’ is an 
exchange of the automatic price compensation for a reduction in working hours and 
the creation of part time jobs. Part of the agreement is the continuation of studies and 
working parties on employment issues. As decentral negotiations on the exchange 
proceed too slowly to the government’s liking, the government threatens to intervene 
with a binding measure. This induces trade unions and employers’ organisations to 
conclude more decentral agreements.  
Government policy is targeted on the reduction of the budget deficit by delinking the 
market and the (semi-) public sector and cutting benefits and wages in the (semi-
public) sector. The proposed cuts are not implemented in 1983.
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1984 
 
The Lubbers I (CDA-VVD) government’s original policy proposals for a 2% cut in 
minimum wages and social security benefits in October 1982 (see 1983) are shelved. 
Instead, in May and August 1983, the government seeks official advice by the SER 
on a new policy proposal for 1984. The new proposal includes: 
- no indexation of minimum wages and social security benefits in 1984 (as is 
prescribed by law); 
- a 3.5% cut of all social security benefits and the legal minimum wage as of 1 
January 1984; 
- a reduction of social security benefits from 80 to 70% of last earned wages (SIB 
5, 1983: 113-117; SIB 9, 1983: 197). 
In line with these cuts, the salaries of civil servants and other (semi-) public sector 
employees will also be cut by 3.5% on January 1st, 1984.  
The proposals are included in the 1984 budget that aims at a reduction of government 
spending with some 10,600 million guilders in 1984, including a 2,000 million 
guilder reduction in costs for employers (SIB 7, 1983: 170; SIB 9, 1983: 205).  
Trade unions are opposed to these cuts. They argue that the people hardest hit by the 
recession will carry the brunt of the budget cuts. Instead, unions propose a lower cut 
in incomes for everyone, plus an employment programme to combat unemployment, 
even if that means a higher budget deficit in 1984. They announce actions against the 
government’s 1984 budget (SIB 4, 1983: 98; SIB 6, 1983: 143, 144, 150; SIB 7, 
1983: 170; SIB 9, 1983: 205, 206; SIB 10, 1983: 236, 241). 
The employers’ organisations on the other hand, advocate even tougher cuts and 
changes in the social security system. They feel that government is not going far 
enough (SIB 6, 1983: 143). As to the 1984 budget, employers support the 
government. If the budget is implemented completely, 1984 will be the first year in 
which public spending and the budget deficit will not rise. The announced reduction 
in costs for employers in the market sector is welcomed as well (SIB 7, 1983: 170; 
SIB 9, 1983: 206). 
In October 1983, a majority in parliament approves the proposed budget (SIB 10, 
1983: 236). 
Consultations between the government, trade unions and employers’ organisations in 
the STAR in October and November 1983 do not lead to agreement. Trade unions 
organise the largest strikes and other actions by (semi-) public sector employees and 
civil servants since 1945. Government acknowledges that the difference in treatment 
of (semi-) public sector employees and civil servants compared to workers in the 
market sector is a problem. In the market sector no wage cuts are implemented, but 
instead an exchange between price indexation and a reduction in working hours was 
effected in 1983. However, as trade unions and employers’ organisations are not 
prepared to ‘break open’ existing collective contracts in the market sector to effect 
comparable cuts in wages in return for a further reduction in working hours, there is 
little the government can do to amend this. The trade unions’ alternative plans are not 
acceptable for the government, as they would increase the budget deficit. Employers’ 
associations support the government. In a gesture to the trade unions, the 3.5% cut in 
wages and benefits in the (semi-) public sector is reduced to 3%, and social security 
premiums paid by employees are reduced with 1.3% (SIB 10, 1983: 236, 237; SIB 
11, 1983: 257-271; STAR 1985: 56, 57; Akkermans 1999: 108-112). 
This difference between trade unions and employers’ organisations is reflected in the 
divided recommendation by the SER on the proposed cuts and other changes in the 
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social security benefit system: trade unions advise against, employers in favour (SIB 
10, 1983: 213-218). 
The agreement between government and employers’ organisations on this issue 
induces the trade unions to step up their actions. The FNV also temporarily stops its 
participation in all national advisory bodies until the law countering the 1984 budget 
has been officially effectuated (SIB 12, 1983: 289, 290). This is the case early 
December 1983. All actions then cease officially. But the FNV threatens to end its 
participation in the SER permanently, unless government is prepared to have 
meaningful consultations, including a discussion of alternative proposals, for future 
years. Duly, government states that it is well prepared to do so and seeks to include 
social partners in its deliberations from an early stage. In response, the FNV returns 
to the SER (SIB 12, 1983: 288, 289; SIB 1, 1984: 12). 
In January 1984, government starts a round of separate consultations with trade 
unions and employers’ organisations. On the agenda are the announced cuts in social 
security benefits from 80 to 70% of last earned wages. Employers’ organisations fear 
extra costs will result from these cuts, because in practice, through collective 
contracts, benefits are usually - at least temporarily - increased from 80 to 100% of 
last earnings. Without any accompanying legislation these proposed cuts will 
effectively mean higher costs for employers. Trade unions on the other hand remain 
dead set against the proposed cuts. As a result, in March 1984 the SER again delivers 
a divided recommendation on the proposed cuts in social security benefits as of 1 
July 1984: employers are in favour, despite their misgivings on costs, and trade 
unions are against (SIB 2, 1984: 44). 
Nevertheless, government decides to postpone its original plan to reduce benefits 
from 80 to 70% of last earned wages in 1984. Instead, for 1984 a few less drastic cuts 
are proposed, plus some changes in the system of bookkeeping of social security 
funds. This policy change, however, does not pacify trade unions. Employers’ 
organisations still prefer the original plan. But in June 1984, a majority in parliament 
approves the government’s change in policy (SIB 4, 1984: 96; SIB 6, 1984: 159). 
As most collective contracts (re)negotiated and concluded in 1983 cover 1984 as 
well, negotiations in branches and industries in the market sector are minimal. 
 
1984 
Government strategy I 
Trade unions style C 
Employers’ organisations style C 
Combined style social partners C 
Outcome IC 
 
Incomes policy in the market sector is determined by the bipartite Central Agreement 
and ensuing collective contracts struck in 1983 that cover 1984 as well. Incomes 
policy in the (semi-) public sector is determined by the government’s new policy 
package that is implemented against heavy opposition by the trade unions.
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19854
 
 
Agendas and consultations for 1985 are influenced by the April 1984 
recommendation of the SER on mid-term socio-economic policy: ‘economic growth 
and combating unemployment in a comprehensive policy’, both with respect to 
content and with respect to the organisation of consultations. 
Trade unions and employers’ organisations agree on the general goals of the policy: a 
recovery of the market sector, a reduction of public spending in relation to market 
income to provide for growth in the market sector, a reduction of the budget deficit, 
and a continuation of the redistribution of employment. They disagree, however, on 
ways and means and timetables to reach these goals. Employers’ organisations want a 
continuation of the reduction of public spending to reduce the budget deficit and 
costs for employers. In order to reach that goal, incomes in the (semi-) public sector 
should lag behind those in the market sector. 
Trade unions fear for growing unemployment as a result of reduced government 
spending and cuts in (semi-) public sector incomes. They argue for solidarity between 
(semi-) public sector and market sector. And they propose to use the announced 
reduction in costs for employers to create employment. To this end they are prepared 
to wait with a major reduction in the budget deficit until the economy has sufficiently 
recovered. 
The recommendation of the SER also proposes a reorganisation of consultations 
between government, trade unions and employers’ organisations. In the beginning of 
each year, the so-called spring consultation should be used to sound out the ideas for 
next year’s socio-economic policies, in preparation for the coming budget in 
September. In the autumn consultation, government and social partners then can co-
ordinate their policies for the coming year (SIB 4, 1984: 65-70). The new system was 
immediately put in action. 
 
Spring consultation 
The Lubbers I (CDA, VVD) government announces it will continue with the 
implementation of its original policy platform of reducing public spending and the 
budget deficit. With regard to the projected annual reduction in costs for employers, 
government is prepared to use that money to support the negotiations between 
employers’ organisations and trade unions on wages and other terms of employment, 
but only if and when that may lead to a further reduction in working hours, instead of 
an increase in wages. If that goal is achieved, government will also reduce working 
hours in the (semi-) public sector. 
Trade unions argue for fewer cuts in public spending to preserve employment in the 
internal sector of the economy, and propose to use the reduction in costs for 
employers for investments in the internal sector of the economy in order to boost 
employment. 
Employers’ organisations urge the government to continue its policies to reduce 
public spending and the budget deficit, but to increase the proposed reduction of 
                                            
4  In 1985, new legislation effectively ended any existing links between the market and the (semi-) 
public sector with regard to wages. Within the (semi-) public sector, trade unions and employers’ 
organisations are “free to negotiate wages (…) but within limits set by the Cabinet”. In continuous 
consultations with trade unions, “eight sectoral bargaining jurisdictions” are introduced in 1993, 
regarding “central government, local government, police, education”, (health) care, social services, 
and the like (Visser and Hemerijck 1997: 101-102). 
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costs for employers in 1985, and not to use that money for other purposes (SIB 5, 
1984: 117, 118) 
 
Agendas 
The government’s agenda for 1985 has two priorities: a further reduction in working 
hours (instead of higher wages) in the market sector, and a continuation of the cuts in 
the minimum wage and in social security benefits. In 1985, the minimum wage and 
social security benefits will again not be indexed for higher prices. And the level of 
benefits will be reduced from 80 tot 70% of last earned wages as of January 1st, 
1985. By introducing tax reductions, the buying power of the lowest paid and the 
people on benefits will be more or less maintained. Employers will receive a 
reduction in costs of some 1,500 million guilders (SIB 9, 1984: 202, 203,210, 211; 
SIB 10, 1984: 245; SIB 11, 1984: 254). 
The trade unions’ agenda for 1985 gives priority to a combination of maintaining 
buying power of workers and getting a further reduction in working hours. A 36-hour 
working week in 1986 is the ultimate goal. The FNV threatens to ‘seize’ the proposed 
reduction in costs for employers as well, if government continues its plans to reduce 
benefits as of January 1st, 1985 (SIB 10, 1984: 243-245; SIB 11, 1984: 269). All 
trade unions criticise the government’s 1985 budget for undermining solidarity 
between workers in the market sector and in the (semi-) public sector, and between 
people on wages and people on benefits. In their view the budget is also one-sidedly 
aimed at a reduction in costs for employers and a reduction in government 
expenditure. Both of which have a negative bearing on employment (SIB 8, 1984: 
190; SIB 9, 1984: 211, 212). 
The agenda of employers’ organisations for 1985 includes: 
- no general collective increase in wages, but a continuation of wage moderation; 
- no general collective reduction in working hours; 
- special attention for employment measures aimed at young people (SIB 12, 1984: 
290). 
Employers’ organisations are in favour of the government’s 1985 budget with respect 
to the reduction of spending and of the deficit. However, they feel the proposed 
reduction of costs for employers is both too low and in fact not a reduction at all, due 
to some of the other government’s proposals. These include a reduction of reserves of 
social security funds, which have been accumulated over the years by contributions 
from employers. Also the proposed reduction of social security benefits from 80 to 
70% of last earnings will have to be ‘repaired’ by employers through collective 
contracts which up the legal percentages to 100% of last earned wages. Both these 
policies will effectively cost employers more than they will get in the form of cost 
reductions. This aspect of government policy is not helpful in restoring company 
profitability (SIB 9, 1984: 214, 215; SIB 10, 1984: 244, 245). 
 
Outcome 
The SER advises almost unanimously against reducing paid sick leave from 80 to 
70% of last earned wages, as that will jeopardise negotiations over the restoration of 
profitability and the redistribution of paid work (SIB 10, 1984: 217-219). The SER is 
evenly split between trade unions and employers’ organisations with respect to the 
government’s proposal not to index the minimum wage and social security benefits. 
Employers are in favour; trade unions oppose the proposal (SIB 10, 1984: 219-223). 
During the autumn consultation, the government announces it will implement its 
budget in 1985, as a majority in parliament has now approved it. Trade unions 
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reiterate their objections and employers’ organisations their support (except with 
respect to the proposed reduction in costs for them). As no tripartite agreement can be 
reached, negotiations for 1985 are referred to trade unions and employers’ 
organisations on the level of branches, industries and firms (SIB 10, 1984: 214).  
The FNV continues its actions and demonstrations against the government’s 
proposed budget for 1985 (SIB 11, 1984: 270), and, together with the CNV, 
announce that they will try to redress the effect of the government’s cuts in the 
minimum wage and benefits in the collective contracts. Trade unions want a further 
reduction in working hours as well. 
Employers complain that this is a violation of the 1982 Wassenaar Agreement for 
1983. That is based on both restoration of profitability and redistribution of work. 
Redressing government’s policy, as the unions want, has a negative effect on 
profitability of companies (SIB 10, 1984: 243; SIB 1, 1985: 15). 
During decentral negotiations, the FNV organises strikes and other actions in 
manufacturing industry and the building trade. Government threatens to intervene in 
collective contracts if cuts in benefits are ‘repaired’, but does not live up to it. In 
general, the social security cuts from 80 to 70% of last earned wages are ‘repaired’ to 
100% in collective contracts. And in most agreements either a further reduction in 
working hours is included, or at least a study into the feasibility thereof. However, 
most workers will not get a 36-hour week in 1986. Usually, a reduction of working 
hours is achieved by early retirement, part-time jobs, and more holidays. The average 
full time working week remains around 38 hours in 1985 (and in 1986 in two-year 
collective contracts). Most agreements cover one year, as opposed to 1983 when a 
majority of agreements lasted longer than one year (SIB 3, 1985: 54; SIB 4, 1985: 75; 
SIB 5, 1985: 105-107). 
Employers’ organisations and trade unions have a different evaluation of 1985. The 
employers stress that collective contracts concluded, on the whole support the notion 
of a combined strategy as agreed in the Wassenaar Agreement: restoration of 
economic growth (profitability) and of employment. This combined strategy was also 
the basis of the July 1984 recommendations of the STAR on youth unemployment. 
Employers also stress that the diversity in collective contracts underlines their 
preference for decentralised negotiations leading to a differentiation in results, that is, 
various forms of a reduction in working hours, as opposed to a general, collective 
reduction. 
Trade unions on the other hand state that 1986 will be crucial in their fight for a 
redistribution of employment by reducing weekly working hours. In 1986, the 36-
hour week will have to be effected, including concrete plans for employing new, 
additional staff to fill the hours relinquished by the original staff. Until now, this has 
not yet been the case. Further delay may give rise to the (dangerous) idea that a 
redistribution of work does not lead to more employment. That the reduction in 
working hours in whatever form had indeed not yet resulted in more employment up 
till mid 1985, was later borne out by research of the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Employment in September 1985 (SIB 7, 1985: 148, 149; SIB 9, 1985: 193; SIB 6, 
1986: 18). 
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1985 
Government strategy IV III I IV I 
Trade unions style B B A A B 
Employers’ organisations style B B B B B 
Combined style social partners B B A A B 
Outcome IB 
 
The government implements its own policy with regard to aspects of incomes policy. 
Central negotiations between the three actors involved do not result in any tripartite 
agreement. Decentral negotiations are characterised by strikes and other conflicts 
organised by the trade unions to redress at least part of the government’s policy 
package. Despite repeated threats, the government does not intervene in these 
negotiations, although trade unions succeed in redressing the effect of part of the 
government’s policy package. On the issue of working hours, however, employers 
are able to withstand unions’ demand for a 36-hour week in 1986.
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1986 
 
The Lubbers I (CDA-VVD) government’s agenda for 1986 is a continuation of stiff 
budget cuts to reduce the budget deficit further. Employees in the (semi-) public 
sector face a reduction of 2,000 million guilders. The minimum wage and social 
security benefits are again not indexed to price hikes. That saves another 1,800 
million. The insetting economic recovery has to be boosted primarily by the 
continuation of the government’s policy to reduce public spending and the budget 
deficit. Government sees no use for further large reductions in costs for employers. 
Consequently, some of these subsidies will be terminated. For the government, 
consultations with trade unions and employers organisations must focus on two 
issues: labour market bottlenecks and long-term unemployment (SIB 8, 1985: 169; 
SIB 9, 1985: 182-184; SIB 10, 1985: 209, 219, 220). 
Trade unions position their agenda for 1986 in connection with the coming general 
elections in that year and publish their agendas for the whole period 1986-1990 in 
which a new government will be in charge. Their main points for the period include a 
32-hour working week in 1990 and solidarity between people at work and people 
living on benefits, and between people working in the market sector and people 
employed in the (semi-) public sector. The budget deficit has to be reduced, but only 
in line with economic growth. Government’s policy should increase spending in the 
internal market sector of the economy. And as an employer, government should also 
reduce working hours in the (semi-) public sector (SIB 2, 1985: 37, 38; SIB 5, 1985: 
104). 
For 1986 specifically, trade unions go for a 36-hour week in the market sector. In the 
(semi-) public sector a 37-hour week in 1986 and a 36-hour week in 1987 is 
demanded. On top of that, the FNV demands a 1.5% wage rise, which can also be 
utilised for a further reduction in working hours, or can even be increased if 
employers refuse any further reduction. The CNV refrains from wage demands on the 
central level. That is left to branch and industry unions (SIB 7, 1985: 148, 149; SIB 
11, 1985: 244, 245). 
Like the trade unions, employers’ organisations position their agenda for 1986 as part 
of their agenda for the new government’s period 1986-1990. Their main points are 
the continuation of the reduction of the (semi-) public sector to reduce the budget 
deficit, lower taxes and social security premiums for employers and employees, and a 
moderate and differentiated development in the costs of wages and other terms of 
employment. Redistribution of work (Wassenaar) should be left to the branches, 
industries, and individual firms. It should definitely not be collectively imposed. The 
same should apply to decentral negotiations on wages and other terms of employment 
(SIB 5, 1985: 104, 105; SIB 10, 1985: 219, 220; SIB 11, 1985: 244). 
For 1986 specifically, employers’ organisations demand a 2,000 million guilder 
reduction of costs for employers, part of which can be used to maintain buying power 
of employees in the market sector (SIB 4, 1985: 78). 
Both trade unions and employers’ organisations are disappointed with the 
government’s 1986 budget. Trade unions disagree with the government on all issues 
regarding unemployment, government investment, reduction of working hours, and 
the focus of cuts on (semi-) public sector employees and social security benefits. 
More government investment and a further reduction of working hours in the (semi-) 
public sector should in their view, tackle unemployment. And again, employees in 
the (semi-) public sector and people living on social security benefits bear the brunt 
of most budget cuts (SIB 9, 1985: 183, 184). 
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Employers organisations are disappointed over the, in their view, meagre reduction of 
costs for them in 1986 and fear that they will even face an increase in costs in 1987. 
Employers’ organisations do, however, favour the government’s general agenda of 
reducing the (semi-) public sector and the budget deficit (SIB 9, 1985: 182, 183). 
For the tripartite consultations on November 29, 1985, the government sets the 
agenda: furthering employment and combating unemployment. All three parties 
involved agree that the policy to further economic growth, redistribute employment 
and solve labour market bottlenecks (Wassenaar) should be continued. To that effect, 
four working parties will report on possible solutions for education and training 
within industry, the long-term unemployed, youth unemployment and better 
information on the actual number of unemployed (SIB 11, 1985: 232)5
In the mean time, decentralised negotiations on wages and other terms of 
employment are taking place in the market sector. Already in an early stage, the FNV 
announces that the 36-hour week is not an issue for massive labour conflicts (SIB 2, 
1986: 17). Consequently, the FNV, but also the CNV, are left out of negotiations in 
some firms and industries where employers conclude separate contracts with the 
MHP. These contracts do not include any further reduction in weekly working hours 
(SIB 3, 1986: 11-14). Also in manufacturing industry, employers refuse a 36-hour 
working week. They prefer early retirement, part time jobs and on-the-job-training 
for young people. In response, the FNV initially refuses to sign the reports on 
education and training, and long-term unemployment on which agreement had been 
reached in the respective working parties on the central level (SIB 3, 1986: 11, 12). 
. 
However, in May 1986, government, trade unions and employers’ organisations 
agree in the STAR to set a common goal of less than 500,000 people to be 
unemployed in 1990. This has to be reached by a variety of measures as mentioned in 
the final four reports on education and training (bipartite), long-term unemployment 
(tripartite), youth unemployment (bipartite), and unemployment figures and statistics 
(tripartite). The national organisations of trade unions and employers call upon their 
affiliates to use these reports in the negotiations on the branch and industry levels 
(SIB 4, 1986: 1, 2, 10-14). 
Eventually, trade unions have to accept that the 36-hour week will not be reached in 
1986, which makes the prospect of a 32-hour week in 1990 unfeasible. Nevertheless, 
most contracts in manufacturing industry concluded in 1986 cover two years, instead 
of one (SIB 5, 1986: 18; CNV Annual Report 1987: 24). Employers’ organisations 
conclude that the outcomes of the 1985 and 1986 negotiations are completely in line 
with the Wassenaar Agreement. Some collective contracts already have 
recommendations and measures with regard to education and training, youth 
unemployment and the long-term unemployed (SIB 6, 1986: 18). 
                                            
5  After ‘Wassenaar’, government has refrained from direct intervention in wages or wage levels in the 
market sector. In 1986, the 1970 Law on Wage Formation is amended. Only one “legitimate reason for 
government intervention in the formation of wages” in the market sector remains, and that is “a 
national emergency, caused by ‘external factors’ ” (Korver 1993: 394). 
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1986 
Government strategy I 
Trade unions style A 
Employers’ organisations style A 
Combined style social partners A 
Outcome IA 
 
On the central level, the government succeeds in getting trade unions and employers’ 
organisations to come to an agreement amongst themselves and with the government 
on aspects regarding (un)employment. On the decentral level negotiations on 
incomes policy are characterised by conflicts over working hours. Employers’ 
organisations determine the outcome. The government determines incomes policy in 
the (semi-) public sector.
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1987 
 
After the general elections early 1986, CDA and VVD continue their coalition 
government in Lubbers II. The main point of their policy platform 1986-1990 is to 
combat unemployment. To that effect, the government will further the economic 
recovery, and continue to reduce government spending and the budget deficit. In this 
effort, government seeks to work closely together with social partners and aims at a 
Central Agreement or understanding regarding the main issues of socio-economic 
policy for the coming period (SIB 7, 1986: 7-9; SIB 9, 1986: 11, 12; Roebroek and 
Hertogh 1998: 396). 
As the Lubbers II government prepares the 1987 budget, it turns out that revenues 
from natural gas will drop dramatically in 1987. This induces the government to 
implement further cuts in expenditure, and impose higher taxes and other revenues. 
Notwithstanding these emergency measures, the budget deficit will rise again in 1987 
(SIB 9, 1986: 11, 12). The minimum wage and social security benefits will again not 
be indexed to higher prices (SIB 8, 1986: 8; SIB 9, 1986: 1; SIB 11, 1986: 9; SIB 12, 
1986: 15). 
Trade unions agree with the central issue of the government: bringing down 
unemployment. They are, however, sceptical whether that goal can be reached with 
the proposed policy platform. And they criticise the government’s continuation of 
cuts in the (semi-) public sector, including benefits, as opposed to the market sector. 
A general agreement or understanding with the government is only possible if major 
policy changes are effected (SIB 7, 1986: 8-10; SIB 9, 1986: 12, 13). With regard to 
the actual budget for 1987, trade unions acknowledge the need for further cuts due to 
reduced revenues from natural gas. They oppose, however, the proposed cuts for their 
adverse effects on employment and argue instead for higher taxation and other 
revenues from companies and citizens (SIB 9, 1986: 12). 
Unions’ agendas for 1987 differ. The FNV continues its campaign for the 36-hour 
week. The CNV brings up a new issue: ‘investment wages’ (investeringsloon), some 
form of wage rises to be paid into temporarily blocked accounts. This would enable 
trade unions to differentiate demands according to the profitability of companies, 
without any negative knock-on effects on benefits, pensions, inflation and the like 
(SIB 9, 1986: 11, 15). 
Employers’ organisations also agree with what they see as the central policy issue of 
the government: a further reduction of government spending to reduce the budget 
deficit (SIB 7, 1986: 9, 10). But they are critical about the actual budget for 1987, 
which will bring substantial extra costs for them (SIB 9, 1986: 12). Employers’ 
organisations are also hesitant about the Central Agreement the government 
proposes. They favour decentralised negotiations and solutions on the basis of the 
four reports agreed upon in May 1986 (SIB 9, 1986: 13). 
Tripartite consultations on October 31, 1986 do not lead to some sort of Central 
Agreement on jobs before income, as the government had hoped for. However, 
parties do agree on continuing the measures against unemployment which were 
proposed in May 1986 (SIB 10, 1986: 1, 2). But even on these issues, agreement is 
hard to reach. Employers’ organisations refuse to discuss terms for part time work as 
long as the FNV insists on a legal arrangement for trade union activities within 
companies (SIB 11, 1986: 14; SIB 12, 1986: 14). Trade unions and employers’ 
organisations are also at loggerheads regarding the minimum wage and the holiday 
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allowance.6
Early 1987, the government proposes new talks to resume the consultations which 
were broken off in October 1986. All parties have their doubts whether renewed talks 
will lead to results. Trade unions want more jobs and higher social security benefits if 
they are to accept a ‘moderate’ development of wages and other costs related to terms 
of employment. Employers’ organisations on the other hand want lower wage costs 
(SIB 1, 1987: 13).  
 Employers oppose any extra rise, whilst trade unions want an extra rise 
(SIB 12, 1986: 1-3). As central negotiations bog down, decentral negotiations 
continue, both in the market sector and in the (semi-) public sector (SIB 12, 1986: 15; 
SIB 1, 1987: 15). 
Finally, in June 1987, central tripartite consultations resume. The outcome is a 
confirmation of previous agreements in the STAR, and their continued application on 
the levels of branches, industries and companies. Parties agree to a moderate 
development of wages and other costs, to facilitate decentral agreements in order to 
reduce unemployment. No central guidelines as to the appropriate means will be 
issued. That will be left to the organisations on the decentral level. 
In return, government pledges to do its best – within given financial constraints – to 
ensure that the (semi-) public sector will be treated equal to the market sector with 
respect to wages and benefits. Government also pledges to ensure that its other 
policies will further and support the moderate wage and cost development in the 
market sector as much as possible. Lastly, government pledges to try and boost 
economic recovery by investment in the infrastructure. 
The original working parties – youth unemployment, education and training, long-
term unemployment, and employment figures – will continue their work. To show 
the government’s involvement, all working parties will be tripartite from now on. 
Their reports will serve as inputs for the 1988 budget (SIB 6, 1987: 1, 2). 
Decentral negotiations on collective contracts cover some 40% of the workforce, as 
many contracts concluded in 1986 cover two years. Negotiations are tough. A 
redistribution of work by reducing working hours is usually achieved by negotiating 
an earlier age to qualify for early retirement schemes, and extra days for education 
and training purposes. Where appropriate, unions do succeed in countering the 
reduction in social security benefits from 80 to 70% of last earnings (CNV Annual 
Report 1987: 24, 25; 1988: 31; VNO Sociaal Economische Kroniek 1987: 70, 71). 
Visser and Hemerijck conclude “by 1987 the campaign for shorter working hours 
was dead” (1997: 104). 
 
1987   
Government strategy III 
Trade unions style B 
Employers’ organisations style B 
Combined style  B 
Outcome IIIB 
 
With some difficulty, government succeeds in getting trade unions and employers’ 
organisations to participate in a tripartite Central Agreement. The agreement is that 
parties renew their commitment to previous bipartite and tripartite agreements on 
                                            
6  Apart from the bi-annual indexation of the minimum wage and social security benefits required by 
law (which was stopped since July 1st, 1983), the law on the minimum wage and the minimum 
holiday allowance also asks for a review every three years to see if there is a need for an extra rise of 
the minimum wage and the minimum holiday allowance. 
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employment policies. Decentral negotiations progress with some difficulty. 
Employers’ organisations determine the outcome with respect to working hours, 
while trade unions succeed in countering the reduction in social security benefits 
from 80 to 70%.
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1988 
 
The Lubbers II (CDA, VVD) government’s agenda for 1988 includes the repeal of 
the law which governs the bi-annual indexation of the minimum wage and social 
security benefits. Since July 1st, 1983 the law has not been applied in order to 
achieve sufficient cuts in public spending. And the law will also not be applied in 
1988. The government proposes to replace the law with a system in which the 
government can annually decide whether and how the minimum wage and benefits 
may be adjusted to the general economic situation. As a concession to the trade 
unions, government is prepared to up child allowances with 6%, and to increase the 
minimum holiday allowance for people on minimum wages and benefits from 7.5 to 
8%. The people worst off will receive an extra one-off payment on top of that. The 
government also proposes to end the legal minimum wage for 15 to 17 year-olds, as 
they are usually enrolled in some sort of education scheme at the workplace (SIB 1, 
1987: 11; SIB 7, 1987: 12; SIB 10, 1987: 8; SIB 3, 1988: 1, 2, 5-7). The 1988 budget 
also includes lower taxes on wages and lower social security premiums in order to 
keep wage costs down. However, investment premiums for companies will be 
stopped. All in all, government plans to reduce expenditure in 1988 with an 
additional 4,000 million, on top of the 3,000 million in the policy programme (CNV 
Annual Report 1988: 28, 29; Queen’s Speech 1987; Miljoenennota 1988) 
The trade unions’ agendas for 1988 differ slightly. Both FNV and CNV want to 
reduce unemployment, to have equal treatment of workers in the market sector and in 
the (semi-) public sector, to get extra money for the lowest incomes and for (massive) 
government investment to create jobs. If those demands can be met, the CNV is 
prepared to exercise wage moderation. The FNV, however, also want wage rises to 
increase real buying power of all employees. The FNV especially argues for an 
active, anti-cyclical government investment policy in infrastructure and the 
environment, instead of a continuation of budget cuts. Both trade unions criticise the 
government for not living up to its promise made during the spring consultations in 
1987 to try and achieve a comparable development of terms of employment in both 
the market and the (semi-) public sector – within given financial constraints (FNV 
Annual Report 1987: 5, 6; 1988: 5, 7, 9; CNV Annual Report 1988: 31, 32). 
Trade unions also oppose the government’s plans to shelve the law on the minimum 
wage and the proposal to end the minimum wage for 15 to 17 year-olds (SIB 9, 1987: 
11, 12; SIB 10, 1987: 8). 
The agenda for 1988 of the employers’ organisations aims at a continuation of the 
reduction of the government’s budget deficit, even if that requires additional budget 
cuts, and at a continuation of the reduction of wage and other costs to support the 
continuation of wage moderation by the unions. Employers’ organisations reject any 
Central Agreement for 1988 as that will, in their view, only serve as a minimum, and 
thus create an upward effect on wage costs. Differentiation is the keyword for them. 
From this perspective, employers are critical of the government’s budget. Although 
the proposed cuts in taxation are welcomed, employers feel that expenditure is still 
not under control. And while buying power for employees will remain stable or even 
slightly increase, profitability will decrease because of higher wage costs for 
companies. In 1988 moderation of wages and other terms of employment is required, 
and government should reduce spending. Employers’ organisations do support the 
government plans with regard to the minimum wage, but only grudgingly agree to the 
increase in child and holiday allowances, as that will increase their wage costs (SIB 
9, 1987: 11; SIB 10, 1987: 8; VNO Annual Report 1987: 6, 12, 16). 
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The autumn consultations in September 1987 reveal the grave differences of opinion 
between trade unions and employers’ organisations. The issue is the relation between 
a moderation in wage costs and boosting employment. Parties can not reach an 
agreement. Intervention by the government ensures that the four working parties will 
continue their work and issue their final reports. These reports will serve as 
recommendations for the organisations on the decentral levels. The object is to 
further employment by taking measures on the company level. This decentralised 
policy should also include a ‘sensible’ redistribution of work and a moderate 
development of wages. In November 1987, the STAR (SIB 9, 1987: 11; SIB 1, 1988: 
9) issues the four reports. And in February 1988 the government and the STAR come 
to an agreement with respect to the law on paid sick leave. Trade unions and 
employers’ organisations get greater responsibilities in the implementation of that 
law than was originally planned by the government (SIB 2, 1988: 7; SIB 4, 1989: 
11). 
The negotiations in branches and industries cover some 60% of the workforce in the 
market sector. The outcome is a minimal rise in wages, no further collective 
reductions in working hours, and although early retirement schemes are maintained, 
they are not expanded. Education and training will be intensified, flexible wage 
systems are introduced in some contracts, but the number of clauses covering the re-
employment of the long-term unemployed has not increased (VNO Annual Report 
1988: 11, 12; CNV Annual Report 1988: 31, 32). 
 
1988 
Government strategy II II II 
Trade unions style A C A 
Employers’ organisations style A C A 
Combined style social partners A C A 
Outcome IIA 
 
Trade unions and employers’ organisations cannot come to a central agreement. The 
four working parties on employment policies continue their work and issue their 
reports thanks to government intervention. These reports serve as a basis for 
decentral negotiations. Decentral contracts are largely determined by employers and 
only marginally feature aspects of employment policies recommended by the 
working parties.
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1989 
 
The Lubbers II (CDA, VVD) government’s agenda for 1989 again includes the 
delinkage of prices and the minimum wage and benefits. The government also again 
announces its intention to replace the law governing this indexation with a new law 
that would allow a more flexible annual adjustment of minimum wage and benefits 
(SIB 10, 1988: 1, 2). For the autumn consultations with trade unions and employers’ 
organisations the government focuses on (un)employment. Government grants and 
subsidies are earmarked to create jobs and to get the unemployed back to work. A 
host of policies is proposed. Ranging from (wage) subsidies for companies 
employing long-term unemployed to grants for taking on young people in training 
schemes; from (wage) subsidies for employers taking on people for unskilled labour 
paying the minimum wage to a modest increase in income for families living on one 
minimum benefit. Taxes will be cut, and child allowances will increase, to increase 
or maintain real buying power of workers. And there is some extra money to improve 
terms of employment for civil servants (SIB 11, 1988: 15, 16; Hoofdpunten van het 
regeringsbeleid 1989). 
The trade union’s agenda includes equal treatment of employees in the market and 
the (semi-) public sector, and an equal division of the available financial room for 
terms of employment over wages, employment, and labour market policies (FNV 
Annual Report 1988: 5, 7). Trade unions oppose the continuation of the 
government’s policy of de-linking wages and benefits in the (semi-) public sector 
from wages in the market sector (SIB 10, 1988: 1, 2). 
The employers’ organisations criticise the government for its growing expenditure 
and rising budget deficit (VNO Annual Report 1989: 9). Employers’ organisations 
support the government’s policy of de-linking the (semi-) public sector from the 
market sector (SIB 10, 1988: 1, 2). 
In October 1988, the government, trade unions and employers’ organisations meet to 
discuss government’s proposals to further employment and reduce unemployment. 
Parties agree to refer these proposals to the new tripartite Central Board for 
Employment (Centraal Bestuur Arbeidsvoorzieningen – CBA), heading the new 
organisation of employment agencies7
In a response to a majority SER recommendation to reinstate the linkage between the 
minimum wage and benefits and wages in the market sector in 1989, the government 
announces that it plans to use an extra 200 million to prop up buying power of people 
on minimum wages and benefits in 1989. Employers see this as a concession to trade 
unions. They themselves had argued for a reduction of the gross minimum wage 
instead (FNV Annual Report 1988: 7; 1989: 20; CNV Annual Report 1988: 30; VNO 
Annual Report 1988: 10). 
. The aim is to arrive at a concrete plan for 
action, with recommendations (and financial support by the government) for the 
affiliates of trade unions and employers’ organisations to get the long-term 
unemployed back into paid work (SIB 11, 1988: 15, 16; SIB 6, 1989: 8). 
In January 1989, the three parties meet again. This time the issue on the agenda is the 
fast growing number of people on sick leave and disability benefits. All parties agree 
that it is indeed an important social problem, that concrete steps have to be taken to 
stem the inflow of people in these benefits and to further the outflow of people from 
these benefits into paid jobs. To devise these concrete policies, a tripartite working 
group is set up. Their brief is to propose measures to reduce absence due to illness, to 
                                            
7  For an extensive overview of Dutch labour market and employment policies, see Visser and 
Hemerijck (1997: 155-179; 1998: 201-226) and Keman and Woldendorp (2000: 219-227). 
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further the quality of work on the workplace in order to prevent people falling ill, to 
give employers a financial stake in reducing both the number of people on sick leave 
and on disability benefits, and to get people on benefits back to paid jobs.  
To stress the urgency of the matter, government announces it will introduce 
compulsory quota if efforts of social partners are not sufficiently successful. The 
government will also see to it that the proposed law governing the quality of jobs 
(Arbowet – Arbeidsomstandighedenwet) will come into force in 1990 (SIB 3, 1989: 
13, 14). 
Eventually, the tripartite talks on the long-term unemployed founder on the demand 
of the FNV to release people on and just above the minimum wage from the 
obligation to pay social security premiums (FNV Annual Report 1988: 9). 
Decentral negotiations result in more clauses in collective contracts on education and 
training, childcare, and projects for the long-term unemployed. Wages rise 
moderately. No further collective reduction in working hours is achieved, early 
retirement schemes are not expanded (VNO Annual Report 1989: 13, 14; FNV 
Annual Report 1989: 7). 
 
1989  
Government strategy II 
Trade unions style B 
Employers’ organisations style B 
Combined style social partners B 
Outcome IIB 
 
Despite attempts and offers by the government, central negotiations on employment 
policies do not result in an agreement. On the issue of sick leave and disability a 
tripartite working group is started. Decentral negotiations show some effect of the 
recommendations from the previous working parties on employment.
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1990 
 
May 2, 1989: the CDA-VVD government breaks up. 
September 6, 1989: general elections. 
November 7, 1989: start of the new CDA-PvdA government. 
 
The new Lubbers III (CDA, PvdA) government’s agenda for 1990 is largely based on 
the outgoing government’s budget. It includes a reinstatement of the linkage between 
market and (semi-) public sectors, an increase in child allowances, a targeted 
maximum wage rise of 2.5% for both sectors, and some 4,000 million in tax cuts 
(SIB 1, 1990: 16; Startbrief).  
The government’s policy programme for 1990-1994 aims at economic recovery plus 
‘social renewal’ (sociale vernieuwing). That is getting people (married women, 
partially disabled, long term unemployed, ethnic minorities) into paid jobs by an 
active labour market policy (Roebroek and Hertogh 1998: 397). 
The agenda of the trade unions for 1990 was derived from their programmes covering 
the next government’s reign 1990-1994. The FNV, in its programme: ‘It can be done 
differently, better’, stresses that no government can count on their unconditional 
support. Support is conditional on the government’s policies addressing the union’s 
demands. The FNV demands more government expenditure for the environment, for 
infrastructure and for education, health- and childcare. It also wants to make up for 
the arrears incurred by the minimum wage and social security benefits since their 
indexation to wages in the market sector has been halted from July 1st, 1983. Benefit 
percentages of last earned wages should be increased from 70 to at least 75%. To that 
effect, the proposed tax reduction for higher incomes should be halved. The FNV 
also wants a 35-hour working week in 1994. 
The CNV, in its programme ‘The future in jobs’ also argues for a reduction in 
working time, but has no preference for any of the possible measures: a shorter 
working week, part time jobs, early retirement, longer holidays, et cetera. That should 
be left to the preferences on the industry and company level. The CNV wants more 
support for families living on one income. And the benefit percentages of last earned 
wages should increase to 75% (SIB 8/9, 1989: 1-3). 
For 1990 specifically, the FNV demands a 4% wage increase, plus another 2% for 
employment measures. The CNV refrains from issuing a central wage demand, but 
agrees that part of the available ‘wage room’ should be used for employment (SIB 1, 
1990: 16; CNV Annual Report 1990: 49-51; FNV Annual Report 1990: 7). 
Employers’ organisations also announce their programme for 1990-1994: ‘Give 
employers full play in Europe’. Less government expenditure and lower costs for 
companies is their main demand. Benefits should not be linked unconditionally to 
wage rises in the market sector. No further reductions in the working week, lower 
minimum wages and a continuation of wage moderation are next. Government 
should spend less on subsidies and grants for rents, housing and social services, in 
exchange for lower taxes. And disability insurance must be reconsidered to stem the 
influx of claimants (SIB 8/9, 1989: 1-3) 
For 1990 specifically employers criticise the reinstated automatic linkage between 
the market and the (semi-) public sector, and the government’s reluctance to continue 
with budget cuts at the expense of the deficit. Expected economic growth is basically 
used to pay for the linkage. The slightest economic downturn will therefore increase 
government expenditure and the budget deficit. The announced average wage rise of 
2.5% is much too high (VNO Annual Report 1989: 4, 5, 11-13). 
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Despite these differences, the autumn consultations on December 1st, 1989 lead to 
and agreement. The three parties involved issue the so-called ‘Gemeenschappelijk 
Beleidskader’ (GBK), or ‘Joint Policy Framework’. Its aims are: 
- to institute an ‘activating labour market policy’8
- reinstating the linkage between wages and benefits in the (semi-) public sector 
and wages in the market sector as of January 1st, 1990; 
; 
- sustaining competitiveness of companies. 
To achieve these aims, parties agree that a moderate development of wage costs is 
essential. And to support that, government will stabilise government expenditure, 
social security premiums and continue to reduce the deficit. Parties also agree that on 
the basis of this policy framework, more efforts are needed. Either in the form of 
concrete agreements on the decentral level, or by further study and recommendations 
by joint working parties. Subjects to be covered include the redistribution of work, 
education and training, the position of women on the labour market, furthering 
employment, a competitive market sector, good labour relations and satisfactory 
labour conditions on the workplace (quality of jobs). These recommendations have to 
be implemented in collective contracts (SIB 1, 1990: 1, 2, 13, 14; Akkermans 1999: 
133; Slomp 2002: 242).  Only the MHP distances itself form the GBK as it feels itself 
‘threatened’ by the sacrifices asked from middle and higher ranking staff with regard 
to wage moderation (SIB 1, 1990: 16). 
Decentral negotiations for collective contracts proceed with some difficulty. 
Employees in the (semi-) public sector demand more than twice as much (6%) as the 
government is prepared to offer (2.5%). Also in other industries and companies there 
are problems. In some industries initial wage rises achieved are so high that central 
trade union officials feel compelled to warn against high wage demands which may 
undo the re-established link between the (semi-) public sector and the market sector. 
In other industries negotiations break down and strikes are organised because of 
tough demands of employers regarding early retirement, overtime and waiting days 
when on sick leave. This induces the FNV to accuse the VNO of going directly 
against the GBK (SIB 1, 1990: 16, 17; SIB 2, 1990: 21; SIB 3, 1990: 14-18). A 
government investigation in 524 companies released in February 1990 seems to 
support this view. The great majority of employers have until then done nothing with 
recommendations by the STAR with regard to employment for ethnic minorities, 
young people and the long-term unemployment. Government stresses that part of the 
GBK is the agreement of all three parties to closely monitor decentral agreements. 
Government reiterates its threat to come with compulsory quota, although it still 
prefers consultations and voluntary agreements (SIB 3, 1990: 26; SIB 7/8, 1990: 28). 
Trade unions regret that the agreements made in the GBK have not been concrete 
enough (target numbers) and that employers have not been fully prepared to 
implement these agreements (SIB 5, 1990: 8). Employers do agree that more should 
be done with respect to non-wage agreements made in the GBK (SIB 5, 1990: 19). 
Slomp (2002: 236) concludes: “soon the agreement was a dead letter”. 
In the end, all contracts expired are renewed. Wage rises are slightly above the 
government’s target of 2.5%: between 2.7 and 2.8%, which is considerably lower 
than the initial union demands of about 4%. But on the other terms of employment 
trade unions hold their ground, although no further reduction in working hours per 
                                            
8  This is a concerted effort to get the individual unemployed to accept a job. Not only by subsidies and 
grants for companies employing the formerly unemployed, or by employment schemes targeted at 
companies or industries, but by directly approaching the individual unemployed with an offer ‘they 
can’t refuse’ on pain of benefit reductions. 
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week is achieved. Furthermore, in all contracts concluded after the GBK is issued, 
clauses are included stipulating specific employment measures with respect to the 
targeted groups: ethnic minorities, young people and the long-term unemployed (SIB 
3, 1990: 25, 26; SIB 4, 1990: 18, 19; SIB 5, 1990: 14-19; SIB 7/8, 1990: 28). 
Employers’ organisations insist that this shows that government does not have to go 
at it alone or impose policies with respect to childcare, ethnic minorities, or the long-
term unemployed (SIB 4, 1990: 4-13; SIB 5, 1990: 8, 19). 
Nevertheless, government decides to give the money earmarked for childcare to local 
authorities instead of to social partners. Both trade unions and employers’ 
organisations protest this decision. In the GBK, the three parties had agreed on 
further consultations on this issue before any money would be spent. Clauses in 
collective contracts on childcare are now endangered, as contract parties had 
anticipated a government subsidy. And the SER had also advised to give the money 
to social partners, instead of to the local authorities. However, government sticks to 
its decision and refers social partners to the 700 local authorities for consultation 
(SIB 4, 1990: 15; SIB 6, 1990: 17). 
 
1990 
Government strategy III III III 
Trade unions style C A B 
Employers’ organisations style C A B 
Combined style social partners C A B 
Outcome IIIB 
 
Tripartite negotiations result in a tripartite Central Agreement. Decentral negotiations 
are characterised by strikes and other conflicts and end in compromises, based on 
employment policies recommended by earlier working parties.
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1991 
 
The first budget prepared wholly by the Lubbers III government (CDA, PvdA) 
contains a host of temporary policies aimed at a reduction of government expenditure 
in 1994 with some 7,000 million guilders. The government announces it will propose 
structural measures in the spring of 1991, after the SER has advised on socio-
economic policies for 1991-1994. 
In the mean time, government does not want wage rises to exceed 3%, in order to be 
able to pay for the renewed linkage between wages, the minimum wage and social 
security benefits. Unless the coming autumn consultation results in agreements on 
wage moderation, jobs for (ethnic) minorities, and a reduction of the number of 
people on sick leave and with disability benefits, government will do away with the 
‘consensus model’ and unilaterally impose socioeconomic policies on trade unions 
and employers’ organisations (SIB 10, 1990: 18; SIB 11, 1990: 26; van Heertum-
Lemmen and Wilthagen 1996: 121, 127, 219). 
For trade unions, employment is again the central issue on the agenda, combined with 
the linkage between wages in the market sector and wages and benefits in the (semi-) 
public sector. Unions are willing to exchange wage moderation for employment by a 
further reduction in working hours, and to conclude a Central Agreement with 
employers to that effect, provided the government actively supports the creation of 
employment with its policies (SIB 10, 1990: 18, 19). The FNV wants a further 
reduction in working hours per week to a 35-hour week in 1993. Wage rises should, 
in their view, not exceed inflation (estimated at about 2.5%) plus the rise in 
productivity in the various industries. Half of that rise in productivity may be used for 
employment for (ethnic) minorities or other purposes than wages. Both FNV and 
CNV warn against high wage rises demanded by their various affiliated unions, 
which range form 4% (manufacturing, civil servants) to more than 10% (ports) (SIB 
11, 1990: 26; SIB 12, 1990: 19; SIB 1, 1991: 14, 15; SIB 2/3, 1991: 23). 
Employers’ organisations announce they will not exchange wage rises for 
employment (SIB 7/8, 1990: 24). They flatly refuse a further reduction in working 
hours and the reinstatement of any form of automatic indexation to prices (SIB 12, 
1990: 19). 
Autumn consultations in the STAR in October 1990 on the high level of sick leave 
and disability claimants and unemployment of (ethnic) minorities lead to a joint, 
tripartite declaration and a unanimous, bipartite report. The joint declaration on sick 
leave and disability acknowledges the shared responsibility of all three parties to the 
following package: 
- special attention to health and safety measures on the workplace as an item for 
negotiations on collective contracts; 
- special attention for the prevention of absence due to illness on the company 
level; 
- intensified attempts to reintegrate workers on sick leave in the workforce; 
- relaxing the rules and regulation to allow people on benefits to (re)start working 
without prejudicing their rights on benefits (SIB 11, 1990: 23, 24; van Heertum-
Lemmen and Wilthagen 1996: 73-77; 118-144). 
The report on reducing the high level of unemployment among (ethnic) minorities 
forms the basis for a joint policy of trade unions and employers’ organisations for 
‘more work for minorities’. The target is to get 60,000 people from (ethnic) 
minorities a job within a period of 4-5 years, starting in 1991. Education, training and 
preventing discriminatory hiring policies are to be the main tools. To that effect 
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companies and employers’ organisations will work closely with the regional 
employment offices (SIB 12, 1990: 14-16). 
In response, the government announces it will refrain from any legal measures to 
compel companies to employ (ethnic) minorities. The government will, however, 
seek advice from the SER as to legislation, which might support this agreement (SIB 
1, 1991: 14; SIB 2/3, 1991: 19; SIB 3, 1992: 1, 2). 
On the wage and working hours issue, trade unions and employers’ organisations 
remain in disagreement. Unions want a 4-day working week and offer wage 
moderation in exchange. Employers do want wage moderation, but are dead set 
against any further reduction in working hours or a 4-day working week (SIB 12, 
1990: 18). 
Decentralised negotiations on these issues take place in the context of a divided 
recommendation by the SER in January 1991 on socio-economic policies 1991-1994, 
and the more structural policy programme of budget cuts 1991-1994 proposed by the 
government in the so-called ‘Tussenbalans’ of February 1991. 
The SER is divided between on the one hand the FNV and CNV, and on the other 
hand the MHP, employers’ organisations and all ‘crown members’. FNV and CNV 
oppose a further reduction in government expenditure, but would rather use 
expenditure to create jobs. The more people in jobs, the lesser the budgetary 
problems of the government. They are also in favour of a net linkage between wages 
in the market sector and wages and benefits in the (semi-) public sector. 
The majority in the SER sees it the other way round. Less government expenditure 
means fewer costs for companies and citizens which gives more room for investment 
and jobs in the market sector. The linkage between market and (semi-) public sector 
should not be on a net basis, and there should be ample provision to suspend or delay 
the linkage if deemed necessary (SIB 7/8, 1990: 1-3, 6, 7; SIB 2/3, 1991: 5-8). 
The ‘Tussenbalans’ increases the reduction in government expenditure 1991-1994 
from 7,000 million to 12,800 million guilders. The government pledges to retain the 
linkage between wages and benefits in the market and the (semi-) public sector, but 
announces a rise in social security premiums if the rise of wages goes above its target 
of 3%. Trade unions remain critical: employment is not increased by budget cuts, and 
the (semi-) public sector again bears the brunt of the reduction in government 
expenditure. Trade unions differ in their view on the wage moderation demanded by 
the government. For the FNV wage moderation is conditional on job creation in the 
market sector by a reduction in weekly working hours. The CNV is in favour of wage 
moderation, but not under threat of higher social security premiums. 
Employers’ organisations agree with the CNV: the government’s position makes any 
fruitful co-operation between social partners rather difficult. They find the announced 
‘punishment’ by higher premiums if wage rises come above the prescribed limit 
‘unacceptable’. At the same time, employers’ organisations stress that the announced 
budget cuts remain insufficient and that other government policies greatly increase 
costs both for business and citizens, making job creation even more difficult (SIB 
2/3, 1991: 26, 27). Consequently, employers’ organisations boycott the spring 
consultations on the preparation of the 1992-budget (SIB 4/5, 1991: 26; Bruggeman 
and Carmijn 1999: 287-88). 
In branches and industries, collective contracts result in an average rise of about 4.7% 
in the market sector, which is well above the government’s target of 3%, but fall 
short of the demands of some trade unions, which were as high as 10%. Nevertheless, 
the government refrains from intervention. There is no significant further reduction 
of working hours in any form (early retirement, shorter working week, longer 
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holidays, et cetera) (SIB 8, 1992: 22). But almost all contracts contain clauses about 
reducing sick leave and disability (SIB 6/7, 1991: 32). As to ‘more work for 
minorities’, 1991 has been used to set up a machinery to get minorities a job. 
However, no significant number of people from minorities has actually been 
employed yet in 1991 (SIB 6/7, 1991: 32). 
Employers’ organisations conclude that decentral negotiations can lead to very 
moderate wage rises. Employers’ organisations announce they do not want to return 
to the (old) model of Central Agreements between social partners and government, at 
least not on this issue (SIB 6/7, 1991: 34). 
 
1991 
Government strategy IV III IV II 
Trade unions style C C B B 
Employers’ organisations style A C B B 
Combined style social partners A C B B 
Outcome IIB    
 
Under pressure from the government, trade unions and employers’ organisations 
come to an agreement amongst themselves and with the government on sick leave, 
disability and employment for ethnic minorities. Decentral negotiations on incomes 
policy result in a higher wage rise than originally stipulated by the government. 
Despite earlier threats, the government in the end refrains from intervention. Most 
contracts also include clauses on sick leave and disability, and on employment for 
ethnic minorities. Neither has yet materialised in any significant reduction or 
improvement.
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1992 
 
Negotiations on incomes policy for 1992 are conducted in the aftermath of the so-
called ‘disability crisis’ between July and October 19919
In response to this divided recommendation, the Lubbers III (CDA, PvdA) 
government announces it will reduce both the percentage of last earnings and the 
duration of benefits, broaden the definition of suitable employment and make an 
exchange between days on sick leave and holiday’s compulsory (SIB 6/7, 1991: 1, 
15, 33; Roebroek and Hertogh 1998: 397-401; 436-459). Trade unions than start a 
series of actions, demonstrations and strikes against these proposals (SIB 10/11, 
1991: 23). Their actions have some success. Government refrains from reducing the 
duration of benefits. Instead, the percentage of last earnings is reduced to 70% for the 
first year on sick leave. After that year people come into disability benefit, and 
depending on age, the percentage is increased until a maximum of 80%. Existing 
benefits will not be reduced, but will remain ‘frozen’ until they are on the same level 
as new cases. By law, all existing agreements in collective contracts to increase 
benefit percentages to either 100% (sick leave) or 80% (disability) are suspended by 
the government. These will have to be renegotiated. Government calls upon 
employers not to give in to union demands in this respect (SIB10/11, 1991: 24, 25). 
. The crisis starts with a 
divided recommendation by the SER on sick leave and disability in July 1991. 
Employers and ‘crown members’ want to limit disability benefits, both with respect 
to the percentage of last earnings and duration of the benefit. All three trade unions 
reject this. Employers, ‘crown members’, CNV and MHP agree on a much broader 
definition of suitable employment that people on sick leave or disability benefit have 
to accept when offered (SIB 6/7, 1991: 1, 13-23: Akkermans 1999: 140-144). 
The government’s 1992 budget reiterates the above policies. The government’s 
targeted wage rise for 1992 is 3% in both the market and the (semi-) public sector, 
with an expected inflation of 3.25%. The linkage between the market and the (semi-) 
public sector will not be fully restored in 1992. That would call for a 3.6% increase 
(SIB 9, 1991: 12; SIB 10/11, 1991: 4, 31; SIB 3, 1992: 22; SIB 4, 1992: 15). 
Trade unions reject the government’s policies on three counts. With regard to sick 
leave and disability, the incomplete linkage between the market and the (semi-) 
public sector, and the targeted maximum wage increase (SIB 10/11, 1991: 4). The 
CNV threatens to demand a 5% wage increase across the board now the government 
has shown to be a completely ‘untrustworthy partner’. Because of bleak economic 
prospects, the FNV is much more moderate in its wage demands: wage rises should 
at least cover expected inflation (3.5%). Further wage demands will depend on the 
situation in the various branches and industries. Apart from wages, the FNV demands 
more jobs, especially for (ethnic) minorities, and compensation for the government’s 
policies with regard to sick leave and disability (SIB 10/11, 1991: 28). All three trade 
unions hold the government responsible for destroying the existing ‘good social 
climate’ by its policies (SIB 10/11, 1991: 31). 
Employers’ organisations are content with the original government’s proposals on 
sick leave and disability benefits (SIB 6/7, 1991: 15). They are more critical towards 
the final policies, as these mean an increase in costs for employers if they cannot 
manage a reduction in sick leave and disability claims among their staff (SIB 10/11, 
1991: 24). For 1992 and 1993 employers’ organisations announce they will refuse to 
agree on increasing the legal percentages of last earnings for disability benefits. 
                                            
9  See Visser and Hemerijck (1997: 117-155; 1998: 159-201) and Roebroek and Hertogh (1998: 373-
460) for a detailed reconstruction of social security reforms between 1982 and the mid-1990s. 
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Employers praise the ‘realistic’ position taken by the FNV with respect to wages in 
1992, but question whether the affiliated branch and industry unions will comply 
(SIB 10/11, 1991: 26, 28, 30). Employers’ organisations criticise the government for 
its failure to reduce expenditure and its continuous increase of costs (benefits, rents, 
premiums, taxes, et cetera). All economic growth expected in 1992 will be needed for 
extra government expenditure. On top of that, government entertains a very 
‘centralistic’ view on wage developments (SIB 10/11, 1991: 31). 
The outcome for 1992 is that no autumn consultations between government, trade 
unions and employers’ organisations take place. Government does not want to budge 
on its disability policies, trade unions see no perspective for negotiations with the 
government due to its continued reduction in spending, and employers’ organisations 
feel that on the one hand government does not go far enough in reducing expenditure, 
and on the other hand keeps increasing costs for business (and citizens). 
In negotiations on the branch and industry level, employers put the financing of the 
early retirement schemes on the agenda. Costs have doubled in 10 years. Trade 
unions demand compensation for the government’s policies regarding sick leave and 
disability. Parties agree that absence due to illness (the first step towards disability) 
should be reduced (SIB 10/11, 1991: 17, 19, 26; Bruggeman and Carmijn 1999: 287-
288; STAR 1995: 98).  
In most collective contracts, trade unions succeed in getting compensation for 
government policies with regard to sick leave and disability, albeit sometimes in 
exchange for wage rises. This induces the government to publicly criticise employers 
for undermining its policies to reduce absence due to illness (SIB 3, 1992: 21, 22, 
25).  
Trade unions also manage to preserve existing schemes for early retirement, and get 
an average wage rise of around 4.4% in the market sector. Almost no concrete 
agreements are struck to reduce absence due to illness. The same goes for increased 
employment for (ethnic) minorities (SIB 5, 1992: 13; SIB 9, 1992: 8; SIB 6, 1993: 9). 
Despite industrial action, wage rises in the (semi-) public sector do not exceed 3%, 
the government’s target for 1992 (SIB 6/7, 1992: 12). 
 
1992 
Government strategy I 
Trade unions style A 
Employers’ organisations style B 
Combined style social partners A 
Outcome IA 
 
Central negotiations on incomes policy do not take place. All parties go their separate 
way. Trade unions clash with the government on its policy with regard to disability 
and sickness. In decentral negotiations trade unions manage to get their way to a 
large extent.
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1993 
 
The Lubbers III (CDA, PvdA) government’s main worry for 1993 is the percentage 
of expected wage rises, based on collective contracts concluded for 1992 and 1993. 
In the market sector the average wage rise already reaches 5%, covering 30% of 
employees under collective contracts. In the (semi-) public sector it is 4.5%. This 
endangers the restored linkage between wages in the private sector, the minimum 
wage, wages in the (semi-) public sector, and benefits. It also endangers the 
government’s two main policy aims: more jobs and more people at work. Therefore, 
the government favours a Central Agreement for 1993 to restrict wage rises to a 
compensation for price rises, in exchange for lower taxes and lower social security 
premiums. Wage rises in new contracts should not exceed 4%. The linkage of wages 
and benefits between the market and the (semi-) public sector will be partial, like in 
1992. Instead of a 3.8% rise (the average expected wage rise across the board in 
1993) the rise in the (semi-) public sector will be restricted to 2.5%, both to keep 
government expenditure under control and give people on benefits an incentive to 
find a job (SIB 3, 1992: 25; SIB 4, 1992: 13; SIB 6/7, 1992: 15; SIB 9, 1992: 10, 11; 
SIB 10, 1992: 8; SIB 11, 1992: 17). The government’s policy to reduce absence due 
to illness (see 1992) will be implemented starting January 1st, 1993 (SIB 11, 1992: 
26). 
As economic forecasts for 1993 become progressively poorer, the government asks 
trade unions and employers’ organisations to suspend agreed wage rises in existing 
contracts for 1993 and to refrain from wage rises in new contracts. In effect, 
government asks both parties to agree to ‘freeze’ wages in 1993 on the 1992-level. If 
parties can not agree voluntarily, the government threatens to impose a wage freeze 
unilaterally (SIB 12, 1992: 14, 15; SIB 1, 1993: 14; Visser and Hemerijck 1997: 
106). 
Finally, with great difficulty, the government succeeds in striking an internal 
compromise between CDA and PvdA on the disability issue. Old cases will be left 
alone (PvdA), but new cases will receive 70% of last earnings (instead of 80%) for a 
maximum of three years (instead of until retirement) and then a lower benefit until 
retirement, depending on age and other criteria (CDA) (SIB 3, 1993: 23). 
FNV and CNV are not averse to a Central Agreement in which wage moderation is 
exchanged for employment. They differ in appraisal of such an agreement. The FNV 
wants concrete deals on employment first, before entering into wage negotiations. 
The FNV is also quite critical of the government’s employment policies. These do 
not create employment, but seek to get the unemployed out of benefits. The CNV is 
more positive, both on government policies and on central negotiations. For the CNV 
a co-ordinated socio-economic policy is impossible without Central Agreement 
between government and social partners. And to be effective, such an agreement 
should be struck for at least five years. The MHP does not agree that central 
negotiations are necessary to ensure wage moderation. That can be left to negotiators 
on the decentral levels (SIB 5, 1992: 8; SIB 9, 1992: 10, 11; SIB 10, 1992: 15; SIB 
11, 1992: 24). 
At first, unions do not want to break open existing contracts. But if concrete 
agreements on employment can be struck, the FNV is willing to consider the 
possibility (SIB 12, 1992: 12, 15; SIB 3, 1993: 22) 
Employers’ organisations are initially not in favour of a Central Agreement on wage 
moderation, employment issues and lower costs for business and citizens (SIB 4, 
1992: 13). As economic forecasts worsen, employers also declare their willingness to 
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come to a Central Agreement. For employers’ organisations, however, the 
negotiations should be placed within the context of the EMU10
Negotiations and consultations take place against a background of steadily worsening 
economic prospects for 1993. The same goes for the recommendation by the SER on 
the EMU and its effects on economic developments, socio-economic policy and 
consultations between social partners and between social partners and the 
government
, and its consequences 
for the Dutch ‘consultation economy’ (overlegeconomie). Employers’ organisations 
are positive over the government’s 1993 budget, but feel that it is not up to 
international economic developments that may undermine economic growth (SIB 10, 
1992: 14). Although they do not want to interfere in existing contracts for 1993, 
employers’ organisations propose a wage ‘pause’ in 1993 by extending all expiring 
contracts with a few months (SIB 12, 1992: 12). 
11
In November 1992, the SER also unanimously advises the government not to 
implement the full linkage between wages in the market sector and wages and 
benefits in the (semi-) public sector (SIB 12, 1992: 2). 
. The recommendation is unanimous and aims at a joint policy of 
government, trade unions and employers’ organisations to get more people into paid 
jobs. To that effect, both a reduction in costs imposed by government on business and 
citizens, and a moderate wage cost development is needed. To achieve these 
objectives, the ‘consultation economy’ has to be revitalised (SIB 11, 1992: 1, 13-16; 
STAR 1995: 18-20). This unanimous recommendation paves the way for a Central 
Agreement between employers’ organisations and trade unions in November 1992, 
after weeks of negotiations. Eventually, it is the government that makes the 
agreement possible after negotiations in the end break down on the employers’ 
demand for a three-month wage pause. In the final Central Agreement employers’ 
organisations and trade unions agree to a  two-month wage pause by extending 
collective contracts that expire on January 1st, 1993 (collective contracts expiring on 
a later date will not be extended). This time will be used to formulate joint policies to 
further employment and to reduce unemployment. In the mean time, government will 
take extra fiscal and other measures to prop up buying power of employees. In 
conjunction with a lower than expected inflation, real buying power in 1993 will 
increase with 2.5%. The government will also refrain from direct intervention in 
wages (SIB 12, 1992: 1, 10, 11; SIB 1, 1993: 14; STAR 1995: 17; Akkermans 1999: 
147). 
Based on the Central Agreement, in September 1993 the STAR issues guidelines for 
decentral negotiations. The aim is to keep older employees at work by various 
devices (a complete reversal of policies since the late 1970s). Existing early 
retirement schemes in which younger employees pay for the retirement of older 
colleagues should be changed into schemes in which employees start saving to pay 
for their early retirement themselves. Retirement in general should become more 
flexible. People wanting to continue working after the legal retirement age of 65 
should be able to do so (SIB 19, 1993: 8). 
Negotiations on the branch and industry level focus on the reparation of the effects of 
government policy regarding sick leave and disability. Employers’ organisations and 
the government reject that reparation. The government even calls on employers’ 
organisations not to give in to union demands and threatens not to make collective 
                                            
10  In December 1991 in Maastricht, the EU agreed upon the EMU. As of January 1, 1997, for a 
country to be able to join the EMU, the budget deficit should be 3% or less of GDP, the public debt 
60% or less of GDP, and inflation should not exceed the EU-average with more than 1%. 
11  SER, Convergentie en overlegeconomie. Den Haag, advies 92/15 of 20 November 1992. 
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contracts containing such clauses binding for the whole industry concerned. 
However, on the whole, unions manage to get their way, albeit that employees 
usually have to pay at least part of the price themselves. Only in a few cases explicit 
arrangements have been made to reduce absence due to illness that involve any 
pecuniary incentives, positive or negative. The average wage rise in 1993, however, 
is well below target: 2.6%, compared to an expected rise of around 4%, and slightly 
lower than inflation (SIB 4, 1993: 17; SIB 5, 1993: 9, 12, 13; SIB 6, 1993: 11-13; 
SIB 7, 1993: 16, 17; SIB 8/9, 1993: 10, 11; SIB 10, 1993: 10, 11; SIB 12, 1993: 20, 
21; Visser and Hemerijck 1997: 106; van den Toren 1996: 57).  
By the end of 1993, the STAR agreement ‘more work for minorities’ of 1990, is 
estimated to have helped some 30,000 of the planned 60,000 people (between 1991 
and 1996) to a job (SIB 2, 1995: 20, 21). 
 
1993 
Government strategy III IV III 
Trade unions style B B B 
Employers’ organisations style B B B 
Combined style social partners B B B 
Outcome IIIB   
 
Faced with deteriorating economic prospects, the government finally succeeds in 
getting trade unions and employers’ organisations to come to a bipartite Central 
Agreement on a wage pause. Decentral contracts involve a trade-off between wage 
rises and reparation of the effects of the government’s policy with regard to sick 
leave and disability.
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1994 
 
To reach its goal of a reduced budget deficit in 1994, the Lubbers III government 
(CDA, PvdA) faces additional budget cuts of some 8,000 million. Government 
considers a binding wage measure as well, to keep wages in the market sector in line 
with de-linked wages and benefits in the (semi-) public sector, in order to preserve as 
much employment as possible in the face of growing job losses. In its 1994 budget, 
the government also proposes to freeze the minimum wage and benefits in 1994. The 
SER is asked for advice on both issues. Simultaneously, the government proposes to 
scrap the legal obligation to ask for the SER’s recommendation (SIB 8/9, 1993: 1, 2, 
7, 10, 11; SIB 10, 1993: 12; Visser and Hemerijck 1997: 106, 107). 
As an alternative to a binding wage measure, the government also toys with the idea 
of a ‘solidarity pact’ with employers’ organisations and trade unions. The pact would 
include no wage rises for a three-year period, to prevent unemployment rising further 
(SIB 8/9, 1993: 14). 
Trade unions reject any government intervention in wages and refuse to break open 
collective contracts in 1994 to achieve a zero wage rise. They accuse the government 
of undermining their position, instead of furthering an exchange between wages and 
employment (SIB 10, 1993: 13). Instead, they propose an employment plan that 
would require the co-operation of all three parties. Employers should increase 
company investment, further part time work, and agree to a continuation of the 
reduction in working hours. Government should support those efforts with fiscal and 
other policies, and should also implement their own investment programme in 
infrastructure, R&D, environment and housing, at the expense of a higher deficit. In 
exchange, unions are willing to accept a loss in buying power, which means no wage 
rises in real terms (SIB 8/9, 1993: 2, 7, 10, 14, 15; SIB 11, 1993: 10). 
For the decentral negotiations, trade unions limit their demands to compensation for 
price rises, or less, depending on the actual situation in companies and industries. 
Other demands include a further collective reduction in working hours, and the right 
for employees to change from full time employment to part time employment if they 
so wish. All in all, it is left pretty much to branch and industry unions to fill in the 
package. The overriding objective is (the preservation of) employment (SIB 11, 
1993: 8, 10). 
Employers’ organisations also oppose any binding wage intervention by the 
government, and they do not agree to break open existing contracts to implement a 
wage freeze (SIB 8/9, 1993: 2, 7, 10). Employers’ organisations also reject any long-
term Central Agreements. They only want to negotiate for 1994, and only with the 
trade unions (SIB 11, 1993: 10). In effect, employers’ organisations want decentral 
negotiations with the unions restricted to the market sector, and the government to 
continue its policy of reducing government spending (SIB 10, 1993: 13). 
The rejection of binding wage interventions by trade unions and employers’ 
organisations is reflected in the almost unanimous recommendation by the SER 
against such an intervention. Negotiations should be left to the decentral level of 
branches and industries, because it is on that level that the most effective trade-offs 
(or even pay-offs) between wages and other issues can be made. The SER also 
unanimously advises to freeze the minimum wage and benefits in 1994, although the 
FNV insists on compensatory measures by the government (SIB 12, 1993: 17). 
Against the background of a deteriorating economy and pressure from the 
government, employers’ organisations and trade unions manage to come to a Central 
Agreement in November/December 1993: ‘A new direction’ (‘een nieuwe koers’). 
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The agreement sets the agenda for decentral negotiations in 1994 and following 
years. In response, the government retracts from its planned intervention (van 
Heertum-Lemmen and Wilthagen 1996: 219; Akkermans 1999: 148-149; Visser 
1999: 289; Slomp 2002: 237). 
The aim of the agreement is to contribute to a restoration of profitability of business 
and to increase employment, both in terms of the number of jobs and the number of 
people in jobs. The room for actual wage rises will depend on the situation in the 
branches and industries, and should preferably be used to increase employment. 
Employers’ organisations give up their resistance to collective reductions in working 
hours, trade unions agree to a further decentralisation, differentiation and 
flexibilisation of the terms of employment (Visser and Hemerijck 1997: 107-08; van 
den Toren 1996: 58). 
As to wage rises already agreed to in existing contracts, parties are suggested to use 
those for other issues, like: 
- part time work and flexible working patterns during people’s working lives 
(STAR report September 1993); 
- education and training; 
- creating jobs for the long term unemployed and the partially handicapped; 
- keeping older employees at work (STAR report  June 1993); 
- reducing absence due to illness (STAR report November 1991) (SIB 12, 1993: 1, 
11-14; SIB 1, 1994: 5, 14; Bruggeman and Carmijn 1999: 288-89; STAR 1995: 
76-79; 111-121; van Heertum-Lemmen and Wilthagen 1996: 77-80; 144-168). 
Decentral negotiations proceed on the basis of the Central Agreement. Wage rises in 
the market sector are minimal, but most contracts contain clauses on blocked, tax-
free savings accounts that are introduced by the government to make wage 
moderation more feasible. Wages in the (semi-) public sector remain frozen (SIB 7, 
1994: 19; SIB 8/9, 1994: 9; SIB 10, 1994: 17; Visser and Hemerijck 1997: 108). 
 
1994 
Government strategy IV II 
Trade unions style C C 
Employers’ organisations style A C 
Combined style social partners A C 
Outcome IIC 
 
Pressure by the government, combined with economic difficulties, brings trade 
unions and employers’ organisations to conclude a bipartite Central Agreement. 
Decentral negotiations proceed on the basis of this agreement.
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1995 
 
Negotiations for 1995 take place against the background of the general elections in 
May 1994, and the SER’s unanimous recommendation on socio-economic policy for 
the new government’s term in March 1994.  
Under pressure from its affiliated unions, the FNV distances itself from the originally 
unanimous recommendation. As a result, all the other parties involved accuse the 
FNV of damaging the ‘consultation economy’. The main bone of contention is that 
the FNV rejects the continuation of the austerity policy of budget cuts to comply with 
the EMU criteria of a maximum budget deficit of 3% GDP, and a public debt of not 
more than 60% of GDP. All other parties in the SER agree that government 
expenditure should be kept in check. Parties differ on how to achieve that. The 
employers’ organisations and a majority of ‘crown members’ want to economise on 
social security benefits. Trade unions and a minority of ‘crown members’ want to 
shift taxes and other levies from labour to energy and the environment. All parties 
agree that the linkage between wages in the market sector and wages and benefits in 
the (semi-) public sector should not be implemented if wages in the market sector and 
general unemployment increase above a certain level. Delinking is also seen as an 
incentive for people on benefits to seek and accept low paid jobs. Long-term 
unemployment of especially the low and unskilled is identified as one of the two 
main socio-economic issues for the new government. The other problem is the reform 
of the whole implementation machinery of social security benefits. 
The FNV supports the general direction of the recommended policies, but rejects the 
recommended extra budget cuts, especially on benefits, and wants to preserve, or 
rather to restore, the linkage between the market and the (semi-) public sector (SIB 
4/5, 1994: 1, 9-16). 
A majority in the SER later that year agrees with the government that in 1995 the 
market and the (semi-) public sector can remain delinked. FNV, and now also CNV, 
disagree, because they do not foresee excessive wage rises, nor an alarming increase 
in the number of unemployed (SIB 12, 1994: 20). 
The agenda of the new, ‘purple’ government Kok I (PvdA, D66, VVD) is as far as 
financial and socio-economic policies are concerned directed by the EMU criteria. 
For 1995 the agenda includes a number of items. Firstly, delinkage of wages and 
benefits in the market and (semi-) public sectors. Secondly, budget cuts of some 
4,500 million, including lower taxes, premiums and other levies. Thirdly, a proposal 
for a complete overhaul of sick leave and disability benefits. And fourthly, tougher 
criteria for unemployment benefit. In general, it will be more difficult to get benefits, 
the duration of benefits will be shorter, and benefits will not be indexed to inflation. 
To increase employment (the new government’s motto is ‘jobs, jobs, jobs’ (werk, 
werk, werk)), the government wants wage moderation. In return, it offers reductions 
in taxes and premiums, plus an employment policy to create 40,000 ‘additional’ jobs 
for the long-term unemployed12
                                            
12 ‘Additional’ jobs are jobs subsidised by the government that are necessary, but for various reasons 
not fulfilled. The single most important reason being that wage and other labour costs are too high to 
make it profitable for employers to hire people for these activities (See Visser and Hemerijck (1997: 
155-179; 1998: 159-201). 
. Social partners are asked to include pay scales for 
low paid jobs in their collective contracts under pain of not declaring these contracts 
binding for the whole sector or industry (SIB 10, 1994: 2, 8, 9; SIB 11, 1994: 14; SIB 
12, 1994: 22; SIB 3, 1995: 28). 
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The trade unions’ agenda for 1995 is quite moderate. Unions set a general wage rise 
of around 2.5%, which will be just over expected inflation. In sectors and industries 
which are doing well, unions have additional financial demands, like blocked saving 
accounts, extra holidays, and the like (SIB 11, 1994: 12). 
Employers’ organisations aim at differentiation in 1995. No collective (de)central 
agreements on wages, working hours, and so on. The companies should be the focus 
of negotiations, as was agreed in the 1994 agreement ‘A new direction’. Those 
companies that are doing well can afford (large) wage rises and also a reduction in 
working hours, but on an individual basis, not across the board (SIB 12, 1994: 22). 
The issues during the autumn consultations are (un)employment and wage 
moderation. Trade unions are only prepared to continue their policy of wage 
moderation if more new jobs are created. The 40,000 ‘additional’ jobs offered by the 
government do help, but are not sufficient. More part time jobs and a redistribution of 
work by a further reduction in working hours are needed. Not enough new jobs will 
mean higher wage demands. The unions declare that for them 1995 will be a crucial 
year with respect to the exchange of wage moderation for jobs. 
Employers’ organisations are quite happy with the way central consultations have 
been conducted lately: parties exchange their point of views and come to the shared 
opinion that unemployment should be decreased. But to effect that, employers 
maintain that decentralised, differentiated agreements are the best instruments. They 
reject any collective, across the board wage rises. 
The government pledges its commitment to further part time jobs and a redistribution 
of work by reducing regulations that impede a more flexible labour market, provided 
that trade unions and employers agree to more low and unskilled jobs in their 
respective collective contracts. To further that objective, government is prepared to 
reduce wage costs for employers of those jobs (SIB 11, 1994: 1; SIB 2, 1995: 22; SIB 
3, 1995: 30). 
Decentral negotiations are characterised by a long duration and a number of conflicts 
in manufacturing, the building industry, banking and other sectors. One of the main 
issues is the cost for early retirement schemes. On the whole, trade unions have to 
accept a redesign of the schemes from a collective annual levy to an individual 
savings system. Wage rises vary, but do not exceed 2.5%. No significant reduction of 
working hours is achieved. In the (semi-) public sector, however, wage rises are 
much lower, in return for a further reduction of working hours per week to a 36-hour 
week in 1997. 
Although more lowly paid jobs are created in collective contracts, government doubts 
this will be enough to significantly increase the number of those jobs. Government 
and social partners therefore agree to a joint investigation how to create more of these 
jobs as input for 1996. Moreover, government announces it plans to use the money 
earmarked for a reduction of costs for business to create low and unskilled jobs. Both 
trade unions and employers’ organisations agree to this proposal (SIB 4, 1995: 22, 
23; SIB 5, 1995: 34, 35; SIB 6, 1995: 6, 22, 23; SIB 7/8, 1995: 22, 23; SIB 9, 1995: 
22; SIB 10, 1995: 27; SIB 11, 1995: 11; SIB 12, 1995: 26; SIB 1, 1996: 26; SIB 2, 
1996: 27). 
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1995 
Government strategy II II II 
Trade unions style A B A 
Employers’ organisations style C B A 
Combined style social partners A B A 
Outcome IIA 
 
Central negotiations on (un)employment and wage moderation do not lead to a 
central agreement, but parties agree to a joint investigation how to create more jobs 
as input for 1996. Decentral negotiations on incomes policy are characterised by 
conflicts and long duration. Trade unions realise their wage demands, but have to 
accept the re-financing of early retirement schemes.
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1996 
 
The Kok I (PvdA, VVD, D66) government’s agenda for 1996 includes: 
- a restoration of the linkage between market and (semi-) public sector with regard 
to wages and benefits; 
- a continuation of wage moderation; 
- the creation of more low and unskilled jobs through collective contracts; 
- subsidies for employers employing long-term unemployed; 
- privatisation of the costs for sick leave to employers. 
Public debt is declining, the budget deficit will go down below 3%, employment is 
expected to grow with 100,000 jobs (sufficient to absorb new people entering the 
labour market), and therefore unemployment will not increase (SIB 10, 1995: 14-16). 
Trade unions agendas aim at a further reduction in working hours, plus a real rise in 
wages. The FNV demands a 36-hour week in 1996, preferably in the shape of a 4-day 
working week. Above the expected 2% inflation, the FNV demands at least a 1% real 
increase in wages = 3%. The CNV concludes that as in 1995 the exchange of wage 
moderation for jobs has not resulted in more jobs, wage moderation in 1996 is off the 
agenda. As the FNV, the CNV demands 3% and a reduction in working hours. In the 
longer term, the CNV wants to achieve a 4-day working week of 32 hours (SIB 9, 
1995: 22; SIB 11, 1995: 18). 
Employers’ organisations give priority to flexibility of working hours and wages in 
1996. Their main objective is to get rid of all special allowances for working 
overtime, working at night, in the weekends, and on holidays (SIB 7/8, 1995: 22). 
They do not agree to the government’s policy of privatising sick leave benefits (SIB 
11, 1995: 16, 19). 
Autumn consultations in October 1995 are wholly devoted to long-term 
unemployment of ethnic minorities. The 1991 agreement on ‘more work for 
minorities’ is extended with one year, to include 1996 as well. And trade unions and 
employers’ organisations promise the government to do their utmost to get more 
people from ethnic minorities a job. In exchange, the government ceases its policy of 
making collective contracts only provisionally binding. In 1996, parties agree, the 
STAR will report on the effects of the concerted efforts of unions and employers. 
With respect to the privatisation of sick leave benefits, the government refers the 
employers’ organisations to parliament that will have the last say on this matter (SIB 
11, 1995: 16, 19). 
Decentral negotiations proceed with few problems, except at Philips. On the whole, 
wage rises are about 3%. However, no significant reductions in working hours are 
achieved, although employers’ organisations did halt their central co-ordination of 
this issue (Visser and Hemerijck 1997: 108). On the other hand, no significant 
reduction in special allowances for working odd hours, as employers insisted upon, is 
achieved either. Trade unions do succeed in getting a better deal for ‘flex workers’ by 
the STAR agreement on ‘flexibility and security’ (SIB 5, 1996: 3-5). And most 
collective contracts include at least some clauses referring to lower pay scales for low 
and unskilled jobs. But not enough to the government’s liking. Unions and employers 
are advised that unless more of those jobs are created, parties may see their contracts 
not made binding (SIB 1, 1997: 27; SIB 3, 1996: 26; SIB 4, 1996: 26; SIB 5, 1996: 
28, 29; SIB 6, 1996: 26; SIB 7/8, 1996: 24). 
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1996 
Government strategy II II II 
Trade unions style B C B 
Employers’ organisations style B C B 
Combined style social partners B C B 
Outcome IIB 
 
Central negotiations are about the long-term unemployment of ethnic minorities. The 
1991 bipartite agreement is extended for another year. In exchange, the government 
ceases its policy of making collective contracts only provisionally binding. Decentral 
bargaining on incomes policy results in compromises.
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1997 
 
The Kok I (PvdA, VVD, D66) government’s agenda for 1997 includes the linkage 
between market and (semi-) public sectors, plus a tax reduction of 1,000 million 
targeted especially at lower incomes derived from paid work to further employment 
in low paid jobs and increase the financial difference between low paid jobs and 
benefits. Although social security premiums will bring in an additional 4,500 million 
to top up depleted reserves, this will have no negative effects on either buying power 
or jobs. The EMU deficit will be 2.2% (Miljoenennota 1997). 
The agendas of trade unions differ only slightly. The FNV assumes a total 
‘negotiation space’ of 3.5-4%. Their maximum wage demand is 3%. This leaves a 
maximum of 1% for ‘good causes’ like education and training, fighting age 
discrimination, more security for flex workers, and employment agreements targeted 
at the long-term unemployed. The 36-hour working week is also still on the agenda. 
For the CNV the ‘good causes’ take priority over wages (FNV Annual Report 1997: 
1; CNV Annual Report 1997: 8). 
For 1997, employers’ organisations again aim at a reduction of special allowances for 
over time, working late, and working in weekends and on holidays. A reduction in 
working hours will only be accepted in combination with proportionally lower 
wages. In general, employers want more flexibility in working hours and other terms 
of employment on the company level, as was agreed upon in the 1994 agreement ‘A 
new direction’. And wage rises should not exceed 2.5% (SIB 2, 1997: 22). From 
government, employers expect deregulation of markets and industrial relations, and a 
sound budget policy (VNO NCW Annual Report 1996: 8; 1997: 6) 
During the autumn consultations in October 1996, trade unions and employers’ 
organisations reach an understanding. Both parties reaffirm the 1994 agreement ‘A 
new direction’. For 1997, parties specifically agree to intensify education and training 
schemes on the company level, and to get more people from ethnic minorities a job 
(CNV Annual Report 1996: 15, 16; FNV Annual Report 1997: 4; VNO NCW Annual 
Report 1996: 41; Slomp 2002: 244) 
Decentral negotiations proceed with few difficulties. The average wage rise in the 
market sector is about 1.8%. The level of payment for low and unskilled jobs is 
steadily going down to the level of the legal minimum wage. Collective schemes of 
early retirement are giving way to more flexible and individual schemes, and costs 
are more and more transferred from employers to workers. Most collective contracts 
contain clauses referring to ‘additional’ jobs. But again no significant reduction in 
working hours per week is achieved. Although theoretically “about half of all full-
time employees will move to an average working week of 36 hours in the next year 
or so”(Visser and Hemerijck 1997: 108), this is usually in the form of a 38-hour 
working week plus more holidays (SIB 7, 1998: 26; FNV Annual Report 1997: 4). 
However, for the government these agreements on jobs for the lower and unskilled 
are still progressing too slowly. Parties are again warned that if the pace is not 
stepped up, the government will reconsider its policy with regard to declaring 
collective contracts binding for whole industries (SIB 1, 1997: 27). 
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1997 
Government strategy II II II 
Trade unions style B C B 
Employers’ organisations style B C B 
Combined style social partners B C B 
Outcome IIB 
 
Trade unions and employers’ organisations re-affirm their commitment to the 1994 
bipartite Central Agreement ‘A new direction’ and the 1991 and 1996 bipartite 
Central Agreements aimed at getting the long-term unemployed and ethnic minorities 
a job. Decentral contracts are concluded without much problems, although trade 
unions are only marginally successful in pressing their demands.
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1998 
 
The Kok I (PvdA, VVD, D66) government’s agenda for 1998 includes an increase in 
government spending with some 10,000 million and at the same time a further 
reduction of the deficit to 1.7%. The government plans to shift financial 
responsibility for sick leave and disability to employers. Lowering taxes and other 
costs will create jobs for especially the low paid, unskilled. Although social security 
premiums are again raised to continue to top up depleted reserves, the negative 
impact on labour costs is offset by the growing number of people in jobs and the 
declining number of benefit claimants. The government claims that in general the 
policy of reducing (labour) costs to further wage moderation has proved to be 
successful in the past years (Miljoenennota 1998). 
For 1998, trade unions demand higher wages, above the expected level of 2% 
inflation. FNV and MHP issue central figures: 3.75% and 4% respectively. Apart 
from a real rise in wages, FNV and CNV also want central negotiations and 
agreements on education and training, and on the rising level of labour intensity in 
the workplace. The quality of jobs, or health and safety on the workplace, also 
becomes an issue. For these and other issues another 1-1.25% is targeted by the FNV 
(SIB 10, 1997: 22; SIB 1, 1998: 34; CNV Annual Report 1997: 14; FNV Annual 
Report 1998: 13, 17-19). 
Employers’ organisations reject the total wage cost percentages of 4-5% mentioned 
by the FNV. Employers fear that demands of that magnitude may easily trigger a 
veritable ‘wave’ of excessive wage rises. Employers reiterate their general policy 
position: lower wage costs by lower taxation and lower social security premiums, 
flexibilisation of jobs, working hours and wages, and a restrained general incomes 
policy (SIB 9, 1997: 22; VNO NCW Annual Report 1997: 14) 
The outcome of central consultations is the agreement between social partners on 
‘Agenda 2002’, a new agenda for contractual negotiations in the coming years. The 
1994 agreement ’A new direction’ is vindicated, but a new central issue is added: 
continuous investment in adaptability of companies and employees. The agreement 
covers a large number of items and aims at 
- a modernisation of industrial relations in which market demands on companies 
have to be harmonised with demands and protection of employees; 
- a further decentralisation and differentiation of wages and terms of employment 
in which the economic profitability of companies, branches and industries is the 
point of reference; 
- a restrained general incomes policy; 
- a continuation of declaring collective contracts binding for whole industries (SIB 
12, 1997: 23). 
The agreement recommends social partners on the decentral levels to conclude 
contracts on issues like education and training, career planning, combining paid work 
and care, pensions, health and safety on the workplace, older employees, the long-
term unemployed, and labour intensity (STAR Annual Report 1997: 8, 9; Slomp 
2002: 238). 
The outcome of decentral negotiations shows an average wage rise of about 2.8%, 
well below original demands. The number of contracts containing clauses on 
individual arrangements for flexible retirement and saving holidays for early 
retirement steadily increases (SIB 7/8, 1999: 18). 
The FNV concludes that the recommendations of ‘Agenda 2002’ have not been fully 
implemented in collective contracts in 1998. To further implementation, the FNV 
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will specifically focus on the issues in the agreement in the coming negotiations on 
collective contracts in 1999 (FNV Annual Report 1998: 6). 
VNO NCW on the other hand sees ‘Agenda 2002’ as part of a whole series of recent 
bipartite agreements that signal the success of the STAR. In their view, ’Agenda 
2002’ is a good mix between wages and other issues. It has to be implemented on the 
decentral levels. That requires that the government exercises restraint with respect to 
interference in industrial relations. Legislation can only thwart negotiations and 
exchange between unions and employers (VNO NCW Annual Report 1997: 17). 
 
1998 
Government strategy II II II 
Trade unions style B C B 
Employers’ organisations style B C B 
Combined style social partners B C B 
Outcome IIB 
 
Trade unions and employers’ organisations agree on a new bipartite agenda for 
contractual negotiations in the coming years (‘Agenda 2002’), based on the 1994 
bipartite agreement ‘A new direction’. Decentral contracts are a trade-off between 
wages and re-financing of early retirement schemes.
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1999 
 
Negotiations for 1999 take place against the background of general elections in May 
1998. Trade unions and employers’ organisations issue their comprehensive agendas 
for the next government’s term 1998-2002, both separately, and as a recommendation 
by the SER on socio-economic policies 1998-2002. Social partners recommend the 
government to continue the success of the consultation economy and to continue to 
actively involve the SER and the STAR in economic decision making in order to 
increase the legitimacy of socio-economic policy. The involvement of social partners 
is also conditional for good labour relations and an efficient transformation of central 
policies to the decentral levels. Therefore, the policy of declaring collective contracts 
legally binding for the whole sector or industry should not be abolished. The SER 
regards this policy as one of the cornerstones of the highly effective consultation 
model. And without it, Central Agreements in the STAR like ‘A new direction’ or 
‘Agenda 2002’ are meaningless. The new government’s policy platform should also 
adhere to the recent recommendations by the SER, and should incorporate the 
continued involvement of employers’ organisations and trade unions in the 
implementation of social security benefits (SIB 6, 1998: 9, 10). 
With respect to incomes policy, the SER recommends to continue the differentiated 
and moderate developments in wage costs, and to allow for more flexibility in both 
(the level of) wages and (the amount of) working hours. Special attention should be 
devoted to keep older employees at work, to get more people from subsidised, 
‘additional’ jobs into ‘real’ jobs, and to get more people from unemployment and 
welfare benefits into a job, ‘additional’ or ‘real’ (SIB 5, 1998: 17-20). 
The new government Kok II is a continuation of the ‘purple’ coalition of PvdA, VVD 
and D66. Its policy platform includes the continuation of the previous government’s 
(un)employment policies. But pressure on social partners, especially on employers’ 
organisations is stepped up by the announcement of two new laws. These will give 
employees a legal right to use a specific number of days per year to take care of 
dependants, and to opt for part time work (Regeerakkoord 1998). 
The government’s agenda for 1999 aims at more jobs, a continued linkage of market 
and (semi-) public sectors, and a dynamic and sustainable economy. To that effect, 
government expects social partners to implement a restrained incomes policy, aimed 
at differentiation and flexibility in wages, and to focus specifically on education and 
training. In turn, the government will implement an active labour market policy, 
reduce costs for employees, and continue to make it more profitable for people on 
benefits to get low paid jobs and to keep older employees at work. For employers, the 
government plans to reduce the number of obsolete regulations (Miljoenennota 
1999). 
Trade unions issue different central figures for demanded wage rises. The FNV 
demands 3.5% across the board. The CNV gives an ‘indication’ of 3.25% from which 
affiliated unions may differ in both directions provided they can argue their case. The 
MHP declines to issue a central demand, but announces that 3% should be sufficient. 
Apart from the wage rises, both FNV and CNV also demand central negotiations on 
labour intensity, education and training, and all forms of temporary, sabbatical and 
other paid and unpaid leaves. The FNV also demands a 4-day, 36-hour working week 
(SIB 10, 1998: 22; SIB 11, 1998: 26; FNV Annual Report 1999: 4). 
Employers’ organisations foresee declining economic growth in 1999. They 
announce that a 2% wage rise is enough. Their other main issue is more flexibility in 
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the labour market. Hiring, firing and paying should become both easier and more 
differentiated (SIB 11, 1998: 26; SIB 1, 1999: 22). 
Central consultations in October 1998 consist of an exchange of views on the new, 
continued ‘purple’ government’s policy platform, the general economic situation and 
the socio-economic agenda for 1999. In November 1998, government asks trade 
unions to exercise moderation in their wage demands since economic forecasts for 
1999 become more and more pessimistic (SIB 12, 1998: 22). In December 1998 talks 
continue, based on a series of working papers on: 
- labour market policy; 
- policy towards older employees; 
- agreements on health and safety on the workplace; 
- education and training; 
- getting the unemployed on the labour market. 
Trade unions, employers’ organisations and the government conclude a series of 
agreements on these issues for implementation on the decentral level and agree to 
continue their deliberations on their differences of opinion on social security reform 
(SIB 10, 1998: 21; CNV Annual Report 1998: 17).  
All issues are finally wrapped up in the Spring consultations in June 1999. As 
economic growth turns out to be higher than expected, although mainly based on 
consumption and not on exports, wages are not a big issue. Government and social 
partners agree that more attention should be paid to 
- the erosion of profits; 
- the deterioration of competitiveness, and; 
- the declining growth of employment. 
Agreements are struck for 1999 and 2000, concerning a number of issues: 
- the shortage of qualified staff - social partners will be included in any government 
policy to redress that problem; 
- European employment policy – Europe will become a standing item on the 
agenda of consultation between government, trade unions and employers’ 
organisations; 
- childcare – the number of places will be increased considerably by the 
government; the STAR will include the issue in its guidelines for decentral 
collective negotiations; 
- training for the long-term unemployed – government and social partners will 
jointly provide sufficient training positions; 
- employability - in 1998, government and social partners agreed upon a 10-point 
programme; by the end of 1999 and evaluation will have to show the results; 
- reintegration of  people on disability benefits  -  the 1998 tripartite action 
programme  on this issue is reaffirmed; 
- ethnic minorities – the government’s policy is aimed at halving the difference in 
unemployment levels between the ethnic minorities and the Dutch; social partners 
must contribute; employers by complying to the law registering how many people 
from ethnic minorities companies employ and trade unions by encouraging their 
representatives in the works councils to take initiatives in this matter (SIB 6, 
1999: 25; SIB 7/8, 1999: 16) 
Decentral negotiations proceed with some minor difficulties, especially in the market 
sector. The average wage rise is some 2.7%. The number of contracts containing 
clauses on individual arrangements for flexible retirement and holidays steadily 
increases (SIB 7/8, 199: 18). Trade unions and employers’ organisations are satisfied 
with the results, although they agree that implementation of the more qualitative 
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aspects of the ‘Agenda 2002’ are still lagging somewhat behind (FNV Annual Report 
1999: 9; VNO NCW Annual Report 1999: 2; STAR Annual Report 1999: 7). 
 
1999 
Government strategy III III 
Trade unions style B C 
Employers’ organisations style B C 
Combined style social partners B C 
Outcome IIIC 
 
 
Trade unions and employers’ organisations conclude a series of Central Agreements 
with each other and with the government. These are both a re-affirmation of previous 
bipartite and tripartite agreements, and the adoption of new policy issues like 
childcare for negotiations on incomes policy. Decentral negotiations proceed on the 
basis of these agreements and result in compromises with which both parties are 
satisfied.
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2000 
 
The Kok II (PvdA, VVD, D66) government’s agenda for 2000 includes lower taxes 
and higher child allowances to increase buying power of the lowest income groups. 
Therefore, government welcomes the unanimous recommendation of the SER not to 
increase the legal minimum wage (SIB 9, 1999: 16/17; SIB 12, 1999: 19). 
Government pledges to continue its policy of lowering taxes and other costs to 
further a moderate incomes policy. The bottlenecks in the labour market are still the 
large number of long-term unemployed and the high unemployment among ethnic 
minorities. Government wants to continue to tackle these issues together with social 
partners. Government also proposes to take over the whole system of implementing 
social security benefits from employers’ organisations and trade unions, in order to 
be able to activate the long-term unemployed and people on disability benefits (SIB 
3, 2000: 15, 16; Miljoenennota 2000). 
Trade unions’ agendas hardly differ. The FNV does not issue a central figure for 
wage rises. Contracts already concluded for 2000 show an average wage rise of some 
3%. For new contracts, the FNV states, the figure will certainly be not lower. 
However, the FNV wants to concentrate on the combination of paid work and care, 
or private life in general. Child care has to be doubled, possibilities for paid and 
unpaid leave greatly improved, and workers should get a much greater say in 
working hours. For these issues, the FNV plans to use another 1.5%. The CNV issues 
an ‘indicative’ figure for wage rises of 3%, which is, however, not a central demand. 
The CNV also will focus on issues like work and care, labour intensity, 
employability, and jobs for minorities (FNV Annual Report 1999: 4; CNV Annual 
Report 1999: 16). 
Employers’ organisations insist on a continuation of wage moderation, flexibilisation 
of the labour market, reorganisation of government finances, increasing employment 
ratios, improving and modernising infrastructure, and modernisation of social 
security. Any attempts by the government to legally impose the possibility for 
workers to obtain paid or unpaid leave to care for dependants is rejected (SIB 2, 
2000: 11; VNO NCW Annual Report 1999: 12). 
On the central level, the government sees consultations more and more as a 
possibility for parties to inform each other of their views. Negotiations on wages and 
other terms of employment take place on the decentral levels of branches, industries 
and companies. Government trusts that trade unions and employers’ organisations 
will agree to a responsible incomes policy in 2000, and refrains from making its 
customary appeal for wage moderation (SIB 11, 1999: 3, 18).  
However, at the end of 1999, employers’ organisations and trade unions halt further 
consultations with the government in response to the government’s plans to oust 
social partners from the new organisation to implement social security benefits. 
Especially trade unions reject these plans, but employers’ organisations express their 
solidarity with the unions’ views. In the end, relations are patched up again with a 
compromise: the existing organisations that implement social security benefits are to 
be reorganised into one new agency, but trade unions and employers’ organisations 
remain involved in the implementation of benefits in an advisory capacity (SIB 2, 
2000: 10; SIB 3, 2000: 15, 16). 
Decentral negotiations proceed without much difficulty as the economy is booming. 
During the spring consultation of 21 June 2000, the government concludes that 
present wage rises are within reasonable limits. However, competitiveness of 
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companies may be jeopardised in the long run, if wage increases are not moderated. 
Average wage increases near the 4%, with a 2% inflation rate (SIB 7/8, 2000: 26). 
 
2000 
Government strategy II 
Trade unions style B 
Employers’ organisations style B 
Combined style social partners B 
Outcome IIB 
 
On the central level, contacts between the government and trade unions and 
employers’ organisations can be characterised as consultations in which points of 
view are exchanged. Negotiations take place on the decentral level and proceed 
without much difficulty as the economy is booming and government policy boosts 
buying power of the lower paid. 
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2001 
 
The ‘purple’ government’s agenda (Kok II: PvdA, D66, VVD) included ƒ 14,500 
million of extra expenditure in the (semi-) public sector (health, education, 
infrastructure) as well as a tax relief of ƒ 6,600 million that boosted buying power of 
all income groups. Nevertheless, for the first time in 51 years, there would be no 
budget deficit. In addition, the linkage between market sector wages, the legal 
minimum and benefits was continued. Government expected an economic growth of 
some 4%, with an inflation rate of 3.5%. Economic growth, extra expenditure and tax 
relief, however, contributed to the danger of an ‘overheating’ economy. Therefore, 
the government asked social partners to be ‘careful’, that is moderate, with structural 
wage increases. In exchange government offered additional expenditure for 
education, job training and on-the-job-training to ease labour market shortages 
(Staatscourant (181) 19-09-2000: 1; (235) 04-12-2000: 1). 
Trade unions’ agendas showed some internal differences. The FNV demanded a 4% 
wage increase whereas the FNV Builders union demanded 6%. Neither the FNV, nor 
the CNV supported this demand; both regarded it as a localised exception due to 
severe labour market shortages in the building industry (Staatscourant (235) 04-12-
2000: 1). Besides the wage increase of 4% the other central issues were ‘time’ 
(reduction of overtime, extra leave, the control of working rosters, the balance 
between working hours and private time, and so on), ‘employability’, and education, 
job training and on-the-job-training (FNV Annual Report 2000-2001: 4; SIB 2, 2001: 
11-13; FNV [zj: 2000]: 5, 7, 9-10, 14; FNV [zj: 2002]: 7). Trade unions were critical 
about the government’s budget. FNV and CNV demanded even more expenditure for 
the (semi-) public sector: an extra ƒ 11,500 million for education, health, and a more 
just distribution of incomes; extra policy measures to ease shortages on the labour 
market; and a one-off bonus of ƒ 100 for people on a minimum income (wages and 
benefits) (Staatscourant (181) 19-09-2001: 4). 
The agenda of VNO NCW was rather different from that of trade unions. Employers 
warned that structural wage increases continued to erode profitability of companies 
which might led to future redundancies. Employers therefore insisted on wage 
moderation. Employers also criticised the government for not sufficiently lowering 
costs for companies, in particular by reducing social security premiums as the various 
funds had accumulated substantial excess surpluses. Taxation of companies also 
remained on too high a level compared to other countries, despite the projected 
changes in the tax regime. According to employers, the outcome of government 
policy and trade union demands would be a reduction of Dutch competitiveness on 
the world market. The solution advocated by employers was to return the excess 
surpluses in the various social security funds to social partners (that could induce 
trade unions to wage moderation), to lower company and capital taxes (to boost 
competitiveness and profitability), to refrain from additional extra government 
expenditure (to pay for lower taxes), and to moderate wages (VNO NCW Annual 
Report 2000: 16; VNO NCW Annual Report 2001: 12, 17; Staatscourant (181) 19-
09-2001: 4). 
Since 1999, negotiations and consultations between the government and social 
partners had been organised and structured by a so-called ‘Regiegroep’ (literally: 
Direction group) in which representatives of social partners and the Ministry of 
Social Affairs (and other ministries, depending on the issues) informally discussed 
and determined the final agendas and venues for the Spring and Autumn 
consultations between government and social partners (STAR [zj: 2001): 6).  
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During the Autumn consultations on 4 December 2000 both the government and the 
employers expressed their concern with regard to wage increases and argued for 
moderation. Trade unions rejected that the (expected) wage increases over 2000 and 
2001 were or would be excessive. In both years average wage increases did not 
exceed 4%. Both the FNV and CNV maintained that the 6% demanded in the 
building industry would remain an exception. Nevertheless, all three actors agreed 
that there was a risk of an ‘overheating’ economy, i.e. a risk of increasing inflation 
(over 2001 an inflation rate of 3.5% was projected) which might fuel a price-wage-
price-spiral. Therefore social partners agreed to develop joint recommendations for 
decentral negotiations that focused specifically on education, job training and on-the-
job-training, arrangements for work leave, and flexible wage systems (Staatscourant 
(235) 04-12-2000: 1; STAR [zj: 2001]: 7-9; SIB 2, 2001: 11-13). 
After negotiations in the STAR  social partners concluded a bipartite Central 
Agreement (‘Er is meer nodig: aanbevelingen voor het arbeidsvoorwaardenoverleg 
2001’) on 22 December 2000. Based on both ‘A new direction’ (Central Agreement 
1993) and ‘Agenda 2002’ (Central Agreement 1997) that argued for decentralisation, 
differentiation, local control and individual responsibility, the 2001 agreement 
stipulated the commitment of social partners to the continuation of a moderate 
development of wage costs by shifting from structural across the board wage 
increases to more flexible wage systems that could move with the economic cycle 
and the position of the individual companies. The 2001 agreement also called for 
more attention to education, job training, on-the-job-training, employability, and the 
balance between work and private life. Trade unions agreed to a working week in 
excess of 36 hours in individual cases, but not as a collective measure. In return, 
social partners expected the promised extra government expenditure for education 
and health, as well as tax facilities to promote flexible wage systems (STAR [zj: 
2001]: 7, 9; VNO NCW Annual Report 2000: 16, 23; SIB 2, 2001: 11).  
Based on the Central Agreement and the massive boost of buying power due to 
government policies, decentral negotiations proceed smoothly, although social 
partners disagreed about the actual level of the average wage increase. According to 
the FNV that remained below 4% (FNV Annual Report 2000-2001: 5), but employers 
computed 4.5% (VNO NCW Annual Report 2002: 9). Both, however, agreed that the 
2001 negotiations did indeed result in a moderate wage increase, more flexible 
systems of remuneration and an increase in decentral agreements on education, job 
training and on-the-job-training (FNV Annual Report 2000-2001: 5; VNO NCW 
Annual report 2000: 16, 23; FNV [zj: 2002]:  7). VNO NCW concluded that the 
Polder Model had shown its viability (VNO NCW Annual report 2000: 23). 
Finally, although social partners ostensibly agreed ‘in principle’ with the 
government’s proposals to reform the social security and labour market 
implementation organisations from bipartite and tripartite organisations into one 
public organisation, they disagreed completely with their unexpectedly proposed 
minimal involvement in this new organisation. From paying and running the 
implementation organisations, social partners were relegated to an advisory capacity 
only in a new advisory board to the government: the Council for Work and Income 
(Raad voor Werk en Inkomen – RWI). The social security and other funds 
administered by the new organisation were, however, still largely filled with the 
premiums levied on employers and employees. Despite their concerted opposition 
government went ahead with the planned reorganisation (STAR [zj: 2001]: 10, 11; 
Bruggeman and van der Houwen 2005: 94-95). 
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2001 Incomes policy Social security 
Government strategy II - II IV 
Trade union style B - C A 
Employers style B - C A 
Combined style B - C A 
Outcome IIC 
Bipartite Central 
Agreement 
IVA 
 
Within the context of a booming economy that was at least partly fuelled by the 
government’s agenda social partners quickly agreed on a bipartite Central Agreement 
on wage moderation in order to reduce the risk of spiralling prices and wages. 
However, with regard to the social security reform the government implemented its 
own agenda, against that of social partners.
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2002 
 
Central negotiations on incomes policy for 2002 were heavily influenced by 9/11, the 
attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington on 
11 September 2001. The government’s agenda stipulated that the attacks were 
expected to have a negative bearing on the world economy and thus also on the 
Dutch economy, making economic prospects for 2002 even bleaker. The government 
originally projected an economic growth of only 2% with a 4% inflation rate, but 
these projections were expected to be negatively influenced by 9/11. Therefore, the 
government stated that wage moderation is required to protect competitiveness of 
Dutch companies. To further wage moderation, the government offered social 
partners € 1,300 million from the surpluses in the social security funds. Besides, for 
the second year running government increased expenditure in education, health (and 
security), with an additional € 3,800 million. Nevertheless, the government’s budget 
again showed a surplus, this time of 1% (Staatscourant (180) 18-09-2001: 1; STAR 
2002: 8). 
In the context of the projected decreasing economic growth and increasing inflation, 
exacerbated by 9/11, the central issue on trade unions’ agendas was ‘a responsible 
development of wage costs’. Trade unions complained that wage levels were pushed 
up by employers responding to shortages on the labour market. Instead of using more 
flexible systems of payments higher wages across the board were paid. This 
negatively (and unnecessarily) impacted upon the competitive position of companies. 
For 2002, the FNV worked with a so-called ‘negotiation space’ of 4% of which 3.5% 
was intended for wages and 0,5% for other issues (FNV 2001: 4, 12). The FNV 
therefore rejected the government’s request for (more) wage moderation in 2002. 
Wage rise demands remained below projected inflation levels, and wage level 
increase were due to employers themselves. The FNV was, however, prepared to 
conclude only short term collective contracts as prospects remained uncertain and 
pointed out that its demands were maximums that could be adjusted downwards, 
depending on the actual situation. Furthermore, FNV, CNV and MHP all argued that 
wage costs could be reduced by lower social security premiums as all social security 
funds still ran considerable excess surpluses. In their view, the proposed reduction of 
€ 1,300 million offered by the government was not sufficient (Staatscourant (180) 18-
09-2001: 5). The CNV declined to come with specific wage demands due to 9/11 
(CNV 2001: 17). Both FNV and CNV agendas again featured the issues of time (a 
shorter working week, extra leave, integration of leave regulations into one system), 
employability, education and on-the-job-training (based on the 1997 and 2001 
Central Agreements). In addition, trade unions argued for a concerted effort of all 
actors to get more people on the regular labour market, in particular people above 45 
years of age, ethnic minorities, and people with subsidised jobs (FNV Annual report  
2000-2001: 5, 7; FNV 2001: 4, 8, 9, 12-13; CNV 2001: 6, 17, 20-21). 
Given the ever bleaker economic prospects for 2002, wage moderation should be the 
central issue for negotiations according to VNO NCW. Increasing wage costs were 
eroding profitability and investments, undermining competitiveness, and that 
increased unemployment. Employers criticised the FNV sticking to its wage demands 
of being ‘rigid’ and  ‘irresponsible’ and praised the CNV and MHP from refraining to 
demand a specific wage increase until it was more evident how the economy would 
develop. Employers agreed with trade unions that the excess surpluses of the social 
security funds could be used to a larger extent to moderate wage costs (VNO NCW 
Annual report 2001: 6; Staatscourant (180) 18-09-2001: 5). 
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During the Autumn consultations on 15 November 2001 9/11 and its economic 
consequences were the central issue. All economic  projections were adjusted 
downwards. The government argued for wage moderation as wage costs were still 
increasing too much and too fast due to shortages in some sections of the labour 
market. Social partners agreed that the economy was slowing down and that a 
differentiated approach on the decentral level was called for to respond to the 
different economic positions of companies. In return they expected from the 
government an additional effort to lower wage costs, either by lowering social 
security premiums or returning more of the excess surpluses of the social security 
funds to social partners. The government, however, pointed out that both in 2001 and 
also for 2002 buying power had been significantly increased by tax reliefs, lower 
social security premiums and the (projected) return of part of the excess surpluses of 
the social security funds to social partners. Moreover, reducing the social security 
funds too much would negatively impact public debt and the budget deficit (based on 
the EMU Stabilisation Pact).  
The upshot of the consultation was that the government agreed to facilitate in-
company and other job training schemes by additional fiscal means (how and what 
would be decided during the Spring consultation in 2002) and that the 2001 Central 
Agreement that was also based on the 1997 Central Agreement ‘Agenda 2002’ would 
not be adjusted for decentral negotiations in 2002. In effect, the 2002 decentral 
negotiations were covered by the same guidelines as those in 2001 (STAR 2002: 8-9; 
VNO NCW Annual report 2001: 6, 12) and resulted in an average structural wage 
increase of some 3.7% (VNO NCW Annual report 2002: 9). 
Finally, in March 2002 social partners succeeded in concluding a unanimous 
agreement on the disability insurance (WAO) in the SER. Trade unions achieved a 
higher percentage of previous earnings fore employees suffering from a more than 
80% disability (75% instead of the current 70%) and had employers agree to top-up 
benefits for the 35-80% category to 70% of previous earnings. Employers got rid of 
the fines they had to pay in proportion to the number of disabled employees from 
their companies, whereas trade unions did agree not to use decentral negotiations to 
try and top-up the 70% of previous earnings sick leave benefits to 100% in the 
second year that employers agreed to keep sick employees on the pay roll before they 
entered the disability benefit system (SIB 1, 2002: 4-6; 2: 4-9; 3: 9-16). 
 
2002 Incomes policy  Social security 
Government strategy II I 
Trade union style B B 
Employers style B B 
Combined style B B 
Outcome IIB IB 
 
 
Despite attempts by the government, and after some discussion and disagreements, 
social partners decided not to adjust the bipartite Central 2001 on wage moderation 
(based on the 1997 ‘Agenda 2002’) for 2002. Decentral negotiations resulted in a 
slowing down of structural wage increases: from 4-4.5% in 2001 to 3.7% in 2002.
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2003 
 
Negotiations for incomes policy in 2003 take place against the background of one of 
the most turbulent years in Dutch politics after World War II. First, the premature 
demise of the ‘purple’ Kok II (PvdA, D66, VVD) government over an inquiry into 
Dutch responsibility for the mass murder by Serbs of Muslim men in Srebreniça in 
former Yugoslavia in 1995. Next the first political murder in the Netherlands for 
more than 300 years of the populist politician Pim Fortuyn that reverberated through 
the scheduled  general elections in May 2002. PvdA and VVD lost heavily and 
Fortuyn’s election list LPF won an unprecedented 26 seats (of 150). Coalition 
negotiations after the elections resulted in the government Balkenende I (CDA, VVD, 
LPF) in July 2002 that foundered already in October 2002 on internal disagreements 
within the LPF, between the LPF parliamentary party and the LPF ministers, and 
between the LPF ministers themselves. The caretaker government Balkenende II 
(CDA, VVD) organised new general elections in January 2003 in which the PvdA 
recouped most of its losses and the LPF lost heavily. Lengthy coalition negotiations 
unexpectedly culminated in the government  Balkenende III (CDA, D66, VVD) in 
May 2003 (Bruggeman and van der Houwen 2005: 99-101). 
The government’s agenda for incomes policy of both Balkenende I and Balkenende 
II was based on the original coalition agreement ‘Stragisch Akkoord’ (Stragic 
Agreement) of July 2002. Given progressively bleaker economic prospects fore the 
Netherlands – lower economic growth than the EU average or the US, increasing 
unemployment and increasing wage costs combined lead to a deterioration of 
profitability and hence to a deterioration of competitiveness of Dutch companies – 
the government opted for stern measures. The government’s aim was to increase 
employment, to lower inflation, and to get rid of public debt (in 25 years). This aim 
could only be reached by moderating wage costs, higher taxes (€ 4,400 million) and 
lower government expenditure (€ 3,600 million) which would inevitably lead to 
lower buying power for all. The government had only a modest amount available for 
extra expenditure on security, health and education (€ 1,000 million). To contribute 
positively to the government’s aims, social partners were requested to exercise wage 
moderation. If and when social partners could agree to wage moderation in a Central 
Agreement, the government was prepared to lower unemployment premiums with € 
500 million. Government declared trade unions’ wage demands of 3.5% 
‘unacceptable’ in view of the projected inflation rate of at least 3.5% in 2003. 
Notwithstanding this offer to social partners , the government intended to keep 
pursuing its own policies to arrive at wage moderation, i.e. lower wage costs, as well. 
The government intended to scrap blocked saving accounts for employees, and to end 
all forms of subsidised employment and fiscal support for early retirement schemes. 
In addition, the government rejected the unanimous recommendation of the SER on 
disability of March 2002 due to the costs involved. The government was not prepared 
to increase the benefit percentage for the 80% plus category from 70% to 75%, unless 
there would be a significant reduction of new disability cases. Besides, for the actual 
benefits for the partly disabled the government intended to take into account other 
household incomes, akin to social welfare benefits. Finally, government wanted to 
link the period in which a disability benefit could be received to the number of years 
of employment of the person in question, akin to the unemployment benefits, 
whereas disability benefits used to last until people qualified for an old age pension. 
After that period, claimants would revert to unemployment benefits, and ultimately to 
social welfare. The government did, however, take over one item from the rejected 
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unanimous SER recommendation: employees on sick leave would be kept on the 
company pay roll for two years. Employers rejected the government’s ‘selective 
shopping’ in the carefully designed compromise between social partners (Bruggeman 
and van der Houwen 2005: 101-102; Staatscourant (124) 03-07-2002: 1, 5; (141) 26-
07-2002: 1, 4; (178) 17-09-2002: 1, 3; (218) 12-11-2002: 6; STAR 2003a: 6-7; SIB 2, 
2003: 7-18). 
Trade unions acknowledged the projected economic deterioration in 2003 (decreasing 
economic growth and increasing inflation and unemployment). Trade unions also 
acknowledged that wage cost increases had to be moderated. However, they 
disagreed with the government and with employers that wage moderation should be 
the only tool, as wages were only part of total wage costs. And apart from requesting 
wage moderation, government had nothing to offer but a significant deterioration in 
employees’ rights with regard to disability, unemployment, early retirement, pensions 
and fiscal support for leave regulations and blocked savings accounts. Trade unions 
agendas featured a ‘negotiation space’ of some 4-4.5% of which at  most 3.5% was 
designated for wages and the remaining 0.5-1% for other terms of employment. The 
issues under that heading featured, like in 2001 and 2002, ‘time’, employability 
(education, job training and on-the-job-training), health on the shop floor, and 
restructuring early retirement schemes. Trade unions refused to conclude a Central 
Agreement on wage moderation only (FNV 2002: 3, 6-14; CNV 2002; Staatscourant 
(154) 14-08-2002:3, (178) 17-09-2002: 7; SIB 2, 2003: 7-18). 
Central issue on the agenda of employers was, as always, wage moderation in order 
to increase economic growth and employment by increasing competitiveness of 
companies. To achieve wage moderation social security premiums should be lowered 
as most of the social security funds still ran (excessive) surpluses. The increase in 
premiums for company or industry pensions due to the crash of the stock market, as 
well as additional demands made by the pension regulator should be temporised. 
Employers were much less critical about the remaining government agenda than trade 
unions, except for the government’s refusal to take over the unanimous SER 
recommendation on disability (WAO) and its intention to keep employees on sick 
leave two years on the company pay roll (VNO NCW Annual Report 2002: 8-9, 14-
5; SIB 2, 2003: 7-18). 
Negotiations between trade unions, employers, and the government took place in the 
context of a deteriorating economy (the after effects of 9/11) and political turmoil. 
All actors agreed on the deterioration of the economy but disagreed on the 
government’s agenda. Especially the government’s rejection of the unanimous SER 
recommendation on disability and its unilateral implementation of only one part of 
the compromise (employees on sick leave for two years on the company pay roll) 
was criticised by social partners. That rejection, plus the cut backs on disability 
payments the government planned to introduce in 2003 scuppered negotiations on a 
Central Agreement on wage moderation that would cover a number of years. For 
trade unions in particular the government’s agenda on disability was unacceptable, 
although the CNV was prepared to continue negotiations much longer than the FNV 
who actually pulled the plug on negotiations, much to the CNV’s frustration. 
Negotiations on a Central Agreement for 2003 continued in the understanding that 
the government would be willing to accommodate social partners on other issues, 
except disability. These issues included the continuation of blocked savings accounts 
(that had been introduced in the past to make wage moderation more palatable for 
trade unions ), lower costs for employers and employees (i.e. lower social security 
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premiums or refunds from social security funds’ surpluses), some extra payment for 
people on the minimum wage and benefits, and less cutbacks on subsidised jobs.  
After lengthy and difficult negotiations social partners (STAR) and the government 
issued separate but co-ordinated declarations on 28 November 2002. Social partners 
agreed to limit general wage rises to the level of inflation (estimated to be 2.5% in 
2003) or even lower depending on the actual position of companies. On the other 
hand, if companies were in good  shape, extra one-off payments above the general 
wage rise would be acceptable as well. The government topped up its offer of € 500 
million to € 900 million to support the bipartite Central Agreement.  The 
government’s € 900 million included an additional 400 million to cover social 
partners’ demands with regard to blocked savings accounts, subsidised jobs and an 
extra one-off payment for the minimum incomes. In addition, the government 
retracted its proposal that employers should keep their employees on sick leave on 
the pay roll for two years. Finally, the so-called ‘pension crisis’13
 
 would be discussed 
separately with social partners early 2003 (SIB  12, 2002: 17; 1, 2003: 9, 18, 24-5; 2, 
2003: 7-18, VNO NCW Annual Report 2002: 5, 8, 9, 14-15: STAR 2003a: 5-8, 24; 
STAR 2003b; Bruggeman and van der Houwen 2005: 99-102; Staatscourant (154) 
14-08-2002: 3, (164) 28-08-2002: 1, (218) 12-11-2002: 6, (230) 28-11-2002: 1). 
2003 Incomes policy Disability (WAO) 
Government strategy IV - II IV 
Trade union style A - B A 
Employers style A - B A 
Combined style A – B  
Outcome IIB 
Bipartite Central 
Agreement 
IVA 
 
Negotiations for 2003 focused on the government’s binding agenda. After lengthy, 
difficult and sometimes rather acrimonious negotiations between themselves and with 
the government social partners concluded to a bipartite Central Agreement on wage 
moderation. To support the Central Agreement, the government in a separate 
declaration retracted most of its projected agenda for 2003 (except its rejection of the 
SER recommendation on disability) and offered some additional expenditure as well.
                                            
13  The ‘pension crisis’ was due to the stock market crash. Company and industry pension funds did no 
longer reach the required legal levels of capital plus income in proportion to present and future 
liabilities and were legally obliged to increase premiums drastically. Increased pension premiums 
presented an additional heavy burden for employers and employees that threatened wage moderation. 
Social partners agreed that premiums should go up, but demanded a (much) slower pace. 
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2004 
 
Negotiations in 2004 are a continuation and largely a repetition of negotiations in 
2003, but even more difficult, protracted and conflictual. After the January 2003 
general elections the government Balkenende III  (CDA, D66, VVD) issued its 
agenda in May 2003. Over a period of four years, the government planned a 
reduction in expenditure of some € 13,000 million; for new policies only € 3,400 
million will be available. Government employees will receive a maximum pay rise of 
1% per year. The linkage between the legal minimum wage and benefits and wages 
in the market sector will only be kept in tact if and when market sector wages are 
moderated to about the same level as wages in the public sector. There will be no 
increase in buying power due to the new health insurance (premiums) and rising 
premiums for company and industry pensions. Furthermore, the government planned 
a series of cut-backs in social security as well. It will become more difficult to get 
unemployment benefits, disabilities of people below 45 years of age with a disability 
benefit  (WAO) will be re-assessed, and household income will be taken into account 
for the level of the disability benefit. Social welfare benefits and rent subsidies will 
be reduced. A few months later an additional reduction of € 3,000 million in 
government expenditure was announced (Bruggeman and van der Houwen 2005: 
102; SIB 9, 2003: 12-21; Staatscourant (95) 19-05-2003: 5, (126) 04-07-2003: 3, 
(174) 10-09-2003: 3). 
In its budget for 2004 the government announced yet again additional measures to 
reduce government expenditure and at the same time to boost employment of people 
between 55 and 65 years of age. All fiscal support for early retirement schemes will 
be ended, making it prohibitive expensive for most people to retire before they are 
65. And again employers will be obliged to keep employees on sick leave on their 
payroll for two years. The government deemed their policy package necessary to 
boost the economy. Without reforming the social security system, including health 
and pensions, that goal could not be reached. In effect, the government planned to put 
the Dutch welfare state on a different footing: instead of income support, individual 
responsibility, activation and employment should be the cornerstones (Staatscourant 
(174) 10-09-2003: 3, (178) 16-09-2003: 1, 3; SIB 9, 2003: 12-21; Star 2004a: 6; 
Bruggeman and van der Houwen 2005: 103). 
As negotiations in 2004 are a continuation (and a repetition) from those in 2003, 
social partners’ agendas are likewise dictated by that of the government. Negotiations 
continued through 2003, covering the bipartite Central Agreement for 2003 that was 
separately supported by the government on 18November 2002, and finally resulted in 
a new bipartite Central Agreement covering 2004 and 2005 in November 2003 that 
was supported by the government, again in a separate declaration. With some 
reservations and not wholeheartedly social partners agreed to wage moderation in 
2004 and 2005. In 2004 structural wage increases will amount to zero, in 2005 they 
will ‘near zero’. In exchange social partners expect to reach agreement with the 
government before April 2004 about the fiscal regime for early retirement schemes, 
including the pace of phasing-in of the governments’ measures and about additional 
one-off payments based on company profits. All trade unions signed up to the Central 
Agreement although not all agreed completely. Employers had supported most of the 
government’s agenda throughout, except for the government’s disability (WAO) 
proposals. 
In response to the bipartite Central Agreement on wage moderation, the government 
put most of its social security (WW and WAO) and early retirement retrenchment 
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proposals on hold (again), pending further negotiations with social partners in the 
STAR (early retirement) or a new recommendation by the SER (WW and WAO) 
early 2004. With regard to the WAO, however, government stipulated that this 
recommendation should result in a drastic reduction of new cases of full disability 
(over 80%) to 25,000 annually in 2006. If not, there would be no deal. Moreover, the 
minimum wage and benefits remained delinked in 2004 and 2005, and there would 
be no wage rises in the (semi-) public sector either in these two years. To solve the 
early retirement issue, the government was prepared to spend some € 2,200 million, 
for lower premiums in the new health insurance system in 2004 another € 200 million 
was available.  
As in 2003, in 2004 negotiations with the government for trade unions basically 
amounted to damage control: an attempt to reduce the impact of the planned 
reductions in government expenditure and social security reforms for their members 
(or employees and people living on benefits in general) in exchange for wage 
moderation. Employers also had some issues with the government but much less so 
than trade unions.  
Both in 2003 and 2004 rifts between and among social partners and especially 
between trade unions and the government increased and relations deteriorated 
progressively. The FNV organised a week of actions around the Autumn 
consultations on 14 October 2003 while at the same time the coming bipartite Central 
Agreement for 2004 and the concomitant government declaration to support it that 
were announced on 18 November 2003 were thrashed out in informal, behind the 
screen negotiations in the STAR and in the Regiegroup with the government. 
Negotiations between the government and social partners on disability (WAO), 
unemployment and early retirement foundered in Spring 2004. Social partners 
disagreed among themselves on the early retirement issues and unemployment. 
Employers sided with the government, trade unions were dead set against it. The 
government clashed with social partners over the new SER recommendation on 
disability (WAO).  
Trade unions concluded that that the conditions set for the continuation of wage 
moderation in 2005 had not been met and that therefore the Central Agreement  for 
2005 was null and void. In response the government announced it planned to 
selectively use its powers to declare collective contracts between trade unions and 
employers binding for a whole industry in 2005. Collective decentral agreements 
with wage rises that the government deemed excessive or inappropriate, and in which 
employees would receive more than 170% of their wages during sick leave, would 
not be made binding for a whole sector of industry. In addition, the government 
decided to implement its original agenda for social security reforms and expenditure 
reduction that had been put on hold during negotiations (SIB 9, 2003: 12-21; 11, 
2003: 21; 3, 2004: 24-25; 6, 2004: 13-15; 7/8, 2004: 18; 9, 2004: 12-21; VNO NCW 
Annual Report 2003: 20-21, 2004: 13; FNV 2003: 3; CNV 2003: 35; CNV Annual 
report  200: 13; Bruggeman and van der Houwen 2005: 103- 107; Staatscourant (181) 
21-09-2004: 1; STAR 2005: 4, 7). 
 
2004 Incomes policy 
Government strategy IV - II – (IV) 
Trade union style A - B - (A) 
Employers style B - B – (B) 
Combined style A - B – (A) 
Outcome IIB 
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Bipartite Central Agreement 2004  
Note: For 2004 the bipartite Central Agreement on wage moderation was in force (IIB). The conflict 
between trade unions and the government in Spring 2004 was the start of the negotiations for 2005. 
 
Negotiations for 2004 focused on the government’s binding agenda. As in 2003, after 
lengthy, difficult an sometimes acrimonious negotiations (accompanied with trade 
union actions), in particular between trade unions and the government, social partners 
concluded a bipartite Central Agreement on wage moderation for 2004 and 2005. To 
support the Central Agreement the government in a separate declaration retracted 
most of its projected agenda for 2004 and following years pending further 
negotiations in 2004. These negotiations foundered, trade unions cancelled the 
Central Agreement for 2005 and the government reverted to its original binding 
agenda.
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2005 
 
Negotiations on incomes policy for 2005 were a continuation and repetition of the 
negotiations for 2003 and 2004. Negotiations for 2004 had resulted in a bipartite 
Central Agreement about a wage freeze in 2004 (and 2005) in exchange for 
mitigation of government policies on social security and early retirement. 
Negotiations on these issues, however, foundered in May 2004. The Central 
Agreement on wage moderation for 2005 was subsequently cancelled by trade 
unions. In response, the government reverted to its original agenda (see 2004) and 
also announced it would not declare decentral collective contracts for 2005 binding if 
these contained wage increases or if sick leave benefits would be topped-up to 100% 
in the second year. Wages and benefits in the (semi-) public sector would not be 
increased in 2005 (except for old age pensions) (SIB 2004 (6): 13-15, (9): 11-21). 
Social partners were divided. Employers generally supported the government’s 
agenda (VNO NCW Annual report 2004: 9), trade unions emphatically disagreed and 
decided to organise actions varying from strikes to demonstrations against the 
government’s plans for early retirement in particular during September and October 
2004 when the government’s agenda was officially announced in the annual budget 
and debated in parliament. Trade union actions culminated in the biggest trade union 
demonstration after World War II in Amsterdam on 4 October 2004 in which some 
300,000 people participated (FNV 2005). Apart from the early retirement issue (and 
unemployment and disability legislation) trade unions also demanded a wage rise of 
at maximum 1.25% in 2005, plus an additional 1.75% of wage costs for other issues 
(FNV 2004: 3, 4, 6, 8, 11). 
During and after trade union actions informal negotiations continued between the 
government and trade unions. Finally, as in 2004 and 2003, these negotiations 
resulted in two separate but co-ordinated declarations of social partners and the 
government, on 5 November 2004. The government made concessions with regard to 
the early retirement issue; largely took on board the SER recommendation on 
disability (WAO); delayed its policies with regard to unemployment until a SER 
recommendation due before 1 April 2005 (provided the recommendation delivered 
the same amount of reduction as the government’s original plans); and promised to 
declare decentral collective agreements binding for industries and sectors without a 
fuzz. In return the government expected social partners to exercise the utmost 
restraint with regard to wages. 
Social partners agreed to keep sick leave benefits at 170% of wages during the two-
year period and to focus decentral negotiations on working conditions instead of 
wages now the government had taken over the SER recommendation on disability ( 
SIB 11, 2004: 14-15;  12, 2004: 13-15; 9, 2004: 8-21; VNO NCW Annual Report 
2004: 9; FNV 2005: 92; STAR 2004b, STAR 2005: 4, 9). 
Decentral negotiations resulted in an average wage rise of about 1%, adjustment of 
early retirement schemes and sick pay. Employers complained that trade unions not 
always stuck to the agreed 170% on sick pay; trade unions returned that employers 
were not willing to invest in the prevention of disability and in child care 
arrangements. In April 2005, the SER issued an unanimous recommendation on 
unemployment after some initial disagreements between trades unions and employers 
that was by and large taken over by the government (SIB 2005 (9): 8-21; STAR 
2006: 10, 11). 
During the Spring consultations in July 2005, all actors stressed the need to restore 
mutual trust. Trade unions asked for a reinstatement of the linkage; employers 
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organisations wanted a continuation of structural reforms of the social security 
system, a flexible labour market by making hiring and firing easier, lower company 
taxes and less (government) rules and regulations. The government refused to 
commit itself to either of these issues and pointed out that social partners did not even 
agree amongst themselves or with the government how to get the higher income 
brackets to moderate their incomes as well. In effect, all actors used the opportunity 
to address their own pressing issues. The meeting had a high measure of ritualism 
(STAR 2006: 11; SIB 2005 (7/8): 7-9). 
 
2005 Incomes policy 
Government strategy IV - II 
Trade union style A - B 
Employers style B - B 
Combined style A - B 
Outcome IIB 
Bipartite Central Agreement 
 
After a process of lengthy, difficult and acrimonious negotiations between trade 
unions and the government that was accompanied by significant trade union actions 
social partners concluded a bipartite Central Agreement on wage moderation for 
2005. To support the Central Agreement, in a separate declaration the government 
again  retracted a major part of its projected agenda for 2005 and took on board social 
partners’ compromises on disability and unemployment. Nevertheless, during the 
process (2003-2005), disability and unemployment legislation had been reformed 
significantly; early retirement for people below 55 years of age in 2005 was 
effectively scrapped; and benefits and wages in the (semi-) public sector had become 
delinked from wages in the market sector. Trade unions in particular had only been 
marginally successful in slowing down and warding off the government’s program of 
retrenchment. 
 101 
2006 
 
After three years of declining incomes and consumption (2003-2005) 2006 will yet 
again be a year in which citizens have to dip into their savings to maintain their 
standard of living. Although disposal income is expected to increase with 2,25% and 
inflation only with 1%, and employment will increase slightly as well, all expenditure 
cutbacks of the government Balkenende-II (CDA, VVD, D66) have not resulted in 
lower taxes and premiums. On the contrary, as a percentage of GDP they have 
increased since 2002 and will rise to an expected 41.4% in 2006. Government 
expenditure will increase in 2006, but as the economy is expected to recover, the 
budget deficit will remain stable at 1.8% of GDP and public debt at around 54%, both 
well below EMU norms. Increased government expenditure – 2.500 million Euro - is 
partly used to reinstate the linkage between wages in the market sector and wages, 
benefits and old age pensions in the (semi-)public sector. The wage freeze in the 
(semi-)public sector will be ended as well. The government also intends to restructure 
unemployment insurance in 2006. The maximum duration of a benefit will be 
reduced from 5 to 3 years and two months. Eligibility will be restricted, but the 
benefit itself will be increased from 70% to 75% of previous earnings during the first 
two months. In addition, all tax benefits for early retirement schemes will be 
abolished. Instead, individuals have to save money personally for early retirement or 
leave of absence. Moreover, disability benefits are overhauled as well. Only total and 
enduring disability will qualify for a benefit. Partial disability is met with a 
suppletion on wages paid by the employer. Finally, health insurance will  be 
completely changed in 2006 as well, incurring higher costs for employees and 
employers (NRC Handelsblad 20-09-2005: 3, 5). 
Employers complain that the 2006 budget means higher costs for them (health 
insurance, energy taxes) and argue for a cost reduction for business in general and 
lower unemployment premiums for employers in particular. For trade unions the 
2006 budget does not even come close to repairing the effects of all budget and social 
security cuts since 2002 and demand that health insurance premiums should be linked 
to wages (instead of a set amount) and rising energy prices should be compensated by 
lower taxes (Staatscourant (182) 20-09-2005: 4, 5). 
Employers’ agenda for 2006 includes a rise of total wage costs of a maximum of 
1.5% in order to keep up competitiveness on the world market (VNO-NCW, AWVN 
2005: 11). In general, employers support the government’s program of reforms in 
2006 (see also 2003-2005). 
Trade unions’ agenda for 2006 includes a 2% wage rise plus an additional 1.5% for 
early retirement and child care (SIB 45 (12): 16). The other issues on their agenda 
have all to do with job security, job mobility, education and training, and child care 
and the balance between work and care. Their aim is to increase the workforce to 
prepare for demographic changes and to keep the welfare state intact (FNV 2005a: 4, 
6, 10-13; CNV 2005). 
During the Autumn consultations in October 2005, employment is the central issue 
and the government and social partners agree to prepare for a ‘Job Top’ (Job 
Summit) in November 2005. Employers succeed in getting a reform of the legal 
protection against dismissal of staff on the agenda. For the FNV a reform of dismissal 
procedures is ‘non-negotiable’, but the CNV is prepared to discuss the issue. In 
addition, trade unions demand more government policies to increase buying power, 
but the government refuses to comply (SIB 45 (11): 9, 17; (12): 16-18). 
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The ‘Job Top’ is originally planned for 23 November 2005 but negotiations on extra 
government funding for employment policies initially founder. Trade unions, lead by 
the FNV, demand 150 million Euro from the government, instead of the 40 million 
offered (STAR 2010: 9, 10; SIB 45 (12): 4,5). Ongoing negotiations, a change in 
leadership of the FNV, the CNV and the VNO-NCW, and all participants’ aim to 
better relations between social partners and between social partners and the 
government after the “disastrous year” 2004 during which the trade unions battled 
with the government and employers simply leaned back and watched (STAR 2010: 
10, 11) finally result in a tripartite Central Agreement on 1 December 2005 
(Tripartiete Beleidsinzet op het gebied van scholing en werk – Tripartite Policy 
document for policies regarding education/training and work). The Central 
Agreement covers 30 pages of policies aimed at getting and keeping people in a paid 
job. The government ups its 40 million Euro to 81 million, adds another 35 million 
for traineeships and increases the planned expenditure of 400 million in 2006 and 
2007 for the prevention of pupils dropping out of schools without a diploma with an 
additional 60 million (SIB 45 (12): 4, 5). 
Reform of dismissal procedures is still on the agenda but not addressed as the trade 
unions refuse to open negotiations on the issue. Employers are content for the 
moment as the issue remains on the agenda of consultations between social partners 
and between them and the government. 
Decentral negotiations proceed smoothly. The average wage increase is about 1.5%, 
but 1.7% for new contracts, which is slightly less than trade unions asked for. The 
length of collective agreements decreases from 28 to 19 months, although more than 
half still cover about 24 months. There is an increase in flexible components of 
wages (bonuses and occasional payments), but trade unions succeed in partly 
repairing the wage cut when on sick leave (VNO-NCW, MKB-Nederland, AWVN 
2006: 93-95; CNV 2007). 
The Spring consultations on 9 March 2006 take place on request of social partners in 
order to be able to influence the 2007 budget and discuss the government’s position 
during the EU Spring summit 2006 (STAR 2007: 7). Employers want to stick to the 
SER report on the Services Directive and to further the free movement of employees 
in the EU to fill shortages on the job market and keep the economy growing. Of 
course, these migrant workers should be treated fairly. But trade unions argue against 
the Services Directive due to an EP amendment that leaves out the temporary 
workers (uitzendkrachten) employed by employment agencies. In their view, this 
renders the SER-report obsolete. Trade unions are only willing to accept open 
borders if employees get equal pay for equal work and government expenditure in 
trying to get the long term unemployed into a paid job is continued. The government 
promises to take both points of view into consideration when preparing for the EU 
Summit (STAR 2007: 7-9). 
Relations between social partners and between them and the government have 
ameliorated in 2006 and all parties evaluate the effect of the ‘Job Top’ of 1 December 
2005 as positive (STAR 2007: 5, 19-20). 
 
2006 Incomes policy 
Government strategy II 
Trade union style B 
Employers style B 
Combined style B 
Outcome IIB  
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Tripartite Central Agreement on jobs and 
other employment issues 
In 2006 the relations between social partners and between them and the government 
are slowly mended after the acrimonious years 2003, 2004 and 2005. The improving 
economic conditions and the change in leadership contribute positively to this 
process. The ‘Job Top’ is seen as a new start and positively evaluated by all involved. 
In addition, the linkage has been restored and the wage freeze in the (semi-)public 
sector ended. Nevertheless, trade unions have to accept the irreversibility of the 
government’s reform agenda and employers succeed in getting the dismissal issue on 
the socioeconomic agenda. 
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2007 
 
The government’s agenda for 2007 is prepared by the caretaker government 
Balkenende-III (CDA, VVD) after D66 left the government. During the preparations 
of the 2007 budget, the government and social partners agreed on the funding of child 
care by increasing the unemployment premium paid by employers (STAR 2007: 9). 
Both citizens and employers get a tax reduction of 1,000 million Euro due to lower 
payments to the EU. In addition, the government provides funding for traineeships 
and increases child benefits. Unemployment premiums for employers and employees 
are reduced (except for the child care part). Old age pensions are increased. The 
linkage between wages and benefits is continued. Employers also get a reduction on 
profit taxes. In effect, the government reduces taxes and premiums to fuel an already 
expanding economy (NRC Handelsblad 20-09-2006: 3; NRC.next 20-09-2006: 8; de 
Volkskrant 16:00 19-09-2006: 1; Staatscourant (182) 1909-2006). 
The main issue on employers’ agenda is decentralisation of wages and of terms of 
employment. Wage costs should be tailored to the situation in companies and 
industries: wages should include more individual and competitive components and 
structural wage increases should be limited. Productivity should be increased by 
curtailing the number of holidays. According to employers, the Dutch economy 
profits from increased competitiveness due to lower wage costs and the structural 
reforms of the previous government (VNO-NCW, MKB-Nederland, AWVN 2006: 9, 
12, 15-16). 
Trade unions’ agenda differs slightly on the wage issue. FNV demands a 2.5% wage 
rise plus 0.5% for other issues, the CNV a wage rise between 1.5 (level of expected 
inflation) and 2.5%. All other issues refer again to job security, employability, 
education and training, and the balance between work and care (FNV 2006: 5, 11, 18, 
20; CNV 2006: 7-13). 
After election in November 2006, in February 2007 the new government 
Balkenende-IV (CDA, PvdA, Christian Union - CU) starts. The new government and 
social partners meet for the first time on 27 June 2007, during the ‘Participation Top’ 
(Participation Summit). There was no Spring Consultation as the government had 
other priorities and social partners were at loggerheads about the dismissal issue. This 
disagreement between social partners also delayed the ‘Participation Top’. 
Employers wanted a deal on the issue, trade unions refuse to negotiate and get their 
way; the issue does not feature on the official agenda for the ‘Top’. At the meeting, 
social partners and the government agree on more than 100 policies to get more 
people in paid jobs and increase their employability by education and training. 
Although the reform of dismissal protection was not on the official agenda, CDA 
minister of Social Affairs Donner takes advantage of the fact that the issue is out in 
the open and a bone of contention between social partners. On 3 July 2007 he asks 
social partners for their advice on his projected dismissal reform in 2008. Social 
partners are requested to deliver their opinion before 1 September 2007 in order to 
include that policy in the 2008 budget. On 30 August 2007 social partners deliver 
their divided opinions: employers support the government’s plans, trade unions are 
against. In the mean time, the government and social partners finally succeed to agree 
on the implementation of the EU Services Directive (see 2006) (STAR 2008: 5, 7-9, 
11; STAR 2010: 29-32, 37, 41, 42). 
Decentral negotiations on collective agreements proceed smoothly. Trade unions by 
and large get their way with wages, on average a structural increase of 2.6%, but the 
number of agreements with flexible wage components does increase as well. The 
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duration of collective agreements remains stable with 20 months on average (VNO-
NCW, AWVN, MKB 2008: 117-120). 
 
2007 Incomes policy 
Government strategy I-II-(IV dismissal issue) 
Trade union style B (A-dismissal issue) 
Employers style B (B-dismissal issue) 
Combined style B 
Outcome IIB  
Tripartite Central Agreement on jobs and 
other employment issues 
 
In 2007 the government is relatively inactive. The 2007 budget is prepared by the 
caretaker government Balkenende-III (CDA, VVD). The new government 
Balkenende-IV (CDA, PvdA, CU) only starts in February 2007. As social partners 
disagree on the dismissal issue, the “Participation Top’ that builds on the ‘Job Top’of 
2006 is postponed to June 2007. Although trade unions succeed in keeping the issue 
of dismissal of the official agenda of the meeting, CDA minister of Social Affairs 
uses the opportunity to get it on the agenda again by asking social partners’ advice on 
his projected policies for 2008. In conclusion, relations between social partners and 
between social partners and the government are improving further (especially after 
the change of government), but trade unions have to accept that the dismissal issue 
has been firmly put on the socioeconomic agenda. First by employers and now also 
by the government. 
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2008 
 
The first proper budget of the government Balkenende-IV (CDA, PvdA, CU)  
contains more expenditures than cutbacks based on higher taxes and premiums 
(except for unemployment). The government expects this will negatively affect 
buying power. Only very specific groups – people on  a minimum wage or benefit 
and low income families – will retain their buying power whereas economic growth 
is expected to reach 2.5%. The linkage remains intact, but the government announces 
further policies to make dismissals of redundant staff more easier. The general aim 
for this governmental period is to achieve a positive budget for all four years in order 
to reduce public debt to 37% of GDP in 2011 (from around 54% in 2006). The aim 
for 2008 is a public debt of 45%. But in 2008 half of the reduced deficit and debt is 
due to higher prices for natural gas that follow higher oil prices and flow into the 
treasury. And the first sign of economic problems ahead – an expected conjunctural 
dip – already show up (NRC Handelsblad 18-09-2007: 1, 10-11; FD 19-09-2007: 3; 
Staatscourant (180) 18-09-2007). 
Except for the dismissal issue, trade unions are positive about the government’s 
budget. The government has taken quite a few policies on board that were agreed 
upon during the ‘Participation Top’ in June 2007. Only the MHP is worries about the 
negative effects of the budget on middle and high income earners. Employers on the 
other hand are quite critical and accuse the government of damaging the economy. 
The new health insurance law (as of 1 January 2006) entails extra costs for 
employers, the reduction of unemployment premiums is much too little and VAT will 
be increased. Less buying power means jobs will disappear  (Staatscourant (180) 18-
09-2007). 
The employers agenda for 2008 is partly driven by the expected economic dip in 
2008 and by the first signs of what will become the full-blown credit crunch of 2009. 
Improving adaptability to improve competitiveness is their main concern. Employers 
stress that employees need to increase their employability by education and training. 
More people have to enter the labour market to cater for looming shortages due to 
demographic changes. Older employees should be kept employed. Working hours 
and working time have to be tailored to company needs. Due to government policies 
and low unemployment wage costs in 2008 are expected to increase with some 
4.25% (3.25% wage increase and 2.25% inflation) and this jeopardizes 
competitiveness of Dutch business on the world market (VNO-NCW, AWVN, MKB-
Nederland 2008: 7, 11-12). 
Trade unions again differ slightly on the issue of wages. The FNV demands a 3.5% 
wage rise plus 0.5% for all other issues (including all policies related to jobs); the 
CNV demands at least 2% and a maximum of 1.5% for other issues, to be decided on 
the decentral level. Like in 2007, employment is the central issue on the agenda. Job 
security, employability, education and training, jobs for the disadvantaged, and the 
balance between work and care are the main issues. Both unions reject any reform of 
the legal protection against dismissal (FNV 2007: 4-21, 23, 25; CNV 2007: 19-20, 
24, 30, 34). 
There is no Autumn consultation between the government and social partners in 2007 
to discuss each other’s agendas for 2008 as the government almost foundered on the 
dismissal issue that had been put on the socioeconomic agenda by CDA minister of 
Social Affairs Donner during the summer of 2007. Both the PvdA and the CU 
rejected the CDA minister’s projected reform policies. By way of political 
compromise in December 2007 a committee of experts was installed to investigate 
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possible alternatives to making dismissal of redundant employees more easy for 
employers in order to increase the number of people with paid jobs. The committee 
was headed by TNT (privatized Royal Mail) CEO Bakker and the members were 
nicely divided over the main parties involved14
Decentral negotiations on collective contracts proceed smoothly again. The average 
wage rise is about 3.2% or more or less what trade unions had demanded. In addition, 
most collective contracts include agreements on (re)integration of sick or disabled 
employees, on employability of employees (mainly training and education), and, after 
a steady decline between 2005 and 2006, also on employment issues (SZW 2009: I-
IV). 
 (NRC Handelsblad 27-02 2008, 16-
06-2008). 
During the Spring consultation in April 2008 the expected (conjunctural) economic 
downturn at the end of 2008 is the main issue. The government wants to forestall a 
wage-price-spiral and does not increase VAT as planned in the 2008 budget. This is 
gladly accepted by social partners. The other issues all have to do with employment: 
discrimination of ethnic minorities on the labour market, getting the long term 
unemployed and the disadvantaged into jobs and making it easier to continue 
working after reaching the official retirement age (65) (STAR 2009: 5, 7). 
In June 2008 the committee Bakker issues its report to get and keep more people 
in(to) jobs. The committee proposes a reform of the unemployment insurance system 
and to increase the retirement age from 65 to 67 to get an additional 400,000 people 
in a job. Redundant staff has to be kept on the payroll for at least six months in which 
both employer and employee both have to do their best to find a new job for the 
redundant staff. Only if that has been the case and no new job has been found, 
employees qualify for unemployment benefits, but for a shorter period of time than 
the present 3 years. In addition, the committee offers an extensive list of other 
measures, short and long term, to achieve the aim of an additional 400,000 jobs. 
According to the committee the dismissal issue is not really relevant as in the coming 
decades staff shortages will be the main issue, not getting rid of redundant staff (NRC 
Handelsblad 16-06-2008). 
The reactions to the report are mixed, but neither social partners, nor the government 
are completely content with the report. Trade unions are not happy with a shorter 
period of unemployment benefits or with increasing the retirement age and call upon 
the government to finance the other policies proposed by the committee. Employers 
agree with the increased retirement age, but not with keeping redundant staff on the 
payroll for another six months and also call upon the government to make sure that 
the policies proposed by the committee do not increase their costs and administrative 
burdens. Government party CDA rejects the proposed increase of the retirement age 
(NRC Handelsblad 16-06-2008). 
During the summer of 2008 VNO-NCW approaches the FNV to find a way out of the 
impasse. In view of the gradually worsening economic conditions, both agree to let 
the dismissal issue rest for the remainder of this government term. They do agree to 
cap severance payments. Employees with an annual salary of Euro 75,000 or more 
can get at most one year severance pay with a maximum of 75,000 (STAR 2009: 5). 
Only at a later stage were CNV and MHP informed over this proposed pacification of 
                                            
14 Economics professor Bovenberg (CDA), Sociology professor Ester (CU), Chairman of the CWI 
(National organisations of labour exchanges) De Groot (PvdA), Social Law professor Klosse 
(unknown), Chairman of the Erasmus University Rotterdam Oosterwijk (VVD), Rotterdam Alderman 
Schrijer (PvdA) and ex- chairman of the CNV Westerlaken (CDA) (NRC Handelsblad 16-06-2008) 
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the dismissal issue. At first, the CNV opposed the compromise, but later acquiesced . 
The MHP remained opposed as the compromise targeted their constituency. 
The compromise cleared the way for a combined approach of the credit crunch that 
started in September 2008 with the Lehman Brothers insolvency. Both the 
compromise and the looming economic crisis had a positive impact on the relations 
between social partners (STAR 2009: 5; STAR 2010: 44-47). 
 
 
2008 Incomes policy 
Government strategy I-II-III 
Trade union style B-C 
Employers style B-C 
Combined style B-C 
Outcome IIC  
Pacification of dismissal issue 
 
The main bone of contention in 2008 is the dismissal issue, both within the 
government and between social partners. The report of the committee Bakker did not 
provide a solution that all actors could agree upon. In view of the looming crisis the 
government decides not to increase VAT, and, on the initiative of the employers, 
social partners agree to a pacification of the dismissal issue. 
 109 
2009 
 
Economic forecasts by the CPB for 2009 are bleak indeed. The credit crunch is 
expected to result in a negative economic growth of at least 3.5% of GDP. 
Unemployment is expected to rise from 3.9% to 5.5% by the end of 2009 and some 
8.75% in 2010. Almost all pension funds got into difficulties as well due to the crash 
of stocks and bonds (STAR 2010: 5, 15). The original government budget for 2009 
featured extra expenditures of some 2,500 million Euro to combat the effects of the 
economic crisis. This included a reduction of unemployment benefit premiums for 
employers and no premiums to be paid at all by employees. The projected VAT 
increase is cancelled as well. The government also claims to have taken on board all 
employment measures recommended by the committee Bakker. Despite higher 
expenditure the budget surplus remains at 1.3% and public debt will get below 40% 
of GDP. Despite keeping the linkage intact, old age pensioners and people living on 
benefits will experience a slight decrease in buying power (Elsevier 20-09-2008; 
NRC.next 16-09-2008; NRC Handelsblad 16-09-2008). 
Social partners are positive about the budget. They appreciate that VAT will not be 
increased. Trade unions criticize the condition set by the government that 
unemployment premiums will only be reduced and relinquished if and when trade 
unions agree to wage moderation. The order should, in their view, be reversed: trade 
unions decide their wage demands on the basis of the government’s budget. Now 
trade unions announce they will wait with their wage demands until it is clear 
whether or not the government will indeed lower and do away with unemployment 
premiums. In addition, trade unions are concerned about the expected reduction in 
buying power of pensioners and people living on benefits. Employers appreciate the 
government’s intention to reduce financial burdens on business, but also request a 
reduction in what they view as ‘strangling’ administrative burdens (FD 15-09-2008; 
NRC Handelsblad 16-09-2008). 
Employers agenda for 2009 is by and large comparable to that of 2008: no increase in 
wage costs to keep competitiveness up, to increase adaptability of firms and 
employees to cope with the crisis and extra government expenditure and other 
policies to keep businesses going and people at work (VNO-NCW, AWVN, MKB 
Nederland 2009). 
Trade unions agendas for 2009 are completely driven by the continuously increasing 
economic crisis. The FNV launches several economic recovery plans to tackle the 
crisis. These plans are all focused on keeping a) as much people as possible in their 
jobs by all possible means including additional government expenditure, and b) 
buying power of both wage earners and people on benefits intact by a reduction of 
taxes and premiums (FNV 2008a; FNV 2008b; FNV 2009). Together with CNV and 
MHP the FNV proposes massive additional government expenditure to keep 
employment and incomes intact (FNV, CNV, MHP 2009). As customary, FNV and 
CNV differ slightly on the level of wage demands. Based on the tripartite Autumn 
Agreement (October 2008) the FNV goes for a 3.5% wage increase in 2009 (FNV 
2008a; SIB 48(11): 10-11), whereas CNV wants at least 1.5% (inflation) and 3.5% at 
most (CNV 2008: 21). 
The economic crisis induces the government and social partners to conclude a 
tripartite Autumn Agreement (Najaarsakkoord) on 7 October 2008 (Samen doen wat 
mogelijk is – Doing together what is possible). The government reduces 
unemployment premiums for employers and scraps them for employees, and does not 
increase VAT in 2009. Social partners agree to do their utmost to avoid a wage-price-
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spiral, i.e. agree to a ‘responsible wage cost development’. Together the government 
and social partners reaffirm their commitment to all previous agreements on getting 
and keeping more people in(to) paid jobs. The pacification of the dismissal issue 
between social partners (see 2008) is also part of the agreement (SIB 48(10): 10-11; 
STAR 2009: 5-8). 
As the economic crisis intensifies and also comes to include a banking crisis (the 
government has to bail out several banks and insurance companies), the government 
decides on 24 March 2009 to implement a series of additional policies in 2009 and 
2010 to keep unemployment low. The government package was completed after 
lengthy negotiations between the coalition parties to amend the original government 
agreement and between the government and social partners on their reciprocal 
commitments. The package is in effect an almost classical Keynesian approach to 
counter the economic crisis. It includes an additional government expenditure of 
3,000 million Euro in 2009 and in 2010 as well. All policies are aimed at keeping 
unemployment as low as possible by extra expenditure to prevent youth 
unemployment, to foster education and training, to increase economic sustainability, 
increase investments in infrastructure and the building industry, and so on. The 
package also includes the measures already announced in the original 2009 budget. 
In addition to the central government, local authorities are also expected to spend an 
additional 1,500 million Euro in 2009 and 2010 by moving forward planned 
maintenance and infrastructural expenditure to 2009 and 2010. The expected 
increased expenditures for unemployment benefits – 1,000 million in 2009, 4,000 
million in 2010 and 4,500 million in 2011 – shall not be met with equivalent cuts of 
the government’s budget. Other additional expenditures (an estimated 3,700 million 
Euro), however, will be met with equal cuts to maintain budget discipline, as will the 
extra interest costs for the increased expenditures in 2009 and 2010 (an estimated 
1,800 million in 2011). Finally, the government introduces an increase in the legal 
retirement age from 65 to 67 years (Werken aan toekomst – Working on future; 
STAR 2010: 5). 
Based on the additional government package government and social partners 
conclude a tripartite Social Agreement (Sociaal Akkoord) on 25 March 2009 to cover 
2009 and 2010. The government will implement the proposed additional government 
policies and expenditures, social partners will do their utmost to get and keep as 
much people in paid jobs and agree to wage moderation in 2009 to be able to keep 
the linkage intact. The aim is to preserve buying power of all groups in society.  
Two issues create problems, one regards the timeframe for reparation schemes for 
pension funds. CDA minister of Social Affairs wants to stick to the period of three 
years prescribed by law, social partners, who run the pension funds, want an 
extension to five years and get their way in the end. The other issue is the increase of 
the legal retirement age from 65 to 67. The government agrees not to implement this 
age increase if social partners come up with an alternative that yields the same 
amount of expenditure savings before 1 October 2009. However, social partners do 
not succeed in coming to an agreement on this issues. Intervention by Crown-
members of the SER are of no avail. According to trade unions employers brake off 
negotiations on 30 September 2009, the latest possible moment. As a result, relations 
between trade unions and employers become quite soured (STAR 2010: 5, 7, 8; SZW 
25-03-2009; STAR 25-03-2009; STAR 2010a: 49, 56, 57; Smag 49(11): 4-6; FNV-
AOW; FNV-Sociaal Akkoord). 
Decentral negotiations in the mean time proceed smoothly. Wage rises in 2009 are on 
average 2.8%, but collective agreements concluded after 25 March 2009 feature on 
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average only a 1% wage rise. Clauses on reintegration of sick or disabled employees, 
on employability and on other measures regarding employment are included in an 
increasing number of collective agreements (SZW 2010: I-IV). 
 
 
2009 Incomes policy 
Government strategy II-III 
Trade union style B-C 
Employers style B-C-A 
Combined style B-C-A 
Outcome IIIA  
Despite two tripartite agreements 
(October 2008 and March 2009) 2009 
ends with social partners at loggerheads 
regarding the retirement age 
 
The economic crisis induces the government and social partners to conclude two 
tripartite Central Agreements based on a Keynesian government expenditure package 
to maintain employment and businesses. Nevertheless, social partner cannot agree on 
the retirement age issue and relations between them deteriorate considerably. 
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2010 
 
The government’s agenda for 2010 is based on the package of additional expenditure 
decided upon on 24 March 2009. For 2010 some 3,000 million Euro will be spent in 
an effort to keep unemployment low. At the same time, the government slightly 
increases taxes and premiums (health insurance) to generate some additional revenue. 
Real expenditure cuts are postponed to 2011. The effects on the budget in 2010 will 
be a deficit of some 6.3% of GDP. Lower tax revenue, higher expenditures and 
especially the bail out of banks and insurance companies will add an additional 10-
11% to public debt that is expected to increase to 65.8% of GDP. Unemployment will 
rise to 8%. Buying power of all groups will only slightly go down with 0.25%. The 
linkage will remain intact as part of the tripartite Social Agreement of 25 March 
2009. Despite all extra expenditure, the economy in 2009 is expected to shrink with 
an unprecedented 4,75%, but on the whole buying power in 2009 and 2010 is not 
negatively affected (NRC.next 16-09-2009; NRC Handelsblad 11-09-2009, 12-09-
2009, 13-09-2009; MEV: 7-10). 
Employers are positive about the government’s budget for 2010, considering the 
extraordinary depth of the economic crisis that was exacerbated by the financial 
crisis. The retirement age is on the agenda due to the crisis, the government has 
reacted wiftly by making part-time redundancy possible to keep employees at work 
and the additional expenditure does help (some) businesses to survive. The 
competitiveness of businesses is also stabilized as the government does not increase 
costs for businesses (FD 15-09-2009; NRC.next 16-09-2009). 
Trade unions are slightly less positive. The government’s package of additional 
expenditure (24 March 2009) was exactly what was needed to avoid deepening the 
crisis. The bail out of banks and insurance companies was unavoidable and swiftly 
done. PvdA minister of Finance Bos saved the banks. But after these swift initial 
crisis policies, the government seems to hesitate and to act only symbolically. No 
policies to counter excessive bonuses and short term thinking in the financial sector. 
The initial reaction of CDA minister of Social Affairs to joint policy plans of social 
partners is lukewarm. He takes too much time for a positive reaction, like with the 
part-time redundancy scheme (FD 15-09-2009). 
Employers’ agenda for 2010 aims at countering the effects of the crisis and preparing 
for the period after (structural shortages on the labour market due to demographic 
changes). Wages should not be increased. In general the stability and recovery of 
businesses should be the main aim of negotiations on wages and other terms of 
employment, as was agreed in the Social Agreement of 25 March 2009. A zero wage 
increase also keeps the linkage intact. Employers specifically criticize the FNV for 
not sticking to a zero wage increase. The government should also lower costs for 
businesses in order to keep up competitiveness, innovation, productivity and 
adaptability of businesses in the long term. Jobs should have priority over wages and 
employees should increase their employability and flexibility (VNO, MKB-
Nederland, AWVN 2009a: 7-10). 
Trade unions agendas for 2010 are a continuation of their joint program of early 
2009. The main issue is to keep people at work and buying power of wage earners 
and people on pensions and benefits stable. For the period 2009-2013, the FNV 
issues a new ‘master’ plan in September 2009 which is essentially a recycled version 
of most of their previous plans (FNV September 2009). The CNV’s agenda is by and 
large the same. In line with tradition, both trade unions differ slightly with reagrd to 
their wage demands: the FNV demands 1.25% for wages and 1.25% fo all other 
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(employment) issues and threatens to up its wage demand to 2% if employers refuse 
to invest in employment policies; the CNV issues a wage demand of 1% and another 
1% for employment issues (FNV 2009a: 2; CNV 2009: 6).  
Despite their deteriorated relations due to the failed agreement on the retirement age 
(see 2009), social partners together ask the government to extend the part-time 
redundancy policy. In December 2009, the government and social partners conduct 
their joint evaluation of the measures agreed upon during the Participation Top of 27 
June 2007 and reaffirm their commitment to the implementation of these policies. 
In the mean time, the government is internally divided over the continuation of the 
military mission in Afghanistan. In the night of 19 to 20 February 2010, the issue 
comes to a head: the government Balkenende-IV (CDA, PvdA, CU) ends when the 
PvdA ministers step down. The caretaker government of CDA and CU start 
preparations for general elections to be held on 9 June 2010. This means that on the 
political level socio- and macroeconomic decision-making comes to a standstill. Only 
policies already accepted by parliament are implemented, no new decisions are taken. 
Social partners use this political lull to reconcile their differences on the retirement 
age and conclude a Pension Agreement (Pensioen Akkoord) on 4 June 2010, a few 
days before the general elections. The main items of the agreement are: the 
retirement age will increase from 65 to 66 in 2020; the state pension will be made 
flexible (i.e. retirement at 65 after 2020 is still possible but with a 6.5% lower 
pension – retirement after 66 will deliver a 6.5% higher pension); company and 
industry pensions will also be flexible (the earlier the retirement the lower the 
pension and vice versa); and the state pension will be linked to real wage increases 
(FNV Pensioen Akkoord a and b; STAR Pensioen Akkoord; STAR 2010: 57). 
Decentral negotiations again proceed smoothly. The average wage rise in 2010 is 1% 
(down from 2.7% in 2009), the number of contracts with clauses on flexible wage 
systems increases to 94% (company contracts) and 73% (industry contracts), but 
clauses on employability and employment issues in general remain stable. Wages 
during illness are only topped up to between 170 and 200% of the original wage over 
two years in about half the contracts (SZW 2010a). 
 
2010 Incomes policy 
Government strategy II-I 
Trade union style B-C 
Employers style A-B-C 
Combined style C 
Outcome IC  
Pension Agreement between social 
partners 
 
Despite initially soured relations between social partners due to the failed agreement 
on the retirement age, social partners patch up their differences and use the political 
lull in socio- and macroeconomic decision-making after the demise of the 
government Balkenende-IV in February 2010 to come to a bipartite Pension 
Agreement in June 2010, just before the general elections.
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